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PREFACE 
"The best laid plans of mice and men ... " My employment between March, 1987 
and November, 1988 was more than a job - it was an experience. Hillcrest Health Center, 
like other hospitals nationwide, was looking for answers. The rapidly changing hospital 
environment concerned administrators who understood that fundamental changes were 
occurring but didn't know how to respond. This shifting environment created the ideal 
conditions for health care consultants to flourish. In July, 1987, Hillcrest decided to use a 
prominent health care consulting group to implement an ambitious Physician Support 
Network consisting of eight major programs, all of which were to be installed in 12 
months. What followed was a classic study in organizational upheaval. As the person 
responsible for development and implementation, I wish to pass on to others the lessons 
learned from this arduous ordeal. 
I want to thank Dr. Raymond Fisk, my major advisor, for his excellent guidance 
and unceasing encouragement on this project. His ongoing critique was invaluable. In 
addition, I am indebted to Cynthia Gray for her patient counsel on my degree requirements. 
Finally, I want to thank all of the professors who invested their time in my education at 
Oklahoma State University. 
I wish to express my sincere appreciation to the many employees at Hillcrest Health 
Center who helped me amass the facts necessary to complete this case study. In particular, 
I am deeply grateful to Mr. James Maccallum who hired me, supported me and encouraged 
me in this project. Special thanks are also due to Pete Thibeault, my friend and compatriot 
at Hillcrest with whom I frequently disagreed yet always respected. 
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This thesis would not have been possible without the continuing help and "inside 
information" provided by the current and former staff members of the Marketing department 
at Hillcrest: Teresa Brekke, Nicholas Hahalis, and Betty Overstreet. The information about 
the inner turmoil in Data Processing provided by Gary McElwee and Glenna Coultas was 
indispensable. A special thank you belongs to Cathy Adams for furnishing candid 
information about the administrative drama so necessary for this case study. I am also 
grateful to Dr. Leon Silvers for providing an eyewitness historical account of Hillcrest and 
to Mr. Mike Bernstein for recounting the history of Professional Marketing Consultants, Inc. 
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CHAPrER I 
HILLCREST HEALTH CENTER 
Background 
From its beginnings in 1955 as a tiny 18 bed hospital, Hillcrest Health Center has 
had a long and colorful history. Allopathic (M.D.) physicians unintentionally played a 
crucial role in the decision to establish Hillcrest.1 
In the 1950s, allopathic physicians generally held the view that osteopathic (D.0.) 
physicians were "second class" physicians who were trained at inferior medical schools by 
practitioners who advocated unproven methods of treatment. Osteopathic physicians could 
not receive payments from many insurance companies including Blue Cross/Blue Shield as a 
direct result of pressure from the M.D. community.2 As a consequence, there was a fair 
amount of malice between the two branches of medicine. 
However, the greatest problem this conflict caused for the osteopathic physician 
concerned hospitalization. All of the hospitals in Oklahoma City and the surrounding 
communities were strictly controlled by M.D.s. When the patient of a D.O. needed to be 
hospitalized, the D.O. had to literally "dump" their patient on an M.D. who had admitting 
privileges at a local hospital. The allopathic physician would generally not consult with the 
D.O. and would never allow the D.0. to be an attending physician. Frequently, the M.D. 
physician would try to persuade the patient to switch to his practice for other medical 
needs. 
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Several events took place in 1955 that finally convinced a small group of 12 
osteopathic physicians to establish a hospital with an osteopathic orientation. One D.O. 
took his patient to the emergency room at Baptist Hospital in Oklahoma City with acute 
appendicitis. Upon arrival he was treated rudely, told that they would perfonn ap original 
diagnosis to find out what the problem was and that his advice was not needed. Dr. Leon 
Silvers related that he had made prior arrangements with Hubbard Hospital in Oklahoma 
City to bring an obstetrics patient in for delivery. When that day arrived, he called the 
hospital only to be infonned that the hospital was completely full and no beds were 
available. The hospital census was actually about 50%, according to Dr. Silvers. He then 
took his patient to an El Reno hospital 28 miles away for delivery. 
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After these events, a small group of D.O.s met and the decision was unanimous: an 
osteopathic hospital must be built In all, 12 physicians pooled their resources for the 
project The three original incorporators were: Leon Silvers, D.0., Richard Almquist, D.O., 
and Fred Erhardt, D.O. They purchased the land at Southwest 59 and Pennsylvania in 
south Oklahoma City and began construction on the first hospital in south Oklahoma City 
and the second osteopathic hospital in the state. 
The physicians developed a unique system for detennining the amount of investment 
required from each D.0. based upon the approximate :financial value of the hospital to each 
specialty. General Practice physicians who wanted admitting privileges were required to 
invest $1,500 dollars. If they wished to also perfonn minor surgery at Hillcrest, the fee 
rose to $5 ,000 dollars. Likewise, the fee for an Anesthesiologist was $2,500 dollars and the 
highest fee of $15,000 dollars was required from the Surgeon. Surprisingly, there was little 
opposition to this schedule. 
The hospital name, Hillcrest Osteopathic Hospital (HOH), was chosen as a 
suggestion from one of the incorporators. It seemed to be an innocuous name that 
"sounded good." 
When the hospital construction was completed in 1955, its 18 beds were filled 
almost immediately. The osteopathic physicians delayed elective hospitalizations until the 
hospital opened causing a severe bed shortage. The physicians would meet regularly to 
discuss their patient's hospitalization needs and would agree among themselves the order in 
which patients would be admitted. 
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With the addition of a second general surgeon in 1957, Hillcrest expanded to 24 
beds. In 1960, the hospital again expanded to 65 beds. With the help of a federal Hill-
Burton grant in 1962, Hillcrest remodeled, added two new floors and expanded to 102 beds. 
By 1974, the census was consistently high enough to require an expansion to 148 beds. 
When Mr. Maccallum gained approval for a Behavioral Medicine Center (alcohol, chemical 
dependency and psychiatric disorders) in 1984, the hospital expanded to its present capacity 
of 186 licensed beds. 
When Mr. Maccallum began as administrator in 1982, he felt strongly that Hillcrest 
Osteopathic Hospital needed a new identity. In 1986 he proposed a name change to 
Hillcrest Health Center which was conditionally approved. The Board of Directors approved 
the name change but many physicians opposed the idea. Therefore, true to fonn, he 
authorized a gradual name change. To this day, many of the fonns and brochures still read 
"Hillcrest Osteopathic Hospital", the sign in front of the hospital reads "Hillcrest Hospital" 
which is also the way the switchboard answers the telephone! 
Osteopathic Emphasis 
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From its inception, Hillcrest Osteopathic Hospital was to have a distinctly 
osteopathic emphasis. Its active and associate medical staffs were restricted to D.O.s, M.D.s 
being allowed on the non-voting, non-influential courtesy staff only. 
But what exactly is an osteopathic emphasis? To many on the outside, an 
osteopathic emphasis connotes a skepticism of new medical advances, an aversion to 
medications, a certain defensiveness about osteopathic medical practice, and a question about 
osteopathic medical training. 2 This is not surprising considering that Osteopathy was 
founded by Dr. Andrew Still in 1874 primarily because of his disenchantment with medical 
practice at that time and with drugs in particular.3 Unquestionably, the negative position 
exhibited by the American Medical Association toward osteopathy before 1968 influenced 
the opinions of many. Compounding the problem, the osteopathic community did little to 
refute this impression. Beyond the competent practice of medicine, osteopathic physicians 
and hospitals did not engage in a concerted public relations campaign designed to present a 
more positive perspective of osteopathy.'~ So, the negative viewpoint remains in the minds 
of a significant segment of the American public. 
To a D.0., and to the administration of an osteopathic hospital, an osteopathic 
emphasis traditionally should consist of several definitive distinctions. In the book The 
Difference a D.O. Makes, author Bob Jones maintains the most important difference is that: 
" ... the D.O. has been conditioned to view the person as a whole. It becomes 
second nature for the osteopathic physician to consider all the implications of the 
diagnosis and the treatment He evaluates the specific illness or injury and the 
treatment that is to be administered in a context of the "whole person." He gives 
careful consideration to the effect that the treatment for that specific problem will 
have upon all the body systems. He is taught to look for the cause of disease and 
not just treat the symptom of disease."5 
He contends the second most important difference is the training the osteopathic physician 
receives in manipulative therapy which "is valuable in treating dysfunctions of the 
musculoskeletal system that may affect other body systems. "6 
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Reality, however, tends to refute the first and reinforce the second. At Hillcrest, the 
notion that a D.O. treats a patient differently than an M.D. in evaluation and diagnosis was 
given official support and unofficial derision. Numerous physicians told this writer that, in 
actuality, there is no difference in diagnosis or treatment between M.D.s and D.O.s. 
Physicians often joked about this assertion, recognizing its inherent ridicule of the allopathic 
branch of medicine. Likewise, members of the hospital administration did not take this 
"advantage" seriously. It possibly originated from an attempt to favorably position 
osteopaths and to excuse the lack of specialization in osteopathy. 
The second "distinction" is much more important Osteopathic manipulative therapy 
(OMT) has been recognized as a treatment for certain musculo-skeletal injuries (especially 
affecting the back or spine) for many years.7 This is a particular advantage to osteopathic 
physicians because back injuries constitute 21 % of all on-the-job injuries in Oklahoma.8 
M.D.s do not receive similar training in their basic medical education. Therefore, 
osteopathic physicians (especially general practitioners) do have a very significant advantage 
in the treatment of their patients, which the allopathic community has chosen not to 
duplicate. 
But osteopathic physicians have allowed even this genuine advantage to be nullified. 
Because of their overwhelming fear of any comparison with chiropractors, they almost 
completely deemphasize their one real strength. Most osteopathic physicians believe that 
their understanding of manipulation techniques and limitations far exceeds that of a 
chiropractor (primarily because it is supported by a medical education), yet they have 
allowed chiropractors to vastly out-marlcet them to the point that back injury treatment is 
automatically associated with chiropractors. 
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In a survey of physicians at Hillcrest conducted by the Marketing department in 1988, only 
30% of the physicians still perfonn OMT. Of those who still perfonn OMT, it only 
. comprises an average of 10% of their practice. 
Organizational Structure 
Knowledge of the organizational structure and a profile of several key managers is an 
important foundation for understanding the reasons behind the development and outcome of 
the 1987-88 marketing initiative. 
Hillcrest Health Center's organizational structure is a product of unintended 
evolution. It is somewhat unusual because there is no president of the hospital. The 
highest administrative office is Executive Vice President. This matter evolved as a result of 
an inordinately involved Board of Directors which never felt compelled to vest decision-
making power in an office of president. 
Below the Executive Vice President are the Directors of the hospital. Again, there 
is some confusion because though there are officially six directors, many other positions 
share the title of "Director." The six directors that comprise the Administrative Advisory 
Committee are: Director of Nursing, Director of Human Resources, Director of Marketing, 
Chief Financial Officer, Director of Support Services and the Director of the Behavioral 
Medicine Center. These individuals, along with the Executive Vice President and the 
Executive Assistant, meet on a regular basis to discuss policy and fonnulate strategy for the 
hospital. Though from an overall decision-making aspect directors are above department 
managers, they receive the same benefits as department managers and are not otherwise 
differentiated. 
As noted above, department managers are below directors yet receive identical 
benefits. There are about 38 department managers at Hillcrest, ranging from Director of 
Volunteers to Director of Infonnation Services (Data Processing). Only a few department 
managers substantially affect the overall direction of the hospital. 
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Below the department managers are the supervisors. Supervisors, unlike department 
managers, must actually oversee the perfonnance of others. This adds to the confusion 
because a department manager can have one person in his department yet have more 
authority than a supervisor of 20 people. At one point, Marketing consisted of four 
department managers and one employee! Obvious feelings of inequity resulted. 
Finally, below the supervisors were employees. Most employees punched a time 
clock unless they consistently worked overtime at which time they could be switched to a 
salary basis. The key management personnel who played influential roles in this project 
were: 
James M. MacCallum. Executive Vice President 
James Maccallum (herein referred to as "Mr. Maccallum") was the "visionary" 
behind the marketing project. He was an aggressive leader who utilized a diplomatic style 
with a high degree of success. Though he often seemed low key in his approach, he would 
nevertheless take risks if he determined the potential rewards were exceptional. It is not an 
overstatement to say that after five years of management, Mr. Maccallum developed not a 
single enemy. He strived to motivate every individual in administration and was respected 
by the medical staff as well. 
When confronted with a dispute between two managers, he often took one of two 
courses. Either he would do nothing and delay the decision or he would try to satisfy both 
with an unworkable plan. He avoided confrontation to an excessive degree and usually 
preferred to wait for the situation to force a change. Many times when funds needed to be 
expended to correct a damaging situation, he would allow the situation to languish 
indefinitely. 
Cathy Adams. Executive Assistant 
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Cathy Adams was frequently referred to as the "glue" that held Hillcrest Health 
Center together. As Mr. Maccallum' s secretary, she welded considerable influence over his 
agenda and over the entire administrative office. Cathy scheduled and supervised the 
administrative secretaries, a pool which several directors utilized. She was organized, 
intelligent, and calm under pressure. 
G. Peter Thibeault. Chief Financial Officer 
G. Peter Thibeault (herein referred to as "Pete") was probably the most talented 
individual in the administration. He was exceptionally adept with complex financial matters 
which required original solutions. In addition, he had a good grasp of marketing and was, 
in fact, a marketing oriented person. His admiration for Tom Peters knew no bounds. (He 
personally paid for a copy of Peter's book "Thriving on Chaos" for each of his managers.) 
Pete's unassailable integrity was undergirded by his devout Christian faith. More than any 
other individual, Mr. Maccallum relied on Pete for advice on any decision that affected 
Hillcrest financially. Rarely, if ever, did Mr. Maccallum contradict an opinion Pete 
provided. 
Pete did an excellent job motivating· his managers. However, his greatest weakness 
was his inability to fire an obviously poor manager. He simply avoided confrontation 
requiring this type of action. This weakness would have an critical affect on the marketing 
project. 
Wanda Lewellen. Director of Human Resources 
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Wanda Lewellen (herein referred to as "Wanda"), a high school graduate originally 
hired as a general secretary shortly before the hospital opened in 1955, has demonstrated an 
amazing ability to adapt to changes, grow into positions for which she had little training 
and relat~ well with physicians. Wanda, by virtue of her desire to succeed and her 
assertiveness, steadily advanced through the hospital ranks, gaining power and prestige. 
When the previous administrator left his position, the Board of Directors appointed Wanda 
as Interim Administrator, a position she held for nine months before the arrival of Mr. 
Maccallum. 
In addition to her position as Director of Human Resources, she serves on the 
corporate Board of Directors. Among hospital employees, the unwritten rule was: NEVER 
offend Wanda Lewellen. Administration employees understand her ability to wield a great 
deal of power and most attempt to gain her favor. 
Because Wanda directly supervised the worlc of the outside public relations agency 
before a marketing department existed, she was very interested in the marketing and public 
relations projects undertaken by the hospital. 
Eddie Wiseman. Data Processing Manager 
Eddie Wiseman (herein referred to as "Eddie") came to Hillcrest after having spent 
the majority of his career worlcing in a mainframe computer environment. His resume 
appeared to be impeccable for the position: double major in computer science and 
marlceting, employed in the data processing field for five years, no major career problems. 
In addition, I had been acquainted with Eddie for years in church activities. Therefore, 
when Pete Thibeault suggested hiring him for the position of Data Processing Manager, I 
gave him substantial encouragement. He was hired in November, 1987, two months after 
we began the marlceting project. 
It became very clear, however, that Eddie's idea of management could be 
summarized in one word: @!l!rnl. He seemed to be obsessed with controlling every 
decision and action concerning computers or peripherals. This trait would have been 
tolerable if Eddie had demonstrated the necessary technical knowledge for the position. 
Unfortunately, he knew very little about the micro-computer environment 
Ken Arfa. Professional Marketing Consultants. Inc. (PMCT) 
16 
Though other managers from PMCT had substantial influence on the project, Ken 
Arfa (herein referred to as "Ken") was involved throughout Ken holds a Masters of Public 
Health (MPH) degree and came to PMCI from HCA where he was a regional manager of 
Marketing and Planning. He gained vital early experience with the marketing and 
distribution of a hospital "health card" when this was virtually unheard of. 
Ken consistently conveyed a sense of urgency, almost panic, to get things done. He 
would always speak as if we were behind schedule even if there was no possible way to 
move that quickly. Ken worked 70 - 80 hours per week, flying all over the country, and 
seemed to thrive on it ("my kids call me 'Sir"'). As one of the founders of PMCI, Ken 
kept in close touch with the project even when the project was under the direction of 
another project manager. 
Other Representatives from PMCI 
Mike Bernstein (herein referred to as "Mike"), our first contact with PMCI, was a 
driven, hyperactive personality who could at once be charming and blunt Mike also held a 
MPH degree and before coming to PMCI was a Senior Vice President at a 200 and a 400 
bed hospital. Mike had a strong need to feel important so he frequently exaggerated his 
and PMCI's accomplishments. He negotiated new project sales for PMCI and in the sales 
process, he constantly "oversold" PMCI's responsibilities (according to Ken Arfa). Mike 
left PMCI in April, 1988 with tremendous animosity. Though one of the founders of the 
company, he was unceremoniously fired after challenging Rich Ekwall's leadership, 
according to an interview with Mike. Ken Arfa was not kind in describing Mike's 
shortcomings when justifying Mike's ouster. Later, Mike visited Hillcrest and bitterly 
reported PMCI's numerous internal problems. 
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Rich Ekwall (herein referred to as "Rich"), the president of PMCI, was previously 
one of the principle architects of the acclaimed Borgess Medical Center network as an 
executive for CyCare Systems, a healthcare computing firm. He was a rotund person who 
could ask for vast sums of money without a blink. Others at PMCI spoke reverently of 
Rich as an expert in just about every area, especially information systems. 
Marketing at Hillcrest 
Mr. Maccallum believed in marketing. He was keenly aware of the marketing 
endeavors by other hospitals in the Oklahoma City area and he stated on many occasions 
that the future of Hillcrest depended on successful marketing. However, he had little 
understanding of what those words involved. 
Consequently, when he hired the first marketing director, Jack Fortenberry, he 
instructed him to "lay low and cool your heels" for the first three months. He was not 
given a job description, nor any mandate to accomplish. Jack, whose background was in 
the oil industry and had no healthcare experience, had a multitude of good ideas but 
virtually no authority. As is so common in the service sector of our economy, marketing 
was considered nonessential and therefore unimportant. In addition, Jack had difficulty 
relating to physicians. When they disagreed with his plans, he would argue and cajole, 
many times in busy office waiting rooms or hospital corridors. The doctors could not abide 
this and finally forced Mr. Maccallum to terminate Jack. 
For the previous three years, public relations for Hillcrest was executed by Dowdy 
& Associates, a small PR finn consisting of Susie Dowdy and her parents. Susie handled 
ad placement and brochure production on a retainer plus expenses basis. Jack maintained 
that Susie was seriously overcharging the hospital through hidden costs in brochures and 
other material. (I later proved that this was correct.) Public Relations and Marketing were 
completely uncoordinated because Susie and Jack despised each other, avoiding almost all 
communication. 
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Therefore, when I began my tenure as Director of Marketing upon Jack's departure, 
expectations were non-existent. Physicians and staff welcomed me because any change was 
viewed as an improvement. Though marketing was still awarded very little status, my 
arrival was greeted with relief and approval. 
Recent Hospital Perfonnance 
Hillcrest's financial perfonnance for the preceding five years had been nothing short 
of spectacular. When Mr. Maccallum arrived, Hillcrest generated $14,000,000 in revenues 
and frequently delayed payment on current bills depending on cash flow. Morale was 
dismal and the hospital was administratively disorganized. 
One of the decisive actions Mr. Maccallum took was to hire Pete Thibeault, an 
auditor from Price Waterhouse. As Chief Financial Officer, Pete quickly became Mr. 
MacCallum's trusted adviser. Few decisions with financial consequences were made without 
Pete's input 
Mr. MacCallum quickly began to expand the medical staff and Pete completely 
reorganized the Business Office. The result was a dramatic increase in hospital revenues. 
From $14,000,000 in 1982, revenues soared to $34,000,000 in 1987! Services expanded too, 
with the addition of a Behavioral Medicine Center and other ancillary services such as 
home health care and a skilled nursing unit. 
Mr. Maccallum knew, however, that in order for progress to continue, Hillcrest 





Professional Marketing Consultants, Inc. (PMCI) 
Professional Marketing Consultants, Inc. (PMCI) was founded in 1985 by Rich 
Ekwall, Ken Arfa and Mike Bemstein.9 Rich Ekwall, the principal, provided the funding 
necessary to begin PMCI and held the title of President. Ken Arfa and Mike Bernstein 
were Vice Presidents and provided, along with Mr. Ekwall, the hospital consulting expertise. 
The stated purpose of the company was to assist the design and implementation of 
Physician Support Networks for client hospitals. PMCI would also assist on other projects 
if requested. 
PMCI began with four employees and expanded to ten by the time they acquired 
Hillcrest. In the two years previous to their work with Hillcrest, they had installed 
Physician Support Networks at seven hospitals. 
TONACK, 1987: Hillcrest Discovers PMCI 
In July, 1987, Mr. MacCallum and Pete Thibeault attended the annual osteopathic 
TONACK conference. Representatives from Texas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Arizona, 
Colorado and Kansas (TONACK) osteopathic hospitals convene to attend workshops on a 
wide range of subjects. 
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PMCI presented a workshop on Physician Support Networks (PSN), a very popular 
topic in 1987. In his presentation, Mike Bernstein contended that hospital marketing in 
general was unfocused, unprofessional, unappealing and amateurish. He spoke of "brochure 
mentality", the idea that the role of marketing was to produce and distribute brochures about 
hospital programs. It was his view that most hospital marketing an unfocused scatter-shot 
attempt to advertise hospital programs. Instead, he maintained that hospital marketing must 
focus on the physician and must be driven by a clearly articulated business plan that 
provides the direction for each program. 
Mr. Maccallum and Pete were clearly impressed. They felt that this approach was 
exactly what Hillcrest needed. Before leaving the convention, they arranged to have PMCI 
come to Hillcrest for an initial assessment. 
PMCI's Initial Assessment 
Two weeks after TONACK, Mike Bernstein came to Hillcrest for a two day 
assessment. He conducted inteiviews with several key physicians, all of the hospital 
directors and several other managers. In addition, he met with Mr. Maccallum and the 
Chainnan of the Board, Mr. Carlton Myroh. 
Through the inteiview process, Mike tried to ascertain any problems that existed 
which would hinder the project. He was highly critical of Susie Dowdy, recommending 
that we hire a full time Public Relations Director instead. Though it was PMCl's policy to 
hire a person to coordinate the project on-site, Mike felt that I would be the best person to 
be the "Network Director." I was very enthusiastic because I wholeheartedly endorsed 
PMCI's systematic methodology and felt that their involvement would provide the expertise 
I lacked to develop the programs that were clearly needed. 
Physiciari Support Network Programs 
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Once the initial assessment was completed, an initial list of programs was 
delineated. These components had been suggested by PMCI several times previously and it 
was clear that they felt qualified to work within the context of these programs. It is open 
to question whether or not these programs would have been recommended regardless of the 
assessment interviews. In fact, physicians were told that programs would be identified upon 
completion of the business plan research. 
Nevertheless, the programs to be developed for the overall Physician Support 
Network were: 
* Physician Referral System 
* Occupational Health 
* Emergency Room Marketing 
* Physician Practice Management Support 
* Women's Health Center 
* Behavioral Medicine Center Marketing 
* Network Infonnation System 
The most attractive and incredible claim presented by PMCI about this PSN was 
that they would design and install all of the components within one year! They claimed that 
it would take three years to bring the programs to maturity but that each would be "up and 
running" in one year. In other words, they would not be consultants that would continue to 
require large fees year after year, removing one of the major criticisms against hospital 
consultants. This "fast tracking" of the project was extremely appealing because it provided 
a sense of quick accomplishment. 
Looking at the items to be accomplished and the time frame for accomplishment 
should have provided a clue that something was amiss. However, the four reference 
hospitals I called all related that PMCI was indeed an excellent, action-oriented consulting 
firm. Even then, one of the hospitals complained that PMCI tended to "force feed" 
programs whether or not it happened to be advantageous for that particular hospital. 
Creative Financing 
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The Finance Committee and the Board of Directors at Hillcrest are exceptionally 
involved on an operations level. For example, any expenditure in excess of five hundred 
dollars must be brought to the Finance Committee for approval! Mr. Maccallum knew that 
there was no possibility of gaining quick approval for this venture which was projected to 
cost $162,000 for the consulting services alone. This does not include any expenditures for 
the proJect itself, such as expanding the marketing staff from one to ten persons, peripheral 
equipment, advertising, or construction of the Women's Health Center. 
Knowing this, Mr. Maccallum decided to make the immediate costs appear painless 
and write all of the major costs into the following year's Marketing budget. Since the 
combined budget for Marketing and Public Relations was approximately $250,000, he 
proposed to the chairman of the Finance Committee that the required $170,000 come from 
the existing budget. Since the Marketing and Public Relations budgets had already been 
approved, no further approval was required from the Finance Committee. It appeared that 
this project was simply a shift in priorities. In reality, however, none of the budgeted 
marketing or PR projects were curtailed which resulted in enormous budget overruns. 
In addition, because Mr. Maccallum never gained Board approval for the PSN, we 
never had Board support when inevitable problems arose. This precipitated very destructive 
criticism from those who correctly felt that this project had been forced through the system. 
On September l, 1987, Mr. Maccallum and Mike Bernstein signed the agreement 
for consulting services. See Appendix A for a copy of this agreement. 
CHAPTER ID 
THE FOUNDATION, SEPrEMBER - DECEMBER 1987 
Development of the Business Plan 
The "hub" of Hillcrest Health Center's Physician Support Netwolk was an extensive 
business plan. This plan was to provide the focus and direction for each day's activity, 
furnishing the model by which we judged our current perfonnance. 
Physician Inteiviews/Data Collection 
Immediately upon signing the contract for the PSN with Hillcrest, PMCI began 
inteiviewing physicians. Invitations were sent to every physician on active staff (about 73 
doctors). In all, 32 inteiviews were completed, about average according to Ken Arfa. The 
original questionnaire was shortened considerably in the actual inteiviews and elicited 
opinions about the physician's practice, Hillcrest Health Center, how their patients felt about 
Hillcrest, the different hospital departments, seivices they need from the hospital and 
changes they expect in the future. Each inteiview lasted approximately 45 minutes. 
Two departments, Medical Records and the Business Office were most affected in 
the collection of data. Medical Records, especially, was called upon to provide the majority 
of the data. Referral and practice patterns were explored for every physician in great detail. 
Patient origin, demographics, ancillary departmental needs, payment patterns, and other 
-
factors were examined. Revenues were tracked from origin in each department and areas of 
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revenue weakness and potential were identified. Fixed and variable costs were identified. 
In all, approximately 250 hours of research were furnished by the Business Office and 
Medical Records. 
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See Appendix B for samples of the physician survey instunnent and the data collec-
tion worksheets. 
Decisions on Priorities 
In theory, the programs most beneficial to the hospital were to be identified from 
the results of this research. This would have ensured that we developed programs for 
which the hospital demonstrated a need. Hospital employees and the medical staff were 
assured that this, in fact, was the procedure we were following. 
In retrospect, however, it is clear that this procedure was not followed. The 
programs were decided upon de facto when Mike Bernstein completed his initial assessment. 
Once the research was completed, Mr. Maccallum, Ken Arfa and I met to identify the order 
the programs should be implemented. There was no discussions of research results. Each 
program was broken down in detail in the time specific "Action Plan" (Appendix C). 
Similarly, the Ideal Bed Mix (IBM) was a central concept early in the project. The 
IBM was the ideal mix of specialties represented by peak census in the hospital. In other 
words, if the hospital operated at 100% census with all 186 beds occupied, what mix of 
specialties would represent those patients? This conclusion would, in theory, detennine the 
kinds of programs necessary to bring about this result. 
In reality, the Ideal Bed Mix was detennined at a meeting between Mr. MacCallum 
and myself. We simply discussed different specialty mix scenarios and chose one that we 
estimated would bring about the highest hospital revenue, given our existing facilities and 
the specialties represented by the medical staff. Once the IBM was decided upon, it was 
never mentioned again, nor did it play any significant role in the remainder of the project. 
Staffing Needs 
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When this project began, the Marketing department at Hillcrest had exactly one 
employee: the director. In addition to the director, Hillcrest utilized a public relations 
agency part-time. Obviously, a project of this size and scope required an organization to 
develop and implement the plans. Though Mr. Maccallum tacitly agreed to increasing the 
marketing staff, he never finnly committed to the size staff the Business Plan required. 
Originally, the marketing staff was to include: 
Director of Marketing (Network Director) 
Public Relations Director 
Physician Support Liaison 
Physician Referral Coordinator 
Physician Referral Assistant 
Occupational Health Manager 
Occupational Health Nurse 
Women's Health Coordinator 
Connection Card Coordinator 
Marketing Secretary 
This staff needed to be established during the first year to ensure the program 
progressed according to our timetable. However, Mr. Maccallum wanted to move very 
slowly because the Board and the physicians were skeptical about an expanding Marketing 
department. Whenever I needed to hire an individual, I had to wait months for the need to 
become convincing (i.e. fall behind schedule, resort to crisis management.). For example, 
the need for a Public Relations Director was identified in September, 1987. The position 
was filled March 16, 1988. 
The Occupational Health Coordinator was secured in December, 1987. Until this 
time, I tried unsuccessfully to develop this program and make the sales calls necessary to 
sustain it while developing all of the other project areas. 
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It was a disaster! For several months, I had so many responsibilities that I was 
literally running from 7:00 am each morning until 8:00 pm each evening. While I was 
overloaded from every area of the PMCI project, I also had all of the marketing 
responsibilities of the hospital apart from PMCI. The busier I became, the less time I had 
to make sure each task was completed .. dequately. If something went wrong or took longer 
than necessary (a frequent occurrence), my schedule would fall apart. This frenzied 
schedule lasted for six months, September 1987 until February 1988. Afterward, my 
schedule was hectic but not quite so chaotic. Unfortunately, valuable time was lost and 
mistakes were made which would eventually damage the project. 
Return on Investment! 
The most exciting aspect of this project were the astounding return on investment 
figures. They more than justified the extensive outlay of funds for the project and promised 
to continue the spectacular growth that Hillcrest had experienced in the previous five years. 
In the three years necessary to fully implement the program, census was expected to 
rise from 65% of staffed beds to 80% of staffed beds! (The hospital was only operating at 
60% of staffed beds at the time but no one seemed concerned about the 5% discrepancy.) 
This 15% rise in census represented new revenue of $7,873,600 over three years. Total 
three year incremental revenue for the 15% increase would be $3,858,064. These figures 
did not include the Behavioral Medicine Center costs or revenue nor did they include the 
Women's Health Center financial results. 
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When total revenue figures were compiled (including ancillary revenue figures), total 
incremental revenue would be $8,268,314, total program costs would be $1,236,879 for a 
net margin of $7,031,435! This represents a cost/benefit ratio of 1:5.68. At every meeting 
with physicians, PMCI continually emphasized that this project would return 5.68 dollars for 
every 1 dollar expended by Hillcrest. 
Program costs were delineated well and seemed to be within a reasonable range. 
However, when taken as a whole, they represented a very large total expenditure. At one 
point early in the project, I was concerned because a needed purchase request was being 
delayed. I met with Mr. Maccallum and asked him if he was aware of the total expense 
required by this project. He responded that he thought so. When I showed him the 
detailed expenditures from the Business Plan, he winced and stated that "we will have to be 
careful about expending that kind of money. We'll need to go slow with major 
expenditures." This was a foreshadowing of the future. See Appendix D for the expected 
return and expenditure figures. 
The Final Product 
When the Business Plan was completed and delivered in January, 1988, it was an 
impressive document Obviously, PMCI utilized the data provided to present an impressive 
case for their programs. 
Book I, the Executive Summary, focused on the Physician Support Network. It 
furnished a theoretical framework to support it and explored the primary programs that 
comprised the PSN. Book I strongly articulated the crucial importance of hospital 
commitment throughout the implementation and declared (predicted?) that "a network under-
financed, under-staffed, and lacking total commitment would be more detrimental to HHC 
than no program implementation." Prophetic. 
Book I also supplied the return on investment figures discussed above and the 
action plan, which was the time table we attempted to meet Excerpts from Book I are 
contained in Appendix E. 
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Book II contained the results of physician interviews, demographic and competitive 
analysis, medical staff analysis and other data collection. This document exhaustively 
analyzed the available data, demonstrating a comprehensive grasp of the issues relevant to 
the hospital competitive environment Those in administration who took the time to read it 
were extremely impressed. Its analysis of Hillcrest's physician base and need for affiliation 
was superb. Excerpts from Book II are contained in Appendix F. 
Book III was actually an appendix for Books I & II. 
The rest of the Business Plan consisted of separate in-depth plans for each PSN 
program. Much of these documents appeared to be boiler plated material. This is not to 
infer that it was sub-standard, on the contrary, these plans contained excellent delineations 
of the programs. 
One might expect that this document would be read by Board members and 
physicians alike. Unfortunately, the Board didn't read it because they never approved it in 
the first place and probably didn't feel any ownership. Physicians simply weren't interested. 
Who did read this document which cost thousands of dollars and provided excellent 
marketing research? Mr. MacCallum, Pete Thibeault and myself. 
Internal Promotion of the Project 
From the beginning, Mr. MacCallum was the principal promoter of the PSN project 
At every manager's meeting he spoke of "revolutionizing" Hillcrest with Marketing taking 
the lead. Though he sought to gain the support of other hospital managers and employees, 
he actually conveyed a sense that Marketing was receiving most of the attention (and 
dollars) in the hospital. This naturally led to outspoken resentment among many of the 
department managers. 
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To combat this, we set up a Network Task Force consisting of key department 
managers whose cooperation was necessary for project success. This task force was 
supposed to engender team ownership and support among department managers. 
Unfortunately, we met infrequently although we envisioned giving each member frequent 
assignments, this never materialized. The meetings were basically reports on the progress of 
the project We did not have a meeting during the final four months of the project. 
CHAPTER IV 
PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT, JANUARY - AUGUST 1988 
The Consulting Relationship 
PMCI normally employed someone on their payroll to execute the project on site. 
In this case, our Board Chairman, Carlton Myroh, felt that this would be redundant since 
we already had a Director of Marketing. Therefore, r was given the responsibility of 
implementing the project. 
PMCI exercised tremendous authority in the early days of the project. Because this 
project had complete support from Mr. Maccallum, hospital employees were aware of its 
importance. PMCI tried to engender a feeling of monumental and historic significance 
toward the establishment of a PSN among employees at Hillcrest by relating in small 
employee groups the "revolutions" that had occurred at other hospitals which had installed 
their PSN. 
Project Management 
PMCl's method of managing a project was to send different professionals (according 
to the need) to the project site approximately two or three times per month for visits of two 
or three days each. On a site visit, the PMCI representative would meet with the on-site 
project coordinator for project status meetings and then would assist the project in any way 
necessary during the visit. At the end of the visit, the PMCI representative would give the 
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on-site coordinator a long list of follow up activities. One or two days after the visit, a trip 
report would arrive detailing the accomplishments of the visit and listing the follow up 
activities to be performed by the on-site coordinator. Samples of several trip reports are 
contained in Appendix G. 
The project was managed by a Project Manager, a senior level employee of PMCI. 
Though PMCI brought various professionals on-site for particular reasons, the Project 
Manager generally made the on-site visits. 
Though Ken Arfa was always kept abreast of the project at Hillcrest, he was not a 
Project Manager initially. Our first Project Manager, Frank Dingler, remained on the 
project from September, 1987 to February, 1988. He was a competent, low-key individual 
who was always rather distant personally. He left PMCI in February, 1988 and we were 
told he simply didn't like the hours and the travel involved. 
Todd Hamilton, our Project Manager from February, 1988 until July, 1988 was a 
different sort altogether. Todd was tall, thin, bespectacled and never quite presented a good 
appearance. Yet technically, he was very sharp. Todd was also adept at mediating conflict, 
which was often necessary during his tenure as Project Manager. When he left, "for 
personal reasons," Ken Arfa painted a very unflattering description of someone with marital 
and financial problems. 
Upon Todd Hamilton's resignation, Ken Arfa assumed the position of Project 
Manager. Because Ken had worked so closely with the project, there was no real lag in 
the transition process. 
Occupational Health 
From the very beginning of my employment with Hillcrest, Occupational Health had 
been a priority program for the hospital. It was viewed by Mr. Maccallum as a broad new 
market that should be actively pursued. Hillcrest's nearest neighbor and closest competitor, 
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South Community Hospital, operated an extremely successful Occupational Health program 
that had over 400 businesses enrolled and resulted in significant revenue for the hospital. 
Mr. Maccallum was so intent upon developing an Occupational Health program at 
Hillcrest that he included an incentive provision in my employment contract which provided 
a bonus determined by the number of employees at the company. 
During my first six months of employment (April - September, 1987), I developed a 
comprehensive Occupational Health package entitled Good Neighbor Care, which consisted 
of six basic elements: pre-employment physicals, on-the-job injury treatment, drug screening, 
Sick and Safe (nursing day care for sick children), drug and alcohol rehabilitation, and 
ancillary seivices (physical therapy and audiology screening). This was printed in an 
expensive, high quality binder. 
One of the major issues confronted early in the program design process was 
negative criticism from some General Practitioners (GP) who felt that because of the 
Occupational Health program, the hospital was now competing for their patients. Because 
Hillcrest is dependent upon the loyalty of its medical staff (as are other hospitals), this was 
a very serious situation. I could not afford to offend our GPs, yet at the same time, 
Occupational Health seemed to be an important target marlcet. 
After weighing the situation carefully, I decided to try to incorporate our GPs into 
the Occupational Health package as satellite clinics. If an employer near one of our 
physicians had an employee who needed treatment, the employer could either call the 
physicians office to confirm availability, or the employer could bring the employee into the 
hospital emergency room. This seemed to meet the objections of the physicians. 
In the package design, we listed our General Practitioners (termed "Good Neighbor 
Clinics") and characterized them as "company doctors." In one sense this made our 
package much more attractive because we supposedly had 13 satellite Occupational Health 
clinics in south Oklahoma City. 
In practice, it was a fi~co. The GPs would not agree to any common pricing or 
hours nor would they use any common forms or procedures. Quality control was non-
existent. When physicians would ignore Occupational Health policies and offend a client 
company, I had no recourse. The hospital emergency room was controllable and the ER 
director was extremely cooperative but I could not organize the clinics. 
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When a company "enrolled" with Good Neighbor Care, they simply signed a non-
binding agreement, choosing the programs they wanted to use. Because the agreement was 
completely non-binding, the affect of the enrollment was purely psychological. As an 
incentive to "sign-up," companies were given a coupon that entitled them to their first 
treatment free of charge in the programs they selected. If they went to a Good Neighbor 
Clinic, the hospital would reimburse the physician for the treatment. 
Our competition, not only from South Community Hospital but also from dedicated 
clinics such as the Meridian Industrial Oinic, were standardized, well organized and very 
professional. We were out-classed, out-performed, and under-priced. 
Staffing 
When the full magnitude of the PSN was revealed in September, 1987, it became 
clear that someone needed to be recruited as an Occupational Health Manager. Previously, 
Pete Thibeault had introduced me to a lovely saleswoman named Vicki Mathews. Vicki 
had been involved in health care sales for 15 years with Pro Health at Baptist Medical 
Center in Oklahoma City. At that time, she was managing a temporary help agency and 
was forthcoming about her desire to return to health care. Vicki was 35 years old, very 
pretty, intelligent and presented herself as the ideal candidate. After some protracted 
negotiations, Vicki was hired as the Occupational Health Manager on December 1, 1987. 
Her contract included a bonus for each company enrolled in Good Neighbor Care. 
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Initial Plans/Revisions 
Initially, PMCI liked the work I had completed on Good Neighbor Care. However, 
they felt that the slick program manual that we were using was not flexible enough and 
should be reprinted as a less expensive folder with inserts. They also recommended 
providing volume discounts to companies. For example, if a company's treatment revenue 
exceeded $5,000, the company should receive a percentage rebate at year end. When the 
revenue exceeded $10,000, a higher percentage rebate should be paid. 
They recommended a work-site nurse be hired to make personal trips to the 
companies at regular intervals for purposes of on-site treatment and evaluation. 
PMCI initially felt that the Good Neighbor Clinic physician participation problems 
could be remedied by better training the clinic front office staffs. This proved to be false 
because the network was too diverse to manage even with training. In addition, training 
was resented by the physicians themselves so it was difficult to accomplish. 
Public Relations 
Hillcrest retained Dowdy & Associates for 10 hours per week and paid full $65 per 
hour rates for overtime. (Susie usually worked 20 hours per week.) I felt that it would be 
cost effective for us to tenninate Dowdy & Associates and hire a pennanent Public 
Relations Director. However, because she had been at Hillcrest for such a long period, this 
suggestion was not taken seriously. In fact, Mr. Maccallum did not feel that Hillcrest 
could utilize a Public Relations professional full time. 
PMCI dispelled that idea. Not only did they dislike Dowdy & Associates' work, 
they recognized that I ~as overloaded and desperately needed some relief. Once the 
decision had been made to tenninate Dowdy & Associates, I began to interview several 
public relations candidates for the position. 
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One of the candidates, Lori McCaslin, had been recommended·to Wanda Lewellen 
by a friend. When I interviewed Lori in the presence of Mr. Maccallum and Wanda, she 
made a curious statement. She asked if the Director of Public Relations was subordinate to 
the Director of Marketing or if they were on the same organizational level. When informed 
that the Director of Public Relations was subordinate, she stated that she felt they should be 
on the same level "like at Baptist," yet she didn't pursue this idea any further. After 
reviewing her work, I recommended we hire her. That is one decision I learned to regret 
Staff Chaos/Reprimand 
Unknown to me, Vicki Mathews felt threatened by Lori Mccaslin. Once Lori was 
hired there was immediate friction between Lori and I. She seemed to resent each and 
every attempt I made at supervision. This resulted in a very icy atmosphere in the office, 
one that Vicki quickly sensed. 
On Monday, Lori's first day, Vicki told me that Lori informed her that she still 
wanted to separate Public Relations and Marketing. She wanted to report only to Mr. 
Maccallum. Obviously, I was greatly disturbed. These increasingly provocative reports 
continued throughout the week as resentment built between Lori and I. By Thursday of 
that same week, I determined to terminate Lori. 
On Friday, I confronted Lori with the allegations. She was shocked and 
categorically denied each allegation. I called Vicki and asked her to meet with us. At this 
point, I began to see another side of Vicki Mathews. Vicki was now very unsure of her 
facts and could not look either of us in the eye. She still maintained that Lori was guilty 
of the allegations but she now seemed to by lying about what had actually transpired. 
From the meeting, I could not determine if Lori was indeed guilty. 
Actually, I was disappointed because it was evident Lori and I could not work 
together. Fortunately, Lori sensed the same thing because she resigned the following 
Monday, after having worked at Hillcrest only one week. 
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This situation would not have been important except that it was the key incident 
that soured the relationship between Wanda and I. Lori provided a very negative report to 
Wanda about my performance before she left and Wanda felt it was serious enough for a 
formal review of my performance by Mr. Maccallum. A meeting was called and attended 
by Mr. Maccallum, Wanda, Pete Thibeault and myself. 
In the meeting it was revealed that both Lori and Vicki had been to see Wanda, 
both giving diametrically opposite accounts of what had occurred. However, both had very 
negative opinions of my performance in the dispute and in general. I was reprimanded for 
my performance in the dispute and was given notice that if anything like it happened again, 
I would be terminated. At this time, Wanda made a very curious statement concerning 
Vicki Mathews. "Gary, I don't believe Vicki Mathews and if you're smart, you'll watch 
your backside." 
Until this time, I had always considered Vicki to be the perfect employee. She was 
sharp, organized, very loyal (according to her), humorous, and somewhat seductive (or at 
least very flattering). What I did not know was that she wanted my position as Director of 
Marketing. At the same time she was telling me what an incredible boss I was, she was 
providing the opposite report to other key employees, even those within the Marketing 
Department who reported her intentions to me at the time. Before this event, I simply did 
not believe the reports that she was acting in this duplicitous manner. Now, there was no 
question. She would be difficult to replace, however, so as long as she performed her job, 
I decided not to terminate her. 
A Jewel From Baptist 
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On the day Lori McCaslin resigned, Ken Arfa called one of his contacts at Baptist 
Medical Center and learned that one of their best public relations associates, Teresa Brekke, 
wanted to leave. An intetview was scheduled that same day and she was hired within 48 
hours. Teresa could not start for three weeks, but her outstanding quality seemed well 
worth the wait. 
Teresa was an incredible employee. As Public Relations Director, she was 
immensely productive, yet had no ego to offend. She was universally liked, produced top 
quality work and would literally do whatever the task demanded. Teresa never had to be 
told what to do. Her creativity allowed her to "see" and develop potential stories. Teresa 
required very little supeivision which helped me focus on other areas of the PSN. She was 
the best asset our department had. 
Physician Referral 
Physician referral was a natural program to develop. Other physician referral 
programs in Oklahoma City had proven to be very successful and we were eager to follow 
suit. It was rumored at the time that MedSearch, the program sponsored by Presbyterian 
Hospital, received about 1000 calls per month. Baptist Medical Center's "Baptist 
CARELINE" was rumored to be receiving about the same number of calls per month. 
Even South Community Hospital, our nearest neighbor, was receiving about 380 calls per 
month on their poorly advertised referral line, according to medical staff meeting reports. 
A physician referral system (PRS) is actually a very simple operation. It requires 
an operator to receive calls, a computer system or a manual card system to ensure fair 
rotation of physicians, and advertising to generate the phone calls. It sounds simple and the 
basic system is simple. PMCI added a substantial amount of record keeping for tracking 
purposes. For example, each month the billing for patients who were admitted to the 
hospital as a result of the physician referral system was totalled .. and reported. This was an 
excellent tool that we utilized to justify our existence. PMCI estimated that over time, 
about 5% of the patients referred to a physician would be admitted to the hospital. 
Conflict With Data Processing 
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PMCI recommended that we begin with a manual card rotation system and quickly 
move to a computerized system. They recommended a computer system they developed for 
St. John's Medical Center in Tulsa, Oklahoma. It ran on an IBM System 36 minicomputer. 
Early in October, 1987, Cathy Adams, Eddie Wiseman and I went to St John's Medical 
Center for the purpose of evaluating their system. Eddie Wiseman, the Data Processing 
Manager, had only been hired two weeks earlier. He infonned me on the trip up to Tulsa 
that he was opposed to the purchase of the System 36 because it was "old technology" and 
that if we purchased it, Data Processing would not support it. 
I was astonished. I couldn't believe that a manager so new to the job would be 
making flat statements ab:<>ut what would or would not be done in another department. This 
development worried me too because the System 36 supported not only physician referral 
but also the entire health card preregistration system and a proposed occupational health 
computer system. 
The site visit at St. John's was very impressive but Eddie remained adamant that he 
would have nothing to do with a System 36. At the same time, I was beginning to have 
strong doubts about Eddie's technical ability. In a phone conversation a few weeks later, 
Eddie complained that he could not seem to get a newly fonnatted diskette to boot up on 
his computer. 
Eddie: "I have fonnatted the disk 5 times and it still won't boot." 
Gary: "Did you fonnat it 'a:/s'?" 
Eddie: "No, what do you mean?" 
40 
Gary: "Eddie, if you want to fonnat a diskette so it will boot, you must type a '/s' after the 
a: so it will transfer the hidden system files." 
Eddie: "Oh, gee, thanks a lot, Gary." 
Formatting a diskette is the first lesson anyone learns after turning on a computer. 
Eddie was the Data Processing Manager. Something didn't compute. 
Less than a week later, I had another disturbing conversation with Eddie, this time 
over the choice of the major hospital infonnation system. 
Eddie: "I've about decided that the hospital needs to go with a DEC Microvax 
minicomputer as our primary computer." 
Gary: "Well, Eddie, are you sure a Digital computer is the best choice?" 
Eddie: "I'm not talking about a Digital computer, I'm talking about a DEC Microvax." 
Gary: (Shocked) "Eddie, DEC stands for Digital Equipment Corporation." 
Eddie: "Oh . . . I guess I didn't notice that" 
At this point, I still considered Eddie a good friend but these two conversations 
concerned me a great deal. I simply could not understand how anyone could become Data 
Processing Manager without knowing how to fonnat a diskette. True, all of Eddie's past 
experience had been with mainframe systems rather than micro computers. In that case, 
how could he not know that DEC and Digital were the same company? 
Because of these and several other incidents, I lost respect for Eddie's technical 
ability. In retrospect, this had a profound influence on our future cooperation. 
Meanwhile, during the stalemate, Mr. Maccallum decided that because we were in 
the midst of development, a decision on a physician referral computer system could be 
postponed. 
Competitive Positioning: Image Strategy 
Hillcrest Health Center did not have the advertising budget to directly compete 
with other physician referral competitors. If we conceived a generic, city wide physician 
referral system, we would logically advertise similarly to MedSearch. This we could not 
afford. 
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On the first issue of whether or not to create a generic PRS or a PRS that would 
bear the Hillcrest name and association, I strongly advocated a generic system. The 
hospital community was divided on the issue. Some, like the highly successful MedSearch, 
made no mention of Presbyterian Hospital, the creator of the PRS. Others, like Mercy 
Physician Referral from Mercy Health Center, were clearly linked to a hospital. Hillcrest 
Health Center had three strikes against it: In the 1970s it developed a poor reputation, it 
had few physicians compared to other hospitals and finally, compared to other hospitals, 
Hillcrest had a small public presence. Therefore, I believed that Hillcrest must establish a 
PRS with an identity independent of Hillcrest Health Center. Whether or not this would 
offend the medical staff was a very real consideration at the time. 
The second issue concerned the target market. Should we develop a citywide 
physician referral like most other hospitals? To do this would burden the advertising 
budget and do nothing toward the creation of a unique image. The location of our 
physicians was a decisive factor. They were all located in South Oklahoma City or one of 
the surrounding areas of Midwest City, Del City, Yukon, Mustang, Moore, Choctaw, and 
Harrah. In addition, the business plan from PMCI indicated that the vast majority of our 
patients lived in these communities. 
Therefore, I recommended we name the PRS "South Oklahoma City Physician 
Referral" and should not identify it with Hillcrest in any way. Although Mr. Maccallum 
doubted the medical staff would accept this, to our complete surprise they wholeheartedly 
endorsed this title. 
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Competitive Positioning: Promotion 
Promotion for physician referral centered primarily around the Yellow Pages. PMCI 
indicated that we could expect about 80% of the calls to come directly from Yellow Pages 
advertising. When perusing the Yellow Pages, I was struck by the fact that all of the 
physician referral ads were at the very end of the Physician section under the heading 
"Physicians & Surgeons Referral & Information Service." The major ads were either full 
page or one half page ads. An ad for "South Oklahoma City Physician Referral" would be 
placed at least two or three pages from the beginning of the classification. 
Another classification was intriguing, however. "Physicians & Surgeons Exchanges" 
was a very small classification with only a few listings. It was located between the listings 
for D.O.s and M.D.s, close to the middle of the Physicians section. Additionally, the 
Yellow Pages automatically discounts a display ad by 50% if it is the first display ad in 
any particular classification. This would lower our annual outlay by about $10,000 dollars 
on a three quarters of a page ad. Because of these factors, Hillcrest became the first 
hospital to use this classification for a major PRS ad. 
In addition to our Yellow Pages strategy, we regularly placed a physician referral ad 
in the South section of the Daily Oklahoman. Several small billboards and bus benches 
were acquired in South Oklahoma City to provide a permanent public presence. Brochures 
and posters were placed in over 100 public places by contract workers to complete our 
promotion strategy. 
Staffing 
The person answering the telephone is a critical link ultimately influencing the 
percentage of callers that decide to make an appointment with their assigned physician. 
Though the PRS operator utilizes either a manual or a computerized system with uniform 
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procedures for making the referral, the operator must .establish credibility and trust if he or 
she hopes to convince the caller to actually make an appointment 
We were fortunate because about the time we decided to begin the search for an 
operator, one of Hillcrest's founding physicians, Dr. Leon Silvers, decided to retire. His 
office manager, Betty Overstreet, had worked for him for 24 years and now needed a new 
job. Dr. Silvers called Hillcrest to inquire about possible positions. Betty was referred to 
me and her qualifications were excellent. She knew most of our physicians on staff, she 
was courteous, she understood osteopathy, and she kept detailed records. Betty was hired in 
February, 1988, the third person to join the Marketing staff. 
The Connection Card 
The pre-registration health card system was the "hub" of the Physician Support 
Network. It was the database that linked all of the programs together and was meant to 
provide the vehicle for extensive cross-sales ability. We wanted card holders to feel that 
they were a part of a healthcare network that contained several benefits including fast, 
convenient hospital admission. We envisioned utilizing direct mail extensively to promote 
hospital services to a demographically stratified mailing list. (One example would be 
special mammography coupons to women over age 35.) Once "good" customers were 
identified from lists of former hospital patients, purchased mailing lists, and current 
physician patients, they would be sent a packet of information about obtaining their own 
pre-registration card. 
In a strategy session, Ken Arfa and myself decided upon the name "Good Neighbor 
Connection Card" or the "Connection Card" for short We felt that by associating it with 
our Good Neighbor Clinic network of physicians would enhance its acceptability by the 
medical staff. 
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In order to induce selected customers to complete the Connection Card application, 
we added benefits such as retail merchant discounts, hospital discounts, and ease of hospital 
admission. Once we decided upon the basic framework of the card program, we contacted 
local merchants about providing discounts for our cardholders. Discount providers included: 
SAFEWAY PHARMACIES: Prescription items at a 10% discount. 
SOUTHSIDE YMCAS: First 10 visits free of charge. 
AMERIFIT FITNESS CLUB: Waiver of initiation fee. 
ROY AL OPTICAL: 40% discount on glasses and 20% discount on contact lenses. 
HERITAGE EYE SURGICENTER: 40% discount on eye exam and 25% discount on any 
other eye service. 
DR. PHILIP WHITLOW, OPTOMETRIST: 15% discount on all services. 
HILLCREST HEALTH CENTER: Private room at semi-private rate, waiver of security 
deposit, 50% discount on inpatient deductible up to $100.00, free cholesterol testing, free 
breast self-exam inf01mation, free physician referral, 30 days to pay patient portion of the 
hospital bill. (The last two items were "filler"; they were free to anyone.) 
Our business office had a very negative reputation among our physicians. The 
medical staff generally felt that in addition to sending incorrect bills, the business office 
often sent computer generated harassment letters to even their best patients. The business 
office also had a practice of calling a patient about their bill while the patient was still in 
the hospital, a tactic which annoyed some patients. I knew that if we could promise this 
practice would be eliminated for all Connection Card holders, physicians would not only 
support the program, they might also furnish us with their patient lists. Therefore, this was 
my primary selling point when presenting this program to numerous physician committees. 
Unfortunately, the physicians didn't believe that this program (or any program) would solve 
business office harassment of patients. They were skeptical although this approach did 
engender some medical staff support among younger physicians. 
Data Processing Deadlock 
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While we could afford to delay a computer system for physician referral, the pre-
registration system depended on a computer system. In early January, 1988, we were still 
at odds with Eddie Wiseman in Data Processing. While we wanted to purchase the System 
36 mentioned earlier, Eddie was still threatening that if we did, Data Processing would not 
support it. He had plans to install a Local Area Network (LAN) of IBM PCs and he was 
afraid that a System 36 would be incompatible. 
Then, I made an important discovery. While getting the documentation from Kurt 
Vanderwater of Meridian Microdata Systems which I needed to prove that one could indeed 
link a System 36 and a LAN harmoniously, I was shown a database language that could 
potentially solve our software problems without a System 36. 
Advanced Revelation from Revelation Technologies was a fourth generation language 
that had several advanced features which would allow us to develop our own system much 
more quickly than would otherwise be possible. Primary among these attributes was the 
ability to construct a system without programming. One could "paint" the entry screen 
(simply type the screen exactly as it should appear) and the source code for this screen 
would be automatically generated. All data variables were selected from menus which 
made changes very simple to accomplish. This combined with a database built around the 
concept of variable length fields meant that changes could be made at anytime in the design 
of the database or the fields without disturbing the data. In other words, instead of long, 
tedious hours spent meticulously planning every aspect of the system, one could "program 
on the fly", confident that if mistakes were made, they could be easily corrected without 
major redesign of the system. Obviously, none of this would be possible in a "normal" 
programming language that relied on perfectly written lines of code. 
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This was of paramount importance to the project because if we designed our own 
program, we would not have the benefit of PMCT's expertise. They agreed to give us a 
general description of how the system should function, but they were not going to spend 
time on specific technical explanation because this was not in their contract. Therefore, I 
felt strongly that any alternative system must have the ability to be modified instantaneously 
because without extensive prior design, many modifications would be necessary. 
Once I saw a demonstration of Advanced Revelation, I told Pete Thibeault about it. 
As Eddie's superior, he had been acting as an intermediary between Eddie and I. Pete 
went to see a demonstration, was amazed at "A-Rev's" flexibility and immediately 
purchased the database. (Pete originally wanted to build the entire hospital information 
system with A-Rev.) 
Without ever seeing Advanced Revelation, Eddie was adamantly opposed to using 
the language. He had decided that the hospital would only use three software packages: 
Lotus 123 for spreadsheet applications, Word Peifect for word processing, and dBase III+ 
for database applications. This time it was my turn to complain about "old technology." 
dBase III+ was an upgrade from dBase II, a common microcomputer language that I had 
programmed in for two years. As a language which must be coded line by line, it lacked 
flexibility which was crucial to success. Nevertheless, Eddie believed that because it was a 
"industry standard," we should not deviate from it. His strongest argument, however, was 
that by programming in dBase III+, Data Processing could provide the maintenance support. 
With Advanced Revelation, we would have to rely on an outside computer firm (Meridian 
Micro Data) for support. 
The major problem, from my point of view, was that Eddie was trying to prescribe 
solutions for problems he knew very little about dBase III+ was a unsuitable for this 
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application because one simply could not develop the application quickly enough, nor could 
the program be easily modified. 
Numerous Conflicting Decisions 
As the intensity of the debate grew between Eddie and I, the quality of our 
communication decreased. Because I frequently went to Pete Thibeault to complain about 
Eddie's position, Pete naturally was drawn into the debate. Technically, Pete was Eddie's 
boss and my equal but in reality, Pete exercised substantial authority because Mr. 
Maccallum relied on him in most situations. 
Pete was already "sold" on A-Rev. When A-Rev was demonstrated to PMCI, they 
agreed that it would work well for our application. They also recommended against dBase 
III+. Therefore, Eddie remained the only person opposed to A-Rev. 
That opposition was enough. Because Pete had an almost unyielding policy of 
letting his managers manage by not overruling them, he felt obligated to give Eddie his 
support. However, he also believed that Eddie was wrong in his conclusion. 
This resulted in nine different "decisions" in six months on the type of hardware 
and software to use. It fluctuated back and forth between the IBM System 36, Advanced 
Revelation and dBase Ill+. It became a battle of who could convince Mr. Maccallum they 
were right. At one point it became obvious that the decision depended only on who had 
last met with Mr. Maccallum. After one of the first decisions in favor of A-Rev, a 
preliminary system was developed in about six hours of programming time. However, we 
couldn't use it because by the time it was developed, the decision had changed again. 
Finally, with the overall project six months behind schedule, we all decided that Marketing 
would communicate to Data Processing its needs and Data Processing would be responsible 
to provide the computer support necessary to meet the needs of Marketing. Both Pete and 
Mr. Maccallum assured me that if Data Processing couldn't produce, Eddie would be 
terminated. 
Data Processing's Attempt 
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Instead of programming the application "in house", Eddie hired a programming firm 
to develop the pre-registration system. The system itself was not complex. Basically, it 
was a data base that would print the information on a hospital admission form. However, a 
week later, Eddie called and asked me to look at the system that had taken 62 hours to 
develop and was about 60 - 70% complete. Pete and I believed this was the final straw for 
dBase Ill+. This system, only partially complete, had taken 10 times longer to complete 
than the A-Rev system. 
In addition, Eddie not only contracted with and outside vendor to program the 
system, he also decided that it should be programmed in Clipper, a dBase "clone" that is 
much faster than dBase. The only problem was that the hospital did not own a copy of 
Clipper, nor did anyone in Data Processing have any experience with it. Therefore, even if 
the system worked, the hospital would still be dependent on an outside consultant for 
support. 
Because we had both systems now available, I suggested a side by side benchmark 
comparison. I felt that by directly comparing the two products, the right decision would be 
self-evident. However, Eddie steadfastly said no. He simply said that his decision was 
dBase Ill+ and therefore he would not take part in a comparison. 
Pete again switched opinions decided we needed to give Eddie more time to develop 
his system. When the dBase system had over 100 hours invested in development, it was 
delivered to Marketing. 
The system was hopeless. It had numerous bugs and had not been programmed 
according to specifications in several places. In addition, there were several things that 
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needed modification once we tried to use the system in the hospital. The outside finn took 
days to respond, I was ignored in Data Processing and my frustration grew. 
Finally, I told Pete that I could not work with the system, detailed the reasons, and 
told him the overall project was in serious jeopardy. By this time Eddie was frustrated too 
and wanted out from the responsibility of the system. I was given back the responsibility 
for the system at the end of July, 1988. We had promised the physicians that the system 
would be installed by May 1. 
Completion of the Software 
A short time later, the pre-registration system in Advanced Revelation was 
completed. Because we involved end users to decide features, it evolved into an elegant 
system. In fact, the "wish list" of features became so extensive that we had to limit our 
modifications. In all, the system probably had about 35 programming hours involved after 
including most of the user wishes. 
Hardware Delays 
One of the principle reasons for choosing against the IBM System 36 was the 
proposed Local Area Network. Eddie had promised the LAN would be in place by 
February, 1988 which would have been acceptable to our time frame. Because of his lack 
of microcomputer experience, he planned to hire a "LAN Administrator" to install and 
support the LAN. This proved to be much more difficult than expected. Finally, in June, 
Eddie hired a LAN Administrator (who happened to be a friend of mine), and the LAN 
became a reality in August, 1988 at which time the system actually became a reality. 
Material Development 
The Connection Card presentation materials were developed swiftly after Teresa 
Brekke began as Public Relations Director. They were divided into three phases: 
PHASE I: The teaser postcard. Three days before the Phase II packet was to arrive, we 
mailed a colorful postcard to the recipient with the message "The Connection Card is 
Coming!" and a brief detail of the card benefits. 
PHASE II: The enrollment packet. This initial packet consisted of a specially printed 
envelope, a cover letter, a brochure detailing the benefits of Connection Card membership 
and an application/self-mailer. 
PHASE III: The fulfillment packet. This packet contained another cover letter, the 
embossed card, the card presentation brochure (the card fit inside), the Connection Card 
benefits brochure (same as in Phase II), and a small gift of a forehead thermometer. 
Staffing 
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The old saying "what goes around, comes around," ironically occurred in the case of 
the Connection Card Coordinator. The Coordinator had to be a person of many talents 
including administrative skill, social talent and technical knowledge of computers. 
By the time the deadlock with Data Processing was broken, I was anxious to hire 
someone quickly. Mike Oelke, who became the Connection Card Coordinator seemed to be 
well qualified, with several years experience in the computer field. Though he worked 
primarily with mainframe computers, he didn't seem to have any reservations about working 
in a microcomputer environment. 
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The lesson that mainframe experience does not translate to microcomputer expertise 
became painfully evident ... again. Mike was very intimidated by his position, especially 
with the computer aspect. He knew very little about MS-DOS and Advanced Revelation 
was very difficult for him to grasp. 
The result was that the Connection Card program continued to dominate my time 
and required continual oversight. Though Mike eventually became more proficient, my 
hiring error kept the program in tunnoil. 
Physician Practice Support 
Because PMCI viewed the physician as a customer of the hospital with a choice to 
take their practice elsewhere, they believed that the hospital which identified and met 
physician needs would be the prosperous hospital in the future. The Physician Practice 
Support program was a key element in their strategy to strengthen physician loyalty while at 
the same time increasing hospital revenues. 
Physician Office Management Needs 
Physicians vary widely in their business acumen. Some are extremely proficient, 
others are extremely poor. Most physicians are somewhere in between. Not only must 
physicians stay current on new medical advances, they must supervise billing, collections, 
personnel, purchasing, record keeping, and scheduling in their offices. Yet they usually do 
not have specific training in any of these areas. 
Physician Support Liaison 
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While the Physician Practice Support program consisted of several components, the 
primary focus was on the role of the Physician Support Liaison. The Physician Liaison 
needed to be a person with expertise in physician office management, preferably someone 
with physician consulting experience. Their responsibility would include providing a 
comprehensive practice assessment for the doctor with follow up meetings scheduled to 
resolve specific weaknesses uncovered by the assessment. The Physician Liaison would 
provide these services to as many physicians as possible. PMCI stipulated that this would 
not only increase physician loyalty but would also result in higher hospital admissions as 
physician practices became more profitable. Indeed, physicians would be told that they 
should derive a minimum of 5% of their gross revenue from hospital treatment. Some 
physicians averaged more than 5% and many physicians averaged less. Also, the Physician 
Liaison would travel to rural osteopathic physicians, providing consulting services which 
encourage hospital admissions. 
PMCl's Unique Criteria For Staff 
PMCI believed the best candidate for the position would be a sharp "front office 
girl" with experience in physician office management. They would then train this person to 
conduct the practice assessments and the follow up consultations would either be conducted 
by the Physician Liaison or would be contracted out to an expert in accounting, personnel, 
etc. 
I felt strongly that this was a certain recipe for disaster. We were telling our 
medical staff that the Physician Liaison was an office management expert. If we sent 
anyone without genuine expertise, our credibility would be destroyed and our physicians 
would not be willing to work with our Liaison. In my view, it was critical that we hire an 
expert in which both we and they could be confident 
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One of the initial candidates for the position was a man named Nicholas Hahalis. 
His qualifications and experience were perfect. Previous experience included a management 
position with the Hospital Corporation of America in which he bought and sold rural 
hospitals, frequently becoming Interim Administrator at the facilities directing administrative 
and financial reorganization. During the past 10 years, he was president of Medical 
Management Group (MMG), which provided physician office management and consulting 
services. ·He was also a registered nurse. A year previously, he sold MMG to begin law 
school at Oklahoma City University. According to Nicholas, he found law school to be 
much easier than he had expected and therefore wanted the position because "he could do it 
with his eyes closed" and would provide extra income for his wife and children. I wanted 
to hire Nicholas and fortunately, Mr. MacCallum who had previously met Nicholas, 
supported this decision also. 
My recommendation to hire Nicholas was finnly opposed by Ken Arfa at PMCI. 
At first, Ken said that because of Nicholas' expertise, he would spend too much time at 
each office solving problems and would not be able to provide services quickly enough to 
our active staff and rural physicians. Then he said that Nicholas would be far too busy in 
law school to work full time. After all, most physician meetings are in the evening. 
Nicholas assured me that he would devote full time to the position for at least three years. 
I never could get Ken to explain why he needed to attend evening physician committee 
meetings. 
Finally the real reason emerged. Nicholas Hahalis was Greek. Ken assured me that 
our physician staff would never accept Nick because of his race and that we needed to hire 
a "blond with big tits" to win the confidence of the medical staff. This really irritated me. 
Mike Bernstein, Rich Ekwall and Ken Arfa were "unblemished" Jews with all of the 
stereotypical Jewish features. Yet race was never a factor when Hillcrest hired them. Of 
course, I couldn't let Nick know the real reason for the delay in our decision so I gave him 
one excuse after another as we postponed the program for three months. Out of a dozen 
other candidates interviewed, none even came close to the matching Nicholas' skill and 
experience. 
The Obvious Choice 
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After a delay of three months, our physicians were becoming restless. They were 
beginning to complain that the Physician Practice Support program would never materialize. 
In a meeting with Mr. Maccallum, we decided to hire Nick and take the chance of 
physician rejection. Ken reluctantly agreed. 
Success From the Beginning 
When we introduced Nicholas as our Physician Support Liaison, and briefly 
reviewed his qualifications in the Medical Staff Executive Committee meeting, three 
physicians immediately raised their hands to request that Nicholas visit their offices first 
By the end of the meeting, Nicholas had seven appointments with doctors. Needless to say, 
acceptance was not a problem. 
The Physician Practice Support program was the most successful program we 
introduced. Nicholas won rave reviews from almost every physician he contacted. In 
several cases he was able to help them realize revenue increases ranging from 20 - 50% 
and he helped several others resolve partnership problems. In addition, Nick was a self-
motivated individual who required very little supervision. PMCI provided no substantive 
help to Nick. He didn't need it. 
Strengths and Weaknesses of PMCI 
As a consulting firm, PMCI demonstrated several evident strengths and weaknesses. 
Strengths 
1. Combined knowledge of the founders. Ken Arfa, Rich Ekwall and Mike Bernstein 
together had a great deal of experience with Physician Support Networks in other hospital 
settings. Their decisions were tempered by previous experience in both large and small 
hospitals. 
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2. Sound. systematic methodology. PMCI believed that the physician should be the central 
focus of a marketing program. They built their Physician Support Network around. the 
concept that loyal, prosperous physicians will ensure hospital prosperity. In addition, they 
developed and utilized a structured method for implementing a PSN with little deviation 
from hospital to hospital. 
3. Well-researched foundational business plan. By requiring such extensive and time 
consuming data collection, PMCI was able to deliver an impressive Business Plan. 
Formulation of the plan enabled them to gain an excellent grasp of hospital strengths and 
weaknesses which helped them avoid potential problems someone with less working 
knowledge might encounter. Though the plan was not utilized to its fullest extent, it 
remains a valuable document for future decision-making. 
4. Oear objectives. PMCI clearly articulated where they wanted to take the hospital in 12 
months. They defined each program in detail and explained the benefits to be realized. 
Financially, they delineated the costs of each program in detail and explained their basis for 
projected revenues. 
5. Ability to generate excitement. PMCI, first and foremost, articulated an exciting vision 
for the hospital. They presented themselves as movers and shakers, the kind of firm that 
would completely revolutionize a hospital in 12 months. They would enable us to cut 
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through bure~ucratic inertia and accomplish in one year what might·ordinarily take four or 
five years. "Twelve months from now, Gary, you will be a star and South Community will 
be in panic," Mike Bernstein told me at our first meeting. It was the kind of challenge that 
dreams are made of and this dream infected all of us in administration. 
Weaknesses 
1. Unreasonable objectives. PMO made the classic sales mistake. They over promised and 
under delivered. It wasn't that they didn't have the expertise to deliver everything they 
promised, it was that they set time schedules that could only be reached if everything went 
perfectly (and then it would have been difficult). Therefore, when we encountered a 
deadlock with Data Processing over the computer system, we fell hopelessly behind 
schedule. The further behind we became, the more we had to compromise programs to 
retain some semblance of a schedule. 
2. Thin organization. Perhaps at the beginning of our project, PMCI had average depth of 
organization. However, once Frank Dingler, Todd Hamilton and Mike Bernstein departed, 
PMCI was left woefully short of qualified, executive personnel to fulfill their commitments. 
This was compounded by their practice of working on four or five projects 
simultaneously. When their senior executives departed, PMCI was forced to hire new 
individuals immediately and it was obvious these new executives were given only cursory 
training. This made a poor impression on the administration at Hillcrest. 
3. Willingness to compromise to generate work. When Mike Bernstein agreed to reduce the 
number of employees necessary to implement the PSN at Hillcrest, he was assuring the PSN 
could not be installed as quickly as they projected. In addition, when Mr. MacCallum 
outlined how the program would be financed by taking monies out of the current marketing 
budget thereby avoiding the Finance Committee, Mike Bernstein should have refused to 
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accept Hillcrest as a client There was no possible way to avoid angering the Finance 
Committee and Board of Directors by sneaking the PSN into effect on a piecemeal basis the 
first year on the assumption that in the following year, a comparatively enormous budget 
would be required and therefore forcibly approved. Yet that is exactly what happened. 
4. Boile1plate programs. As mentioned before, PMCI knew before the Business Plan was 
ever delivered which programs they wanted to pursue at Hillcrest. While the systematic 
methodology enables programs to be enacted quickly, it does not ensure that the program 
components will work in any particular hospital. There were numerous instances where 
PMCI would insist on an item that was completely inappropriate for Hillcrest. Occupational 
Health was especially troublesome because PMCI wanted to force fit a program that our 
doctors would not tolerate. 
CHAPTER V 
PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION AND OPPOSIDON: MAY - AUGUST 1988 
Physician Unrest 
Because physician expectations were raised to excessive heights, every problem we 
encountered provided further evidence to a few that the program contained empty promises 
or was being incompetently implemented. From October, 1987 until June, 1988, I attended 
most monthly physician committee and subcommittee meetings. As time passed with one 
problem or another blocking progress, the doctors became increasingly critical. 
It is important to note that the opposition on the medical staff actually resulted from 
the strong criticism of only four or five doctors. On a staff of 73, there were also about 10 
supporters of the marketing project and the rest had no opinion. The opponents, however, 
were able to sway a large number of "uncommitted" physicians. 
Three programs especially drew criticism. The first, occupational health, was 
conceptually plagued from the outset with unworkable compromises negotiated to gain 
physician acceptance. As mentioned earlier, the primary compromise that damaged the 
program was the decision to utilize physician offices as occupational health clinics. Once 
employees actually began using the system, the vast majority simply opted to use the 
hospital emergency room instead of attempting to visit a clinic that may or may not be 
open. This exacerbated the dissatisfaction of General Practitioners who suspected that the 
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hospital was trying to compete with their practice. However, when Worker's Compensation 
patients went to their offices, major mistakes occurred literally every visit, usually in billing. 
The medical staff was generally supportive of the Connection Card program when it 
was introduced because they hoped it would provide easier admission and discharge, among 
other benefits. However, when the delay in the program stretched into months, the medical 
staff became angry and strident in their criticism. I felt the blame lay squarely on the 
shoulders of Eddie Wiseman but I couldn't say that in a medical staff meeting. So I 
provided one excuse after another which undermined my credibility and increased physician 
criticism. 
The third major disappointment expressed by the medical staff was the Women's 
Health Program. Mr. MacCallum was very non-committal about funding for the program 
and his clear direction was to "go slow." All our medical staff saw, however, was another 
program where little progress was being made. 
One of the primary ways we tried to obtain physician input in the marketing process 
was through regularly scheduled Physician Marketing Committee meetings. We met once 
a month to discuss the project progress and to get their input on how to tailor the programs 
in the areas that affect their practices. The chairman of the group, Dr. Edward Glinski, was 
completely supportive of the PSN and he tried to keep negative physicians off the 
committee. However, some physicians who were negative requested to be on the Physician 
Marketing Committee and this resulted in better interaction because their objections helped 
us avoid several pitfalls. Unfortunately, a few of these physicians seemed more interested 
in picking apart the project. Interestingly, the physicians who were the most negative were 
also the physicians who were experiencing severe financial problems in their practice. 
After July, I found myself consciously avoiding regular hospital medical staff 
meetings. Though there were reasons for the difficulties we experienced in several 
programs, the meetings had become very harsh and I found many reasons for 
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nonattendance. This created further alienation and did nothing to bolster Marketing's image 
among our physicians. 
Employee Resentment 
As the project progressed, significant employee resistance developed. For example, 
Hillcrest relied on a very arcane purchasing system. Because the PSN was bound by a very 
tight time schedule, many products and services were needed on a moments notice. 
Purchasing was very resistant to any change in their procedures, which usually delayed the 
purchasing process by days or weeks. Because of problems like this, a meeting of 
department managers was scheduled to discuss methods to "cut red tape." At this meeting, 
several managers complained that Marketing was receiving favored treatment and they 
resented it. While there was general agreement that unnecessary "red tape" should be 
avoided, the real message was one of a growing resentment of Marketing's "privileged" 
status. 
PMCI recommended a "Network Task Force" consisting of key department managers 
that would involve them in decision making and provide a sense of ownership for the 
managers. However, the meetings were actually infonnation sessions and did not require any 
real input from the participating managers. These meetings were discontinued in May, 1988. 
By June of 1988, several managers became vocal about the number of computers 
Marketing was purchasing and the number of employees added to the Marketing staff. 
Other managers felt that Marketing, by virtue of what they imagined was an unlimited 
budget, was receiving a disproportionate share of microcomputers. In addition, almost all of 
the employees in Marketing were managers, which meant they were accorded the highest 
level of benefits the hospital offered. 
Early Success: Physician Referral and Physician Practice Support 
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At a hospital Board of Directors meeting in January, 1988, our numerical projections 
for Physician Referral were being challenged. I responded, somewhat brashly, that if the 
hospital was not receiving 400 total incoming calls by September, "the hospital should look 
for a new Director of Marketing." When I made that assertion, Wanda Lewellen somewhat 
lightheartedly stated that "now the Board has something concrete to hold you to." I knew 
she was serious, yet I was not overly concerned because "total incoming calls" included all 
calls on the "Connection Line", a line that received inquiries about all of the hospital 
programs and services. Any numerical concerns vanished once the Yellow Pages were 
released in mid-July as shown below. 
TABLE I 
PHYSICIAN REFERRALS AND TOT AL CALLS: 
FIRST SEVEN MONTHS OF OPERATION 
Physician Referrals Total Incoming Calls 
Feb. 1988 25 32 
Mar. 43 51 
Apr. 50 77 
May 79 106 
June 56 260 
July 153 476 
Aug. 240 524 
Even the most ardent opponents of Marketing on the medical staff conceded that 
South Oklahoma City Physician Referral was a great success. 
Similarly, Physician Practice Support demonstrated impressive success from the start. 
Nicholas Hahalis completed 32 physician practice a~sessments in the first three months of 
his employment and the medical staff overwhelmingly approved of the program. After an 
assessment, Nicholas was available to provide the assistance necessary to implement his 
recommendations. Many physicians began to rely on Nicholas for wide ranging practice 
advice and he also served as an analyst for several opportunities the hospital considered. 
Nicholas believed that he would increase the physician patient admission rate by 5 % per 
physician because of the assistance and advice he furnished. 
These two programs were the primary success stories of the PSN. They illustrate 
the potential that correctly implemented Marketing programs can provide to improved 
medical staff loyalty and prosperity. 
Forgotten Programs 
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When problems inevitably slowed progress on the core programs in the PSN, other 
programs were given cursory treatment. Though PMCT was paid to implement all eight 
programs, they did not implement the following four. 
Emergency Room Marketing 
The Emergency Room at Hillcrest has the worst physical plant of any in Oklahoma 
City. It is small, cramped and has a deplorable entrance. The entry, which looks like a 
warehouse entrance with a brown steel door and unclear, antiquated signage, has long been 
an embarrassment to the hospital. 
In contrast, the Emergency Room service ranks among the very best in Oklahoma 
City according to AmCare drivers and attendants (the city ambulance service). The 
Emergency Room director, Dr. Dale Askins, was widely regarded as the best asset Hillcrest 
had. Mr. Maccallum hired Dr. Askins to improve ER service five years ago, paying him 
extremely well. In addition to exceptional medical skills, he was a marketing oriented 
physician who set out to ensure that the ER developed a reputation for excellence in service 
to patients. Dr. Askins upgraded the ER status to Level II, equal to the best in the 
Oklahoma City area. 
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The first priority was appearance. PMCI felt that it would be counterproductive to 
develop and promote programs designed to increase ER traffic only to display a poor image 
due to a substandard physical appearance. A new Emergency Room was planned in an 
eight million dollar construction project that was about to begin. Therefore, every time we 
tried to order much needed interior and exterior furnishings, they were delayed because of 
uncertainty over the new plans. Finally, PMCI delivered an Emergency Room marketing 
plan that could be implemented whenever the hospital built the new ER. 
Information Systems 
Originally, PMCI planned to install a complete computer network capable of 
supporting the marlc.eting programs. In addition, they would have provided technical 
assistance to ensure that the overall hospital computer system was functioned compatibly 
with the marketing network computer system. 
However, because they encountered utter hostility from Eddie Wiseman in Data 
Processing, they could not accomplish their objectives. 
Finally, they delivered a generic computer network plan that detailed the design and 
function of a network computer system. 
Behavioral Medicine Marketing 
The Behavioral Medicin~ Center (BMC), established in 1985 by the insistence of 
Mr. Maccallum, had developed into a major asset for Hillcrest, contributing about 30% of 
hospital revenues. The BMC consisted of alcohoVchemical dependency treatment, psych-
iatric treatment, outpatient counseling, and crisis intervention. 
Under the leadership of Betty Chase, a psychiatric nurse, the BMC essentially 
behaved as a separate entity from the hospital, frequently acting on its own directives with 
its own marketing plan. Mr. Maccallum envisioned the marlc.eting plan from PMCI as a 
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method of integrating the BMC back into the overall hospital direction. However, Betty 
Chase was very protective of the BMC and viewed PMCI as a possible threat to their 
independence. However, unlike Eddie Wiseman, she decided to define the help she wanted, 
thereby controlling the input she received. 
PMCI's consultant in the mental health arena was truly major figure in the 
psychiatric world. Dr. Mel Kolb, the chief psychiatrist for Champus and a dominant 
military and governmental insurer, had extensive consulting experience with mental health 
facilities. He was also an osteopathic psychiatrist, a relatively rare osteopathic specialty. 
PMCI arranged a telephone interview between Dr. Kolb and Betty Chase to discuss 
operational and recruiting issues. Their interview was transcribed and delivered as part of a 
Behavioral Medicine Center marketing plan. As in other "forgotten" programs, the 
marketing plan was quickly disregarded and never affected actual operations. 
Women's Health Center 
Unlike the other "forgotten" programs, the proposed Women's Health Center (WHC) 
began as a priority program. Newborn deliveries at Hillcrest had reached a low-point by 
the time the Women's Health Center was proposed. General Practice doctors had all but 
ceased delivering babies because of the enonnous increase in malpractice rates charged to 
GPs who practiced obstetrics. The two OB/GYN specialists on staff, Dr. Raymond Deiter 
and Dr. Mona Motz, were unhappy because they were receiving only an average number of 
referrals by GPs because of some perceived "political" problems. Because of a recent 
malpractice suit that involved a General Practitioner and the hospital, some doctors were 
beginning to suggest that Hillcrest would be better off without obstetrics altogether. 
Expense posed one of the biggest obstacles to a Women's Health Center. Several 
hundred thousand dollars would need to be expended for a competitive WHC. These 
expenses were not included in the original Business Plan submitted by PMCI. In addition to 
the expense, even a minimal return on invesbnent would not be realized for five years or 
longer. 
After several planning meetings with Ors. Deiter and Motz, PMCI brought in 
Deborah Martin, the primary designer of the Women's Health Center at St. Joseph's 
Hospital in Atlanta, Georgia. In meetings with Ors. Deiter, Motz and others, Deborah 
convinced them that not only did she thoroughly know every aspect of a WHC, she 
convinced them that it would revolutionize the OB/GYN deparnnent at Hillcrest. She 
greatly impressed physicians that were initially very skeptical. 
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However, once their expectations were raised, Mr. Maccallum became somewhat 
ambivalent. When I requested funding for the WHC Product Line Manager position, I was 
told we needed official approval from the OB/GYN deparbnent and the Executive 
Committee of the medical staff. This delayed a decision for about six weeks. Then once I 
received those approvals, Deborah Martin became very absorbed in another hospital project. 
Meanwhile, Ors. Deiter and Motz were becoming very inpatient and_ vocally critical at 
medical staff meetings. Finally, we simply needed funding for progress. I gave the request 
for funding to Mr. Maccallum and began to concentrate on other problems in the PSN. 
The WHC project literally faded away. 
Launching the Connection Card 
Once we initially designed the Connection Card software in Advanced Revelation, 
we began the mail outs to former patients, occupational health employees, and purchased 
mailing list prospects. 
Finding former patients who we felt would be "good payers" was much more 
difficult than we initially presumed. It seems that the hospital kept meticulous records on 
those who did not pay their hospital bill, but "purged" those who did. We had no idea 
who our good "customers" were. Finally, we changed the procedures and began keeping 
records of our good paying patients. 
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While searching for a company to purchase a select mailing list, I discovered a 
company that could give us a list of those with hospitalization insurance. We purchased a 
mailing list of 5000 heads of households in certain zip codes in south Oklahoma City that 
were over 20 years old and had hospitalization insurance. 
Response to the Connection Card packet from the purchased mailing list was poor. 
The response rate was only about 1.4%, somewhat below the rate of most "cold" mailings. 
In the beginning, the low response rate was an advantage. The laboratory, which 
was responsible for the free cholesterol testing, was very recalcitrant. The lab director 
believed they were having to expend time and energy on "Marketing's project" that they did 
not care anything about. 
In addition, because of problems getting inpatient admission fonns to function 
properly with the selected hardware, the Connection Card computer software was only 
operated in the outpatient area. The inpatient admission fonns were 12-part fonns typed on 
a typewriter. We could not find a printer that would function with 12-part fonns so we 
decided to design two 6-part forms that would be printed twice. Unfortunately, I selected a 
printer that did not work correctly. Instead of working through the obstacles, Eddie 
Wiseman succeeded in getting the Connection Card software and hardware confined to the 
outpatient area. This does not mean it was not extensively used, on the contrary, the 
hospital registered about 1000 outpatients per month versus about 500 inpatient admissions. 
Because of the relatively low initial distribution of the Cards, very few actual problems 
occurred. 
Occupational Health Disaster 
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As mentioned before, Occupational Health had been fraught with problems from the 
outset These problems were exacerbated by the excellent sales success of Vicki Mathews. 
She signed several companies immediately and eventually signed about 17 companies to be 
Good Neighbor Care members. 
The two most important factors to an employer considering an occupational health 
program were cost and rapid treatment. Cost was fairly easy to manage. Since no one in 
Hillcrest's Business Office had any idea what the real cost of providing service was, we 
simply based our prices on what other competing hospitals or clinics were charging. 
Unfortunately, this was far below our standard rates. However, Mr. Maccallum was 
determined that we should do whatever it took to be competitive. Therefore, if other 
services were charging $35 dollars for minor injury care, we would charge $35 dollars. We 
thought we were probably losing money at this rate but the goal was to build a competitive 
occupational health program. Therefore, we instituted a separate occupational health charge 
scale for those employers that were members of Good Neighbor Care. (Rarely, if ever, was 
a correct billing sent to an employer. In fact, incorrect billing was so chronic that Vicki 
began checking every bill before it was sent) 
Rapid treatment was equally or more important to employers. Fortunately, we 
already had one of the fastest emergency rooms in the city with most patients initially 
treated within 5 to 10 minutes upon arrival. In fact, the Emergency Room director, Dr. 
Dale Askins, advised the ER physicians to meet Amcare Ambulances at the door whenever 
possible. This was virtually unheard of and was illustrative of the tremendous marketing 
sense Dr. Askins exhibited. Needless to say, AmCare drivers were impressed. Dr. Askins 
was completely supportive of occupational health and vowed to treat those patients with the 
utmost speed. 
As it goes for an ill-fated program, disaster struck. One of our General 
Practitioners was called to the ER when one of his patients arrived with an injury. 
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Moments later, an Occupational Health patient also arrived. The ER personnel rushed the 
Occupational Health patient ahe~ of the GP's patient, explaining that Occupational Health 
patients receive priority. The General Practitioner was furious. Then he discovered that 
Occupational Health patients were being charged much less than his patient for the same 
injury treatment. This just added fuel to the fire. He called the physicians who were 
opposed to Occupational Health and they demanded we form a committee of Good 
Neighbor Clinic General Practitioners to govern Occupational Health. 
At the first meeting for the Occupational Health committee, the doctors directed us 
to stop all marketing activities associated with Occupational Health. We could still service 
the member companies, but we were not to sign up any additional companies. I explained 
that the intent of the rapid treatment was not that one patient would be rushed ahead of 
another - this had never been suggested - but that special attention would be given to 
Occupational Health patients to ensure that there were not any unnecessary delays. 
Nevertheless, the physicians directed that the program be placed on "hold" until they could 
provide us with guidelines they were to design. 
Shortly after this meeting, Vicki Mathews and I met with Mr. Maccallum to discuss 
the results of this physician meeting. She was distressed over the moratorium placed on 
new accounts because she was paid a commission based on the number of new companies 
she signed. In addition, she had already started negotiations with several new companies. 
"What should I do with the companies I've already talked to? Should I just let them 
drop?" she asked. "No, I wouldn't want you to do that," replied Mr. Maccallum, "You 
keep selling, just don't be vocal about it." 
CHAPTER VI 
TRANSmON AND DISINTEGRATION 
TONACK., 1988 
For the 1988 TONACK. conference in Corpus Christi, Texas, Mr. Maccallum, Pete 
Thibeault and myself were scheduled to present an overview of the PSN development and 
installation at Hillcrest. PMCI had a booth at the conference and ultimately, we hoped to 
persuade another osteopathic hospital to engage PMCI. (A clause in Hillcrest's contract 
with PMCI provided that Hillcrest would be paid 10% of any PMCI hospital contract that 
Hillcrest helped secure.) 
After our presentation, Mr. Maccallum "dropped a bombshell." As we walked by 
the bay, he informed me he had accepted an offer from Oklahoma Osteopathic Hospital 
(OOH) in Tulsa to become their new President I knew this was quite an opportunity for 
him because OOH happened to be the largest osteopathic hospital in the nation at 533 beds. 
They had experienced financial difficulty in the past few years and were looking for 
someone to tum the hospital around. 
I also knew, however, that this could portend ominous things for my situation. My 
strong base of support at the hospital was primarily with Mr. Maccallum and Pete 
Thibeault. Mr. Maccallum assured me that Pete would at least be the interim administrator 
and could possibly become the new administrator. However, there was no assurance that 
either would occur. If neither of these occurred, Wanda Lewellen would probably be 
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chosen as the interim administrator because she held this position for nine months before 
Mr. Maccallum came to the hospital. I had a nagging suspicion that if Wanda became 
interim administrator, I would have to leave. 
Non-Renewal of PMCI's Contract 
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Meanwhile, PMCI had begun to discuss a substantially higher contract for the 
following year. When Hillcrest began discussions with PMCI, one of the attractive aspects 
was their commitment to a one year timetable. They would complete the project in one 
year with a small retainer fee of approximately $2,000 per month the following year. This 
sharply contrasted with other consultants who would sometimes require years to complete 
their projects at enormous cost. Mike Bernstein, in fact, told us that if they did not 
complete the first year tasks in a year, they would stay at no charge until they were 
completed. 
When we finally met to discuss new contract terms in early September, 1988, the 
second year contract had grown to approximately $135,000! The second year project 
basically called for a restructuring of Occupational Health and implementation of three of 
the "forgotten" programs: Women's Health Center, Behavioral Medicine Center Marlceting 
and Emergency Room Marlceting. Worse still, they had simply copied large sections of the 
original contract and tied it all together into the second year contract. After discussion with 
Pete and I, Mr. Maccallum told them there was no possibility the Board would approve 
such an extension after having just approved a mammoth Marlceting budget in June. 
PMCI then submitted another second year contract that totalled about $81,000. 
However, as Pete was quick to point out, the only thing that changed between the first 
submission and this revision was the fee. They simply resubmitted the initial second year 
plan with a lower dollar figure. This made us ever more skeptical because they had 
consistently maintained that their profit margin was only in the 5 - 10% range. 
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At a meeting to discuss this revised second year contract, Mr. Maccallum asked 
them why they expected us to again pay for the implementation of programs promised in 
the initial contract. In each program they explained that the delays were not a result of their 
mistakes but resulted from administrative decisions or conflicts. They were right, of course. 
However, this still meant that for whatever reason, they did not expend the time and effort 
for these programs. "Why shouldn't we expect you to provide this consulting time which 
we paid for and haven't received?" asked Mr. Maccallum. "Because of unexpected 
problems such as the computer system, we spent our allotment of consulting time," replied 
Ken Arfa. This assertion was probably true but it still didn't convince us that another year 
at this level of funding was a wise choice. Mr. Maccallum delayed the decision. 
Another grievous mistake concerned their expenses for the contract negotiation trip. 
Since the former contract expired in August, there were no contract payments in September. 
After their trip, they submitted a $2,500 bill to Hillcrest for the two days of contract 
negotiations. This action incensed Pete. Since we did nothing during those two days 
except discuss future contracts, Pete, Mr. Maccallum and I felt that submitting this bill was 
in extremely poor taste. 
The second year contract issue was delayed until after Mr. Maccallum left for 
OOH. Wanda Lewellen, after discussing the issue with Pete and myself, declined to renew 
the contract. 
Physician Revolt 
Shortly before Mr. Maccallum departed, Ken Arfa and I attended a Physician 
Marketing Committee meeting. Instead of Mr. MacCallum, Wanda Lewellen was present at 
the meeting. This made an incredible difference in the attitudes of the negative physicians. 
When Mr. Maccallum was present, the physicians never stridently attacked the PSN and 
Mr. Maccallum always demonstrated unqualified support. This was entirely different 
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I began by presenting the statistics for Physician Referral which were very positive. 
From the moment I began, the primary "attack" physician, Dr. Pamela Hiti, began to 
complain loudly about the quality of her referrals. From the tone of her voice, I suspected 
that she had been drinking. She was evidently very angry. However, Physician Referral 
was so successful that she was quickly contradicted by several other physicians in the room. 
Next, I began to discuss Occupational Health, a program that was in the midst of 
severe difficulty. Dr. Hiti began to castigate me for the problems in the program and at 
that moment I made the worst mistake of my career at Hillcrest. In defense of the 
program, I revealed that Vicki Mathews had signed three new companies the previous week. 
Dr. Hiti became apoplectic, "Do you mean that after we specifically told you at our last 
meeting to completely stop all marketing activities in Occupational Health, you let Vicki go 
out and continue selling? Against our direct orders?" 
She was furious and her face was now red as a beet. Silence engulfed the room. 
Every eye was on me. My mind was spinning. Should I tell them what Mr. MacCallum 
instructed us to do? What should I say? Finally, I rather sheepishly said, "Vicki simply 
closed on some companies she had previously made contact with. We didn't think we 
should just leave them hanging." 
"That doesn't matter," she shouted, "We told you to stop and we meant stop, period. 
It's clear you will not listen to us. And I'm going to check with Vicki to see if she really 
had made previous contact with those companies." Immediately, I knew that if Vicki 
realized the precarious position I was in, she would lie without a blink and say that the 
companies had not been previously contacted. 
Dr. Glinski broke the tension and asked me to report on the Connection Card. I 
reported that we had about 2,000 cardholders, many of whom were former patients. I also 
related that the computer hardware and software was functioning smoothly in the outpatient 
admitting area. Then Dr. Askins expressed disappointment because the computer hardware 
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and software had not been installed in the ER yet. I explained that we had experienced 
long delays in the installation of the Local Area Networlc and with the printer for the 12 
part admitting fonns. Dr. Hiti angrily interrupted, "I don't care whose fault it is, I hold 
you personally responsible for the screw ups in that system. It's your fault and I hold you 
responsible! Do you understand me?" At that moment, another very negative physician, 
Dr. Ronnie Keith, stood up, wadded up his meeting agenda, threw it on the table and said, 
"What's the point of this meeting? What are we here for?" as he stonned out of the room. 
Dr. Glinski again broke the silence by asking me to report on the Physician Support 
Program. Finally a program that exceeded its goals! Nicholas Hahalis had entered the 
room a few minutes before and so I presented a brief report and asked Nick to comment. 
Doctors almost unanimously volunteered that the program had provided some very tangible 
benefits to them. When Dr. Hiti tried to criticize some of the recommendations Nick 
provided, Dr. Glinski and others interrupted her in disagreement and she ceased her 
criticism. The meeting quickly adjourned. 
The suspicions I had about the continuation of the PSN after Mr. Maccallum 's 
departure were confinned that night Leadership made all the difference. I am convinced 
that if Mr. Maccallum had been present that the meeting would have taken an entirely 
different course. The following morning he told me that he would have never allowed the 
unjust criticism and would have taken personal responsibility for any criticism offered. In 
addition, when he would have cooled strident criticism immediately, not allowing it to build. 
He said, "I would have made it clear that any criticism of the program was a criticism of 
me because I have been closely involved in all respects." In short, he would have 
expressed unqualified support for the project. 
In contrast, Wanda Lewellen did not say anything the entire meeting, even when she 
personally knew some of the criticism was unjust. Instead she was silent 
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In retrospect, I believe that a fast-track, "let's change everything" project like this 
one is positively doomed unless it receives unequivocal support from the C.E.O. of the 
hospital. In addition, the C.E.O. must command the respect of those who will inevitably 
attack the program. If the C.E.0. is not in a very strong position with key hospital 
factions, the C.E.0. may not be able to withstand the storm of criticism that will result 
from the imposition of tremendous organizational change. If, on the other hand, the C.E.O. 
tries to escape the criticism by allowing it to focus on those involved with the installation, 
the program will disintegrate as the primary implementors are forced to leave. 
An Unlikely Interim Administrator 
When Mr. Maccallum announced he had accepted the Presidency of Oklahoma 
Osteopathic Hospital in Tulsa, everyone assumed that Pete Thibeault would be the Interim 
Administrator. He was the logical choice because he understood every aspect of hospital 
administration. As mentioned previously, Pete was the co-architect with Mr. Maccallum of 
Hillcrest's spectacular financial performance. 
However, Pete had one major shortcoming. He tended to be rather tactless and 
straightforward even with the Chairman of the Board, Mr. Carlton Myroh. Mr. Myroh 
tended to look at financial reports and draw the wrong conclusions, sometimes critical of 
Pete. If Pete was exasperated, he would respond, "I can't help it if people who are 
ignorant of financial principles draw that conclusion." Then he would drive the point home 
by proving conclusively Mr. Myroh's error. This scenario was repeated more than once. 
Therefore, shortly after Mr. Maccallum resigned in late July, the Board 
recommended that Pete and Wanda be Co-Interim Administrators. When Pete was informed 
of the decision, he refused. He felt this was a ludicrous idea that would be awkward at 
best. Pete also suspected that Wanda, a Board member herself, influenced the decision. In 
his opinion, Wanda had little education, knowledge or ability to lead Hillcrest. Virtually no 
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progress resulted from Wanda's previous stint as Interim Administrator when hospital 
revenues were only about $14,000,000 annually. Since that time, the hospital had grown in 
both revenues and complexity. When Pete refused the recommendation, the decision was 
delayed. 
Three weeks later, Pete decided that even if he were offered the position of Interim 
Administrator, he would refuse. At the time, he told me he "wanted to keep his options 
open." Accordingly, the Board chose Wanda to be Interim Administrator and Pete was 
appointed to the position of Interim Assistant 
Mr. Maccallum 's Departure 
Mr. MacCallum's last day as Administrator, September 16, was a sad one for 
Hillcrest. In all of the festivities surrounding his departure, one theme kept arising: 
Hillcrest had experienced its "golden" years. It was almost an ominous inference that the 
future was not as bright as the past. His last request to the Board was that Marketing's 
endeavors not be pennitted to fade. 
Director of Marketing Resigns 
During this period of time, I had an ominous feeling that Wanda had been 
discussing ways to force my departure with certain physicians on staff. Because all of my 
perfonnance reviews had been very good to excellent, she needed a reason to persuade me 
to resign. So, I just had a premonition that something was happening to bring this about. 
Shortly after Mr. Maccallum left, I wanted to take the steps necessary to improve 
my relationship with the negative physicians on the staff. As I was planning my strategy, I 
decided to call Wanda for her advice. After all, I called Mr. Maccallum many times in the 
past for advice on how to handle various situations and Wanda was now my boss. When I 
reached her, she seemed to be very uncomfortable with my plans. Finally, she said, "Gary, 
why don't you wait until after the medical staff meeting Tuesday night." When I asked 
why, she didn't have an answer. At this point, I knew that something was up. 
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A few days later on Wednesday morning after the medical staff meeting, Wanda 
called me for a meeting. I knew what the meeting would entail. When the meeting began, 
Wanda told me that at the medical staff meeting the previous night, the medical staff 
recommended that I be replaced. She was very gracious. She said, "Gary, what do you 
want to do? What do you think is best for you in this situation?" As I considered my 
options, I could either refuse to resign and attempt to work with an alienated medical staff 
or I could resign on my own time schedule. I chose the latter and responded, "Wanda, 
there are several things that need to be accomplished so the PSN will continue on a 
stronger foundation. This will take about six weeks. I will plan to leave on November l." 
Wanda said, "That sounds great, Gary. I just don't want anyone to say that the first thing I 
did was force you out. That's the last thing I want anyone to think." She then 
complimented me on my performance and insisted that I would always have a good 
recommendation from her. I didn't believe a word of this but she was gracious in her 
remarks. 
Programs On Hold 
All progress went on "hold" at this point. I pushed through the completion of the 
Physician Referral software because without it, the entire program depended on Betty 
Overstreet's expertise. The Connection Card system was also refined. I recommended that 
Teresa Brekke serve as the coordinator for Marketing. 
CHAPTER VII 
CURRENT STATUS AND SUMMARY 
Comparative Position of Hillcrest Health Center 
Census Trends 
After falling dramatically to less than 100 patients per day in November and 
December, 1988, the average daily cen8us (ADC) climbed to record levels in January 
through March, 1989. February, 1989 was a record month for Hillcrest with an ADC of 
about 120 patients per day (70% full). March continued with a very high ADC, according 
to Nicholas Hahalis. 
Reasons for the high census varied but Nicholas attributed some of the increase to 
the cumulative affect of Physician Referral and the patient load improvements effected by 
the Physician Support program. 
Administrative Staff Changes 
Shortly before I left Hillcrest, the Board of Directors voted to appoint Wanda 
Lewellen pennanent administrator. They raised her annual salary from approximately $45 -
50,000 to $80,000. This came as a complete surprise to the employees at Hillcrest. Before 
this time, Wanda had always maintained that she did not want to be the Administrator. 
Within three weeks after Wanda was appointed pennanent administrator, Pete 
Thibeault announced his resignation. He accepted an offer from Mr. Maccallum to become 
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the Chief Operating Officer at OOH in Tulsa. When Pete announced his intention, Wanda 
and the Board of Directors panicked. Pete was the only person at Hillcrest who understood 
hospital finances and operations. The Controller, Phil Ross, had been at Hillcrest less than 
a year, having no previous healthcare background. The Board made Pete several counter 
offers, eventually offering him slightly more than he had been offered at OOH. Pete, 
however, was weary of the convoluted Board committee control over operational decisions. 
In tears, Wanda begged Pete not to leave, saying that she couldn't run the hospital without 
him. However, Pete told me that Wanda only spent a couple of hours with him in the two 
months following Mr. Maccallum 's departure. In contrast, Mr. Maccallum rarely ever 
make a substantial decision without Pete's input. Pete was also disgusted with Wanda's 
salary increase. He thought it was completely unwarranted in view of her qualifications. 
Additionally, Human Resources, under Wanda's direction, had just completed a scientific job 
description and classification system. They hired a firm for this very purpose, spending 
thousands of dollars. Pete was incensed that Wanda simply ignored the minimum educa-
tional and experience requirements formulated for the position of Administrator when she 
accepted the appointment 
Pete certainly "burned his bridges" before he left. He wrote Wanda a scathing 
memo that said, among other things, that Wanda was not a leader and did not have the 
background to make administrative decisions. Pete read· the memo to Wanda at his last 
meeting with her. Her response was that she never wanted the position in the first place. 
Shortly after Pete left in mid-December, Mike Oelke, the Connection Card 
Coordinator, announced his resignation. Mike had been frustrated with the Connection Card 
program and he did not see any future for his position. He found a government position 
working in a mainframe computer environment. 
Teresa Brekke shocked the hospital by announcing her resignation effective February 
15, 1989. Teresa had always been the most creative, talented and productive employee in 
Marketing. Even more important, her attitude literally gave everyone hope that things 
would improve. Therefore, when she resigned, it was very distressing to everyone in 
administration. She accepted the position of Director of Physician Recruitment at the 
Oklahoma City Oinic. This position, she said, would allow her to broaden her skills. 
Privately, Teresa expressed disappointment concerning Wanda's leadership. 
Organizational leadership was of great importance to Teresa and she was extremely 
confident in Mr. Maccallum. In fact, no one expressed greater sorrow at his resignation. 
Unfortunately, she could not follow Wanda with the same enthusiasm. 
On March 6, 1989, Hillcrest hired Janet Sellers to become the new Director of 
Marketing/Public Relations. Janet formerly worked in the Public Relations department at 
Presbyterian Hospital in Oklahoma City. 
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Physician pressure on Eddie Wiseman increased substantially in 1989.11 The 
physicians had been promised a new Hospital Information System (HIS) a year earlier and 
very little had actually been accomplished. Dr. Joe Anderson, a very outspoken Internal 
Medicine specialist, led the physician opposition. Meanwhile, Gary McElwee, LAN 
Administrator, and several other Data Processing Department employees met with Wanda in 
early March to report their dissatisfaction with Eddie. 
On Tuesday, April 4, Dr. Anderson and Dr. Larry Schwartz, another vocal critic of 
Eddie, showed up uninvited at an Information Systems steering committee meeting. These 
meetings were held to discuss the Hospital Information System (HIS) options available to 
the hospital and were attended by Wanda and most of the department managers. Dr. 
Anderson and Dr. Schwartz proceeded to castigate Eddie about the lack of progress on the 
HIS and Eddie's inability to grasp the technical issues involved. According to Glenna 
Coultas, the meeting was "stormy." Eddie was officially "placed on probation" that day. In 
reality, he was given the opportunity to resign with two weeks notice. Eddie's last day was 
April 18, 1989. Gary McElwee was named Interim Data Processing Manager. 
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"He's only getting what's coming to him," commented Glenna Coultas. "Eddie did 
everything he could to undennine the Connection Card program. He told us specifically not 
to support the Connection Card in any way and when you left, he told us that it had been a 
mistake to begin with and he was going to dismantle it." 
Review of Each Program 10 
Physician Referral 
Calls to South Oklahoma City Physician Referral have remained strong with about 
200 - 250 actual referrals occurring each month. In its first year of existence, Physician 
Referral generated over $200,000 in gross revenue. Betty Overstreet reported that the 
hospital as a whole seems to be satisfied with the perfonnance of Physician Referral. 
However, Betty became distressed over the changes in the Marketing staff. She 
interviewed for the position of Physician Referral Specialist at Oklahoma Osteopathic 
Hospital in Tulsa in late March but did not get the position. When I last spoke to her in 
early April, she told me she was continuing to interview because she "had to get out of this 
place." 
Physician Practice Support 
Physician Practice Support is another area which has experienced good success with 
few problems. Nicholas Hahalis has provided practice assessments for 42 physicians out of 
a total staff of 73. Most of the physicians interested in an assessment have already 
received one and as of April, 1989, Nicholas was primarily providing follow up consulting 
for physicians. 
Nicholas has always been involved in healthcare ventures apart from his hospital 
consulting. He expects to leave Hillcrest soon.-to further develop a healthcare plan called 
"Medical Trust" that operates similarly to an Health Maintenance Organization (HMO). 
Occupational Health 
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After the disastrous Physician Steering Committee meeting referred to in Chapter VI, 
all promotion of Occupational Health ceased. While the Physician Steering Committee 
maintained that they still wanted an Occupational Health program, the Good Neighbor Care 
price and treatment guidelines were abandoned almost immediately. After no progress was 
made developing a program acceptable to the physicians, discussion about the program 
slowly faded away. By January, 1989, Occupational Health had essentially dissolved. 
Vicki Mathews became involved with the Behavioral Medicine Center, doing 
whatever was needed. She attended seminars as a representative of the BMC and basically 
performed "odd jobs" as needed. 
Connection Card 
As mentioned before, because Eddie Wiseman opposed the Connection Card so 
vigorously, the supporting computer system was only installed in outpatient registration. 
Once I left, he tried to dismantle even that portion of the system but was restrained by the 
protests of Teresa Brekke. Teresa also tried to get the system expanded to the inpatient 
admitting area and the Emergency Room as per the original plans but Eddie paralyzed this 
process by claiming that it would require $60,000 in new equipment to install the system in 
these areas. 
Finally, in February, 1989, a physician's wife with a Connection Card came into the 
Emergency Room. Because there was no computer database with her information to speed 
registration, the ER registration took the same amount of time as it would for a person 
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without a Connection Card. This infuriated the physician who recognized that the Card 
made no difference whatsoever. The physician angrily called Wanda about the situation. 
Wanda called Eddie and demanded the system be expanded to inpatient admitting and the 
Emergency Room. Eddie told Gary McElwee to get the system installed quick. Since the 
computers had previously been purchased, Gary McElwee simply purchased two printers that 
cost about $1000 and brought the system up in a couple of days. Within two weeks, all of 
the end users had been trained and the Connection Card computer system was fully 
operational. 
Though the computer support was finally installed, the promotion of the program 
had fallen to Steve Petty, who was transferred to Marketing from the Business Office. 
Steve had no experience in Marketing and he simply tried to keep the program afloat. 
After four months of further promotion, the Connection Card program was deemphasized. 
As of April, 1989, the Card program was simply being maintained at current levels of 
membership. 
Public Relations 
After Teresa Brekke's resignation, advertising decreased sharply. However, annual 
public relations events continued with the help of other hospital staff members. 
Morale and Expectations 
Both Cathy Adams and Nicholas Hahalis described Hillcrest in April, 1989 as a 
"ship adrift without a captain." The medical staff has become extremely negative and, 
according to Nicholas, they are becoming dissatisfied with Wanda's leadership to the point 
of demanding her resignation. Cathy disagreed with this assessment but she did think that 
Wanda would leave of her own volition in the near future. "Wanda honestly doesn't want 
her job," Cathy said, "She told me, 'Cathy, I guarantee you I won't be here a long time."' 
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The leadership vacuum is evidenced by Wanda's avoidance of medical staff 
meetings. "She has simply stopped going," Cathy said, "In fact, she's only working about 
six hours a day." Both Nicholas and Cathy complained that important decisions are delayed 
and "finn" decisions are reversed numerous times. This has severely affected employee 
morale. "I think eighty percent of the managers would leave if they had a place to go," 
Cathy said. The much needed building program is at a standstill. 
In the absence of administrative leadership, the medical staff has begun to assert 
itself in operational decisions. The medical staff has always tried to exercise undo influence 
on administrative decisions but Mr. Maccallum maintained a clear separation between 
physician input and physician imposition. Otherwise, it becomes very difficult for the 
administration to manage properly. The trend toward physician imposition in administrative 
decision-making has become alanning at Hillcrest, according to Cathy and Nicholas. 
Summary 
What began as a bold initiative filled with promise and excitement concluded far 
short of its original objectives in general disarray. Why? What fatally crippled this 
ambitious project? 
PMCI proposed a bold plan in a very short time frame. For Hillcrest Health Center 
and possibly for any other hospital, the time frame was far too short. To finish a project 
of that magnitude in 12 months was a noble but foolish objective. To accomplish this, 
each program would needed to be developed and implemented without any major problems. 
This is too much to expect. PMCI should have proposed a longer time frame taking into 
account the problems and setbacks that occur in any organizational setting. There is no 
penalty for accomplishing a task early. PMCI over promised and under delivered. 
From the beginning, the PSN was "fast-tracked" through the approval process. By 
doing so, the Board of Directors and the medical staff never fully supported the PSN and 
never really gained a sense of "ownership" in the ensuing development. They recognized 
the methods that were utilized to "force" the PSN through committees without the normal 
approvals. Later, when problems occurred, these groups were the first to openly criticize 
rather than support the project. It is probable that pushing the project through the process 
created hidden animosity which appeared when the project encountered problems. 
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Also related to the initial handling of the approval process was the funding for the 
project. Because adequate funding was never requested at the onset, the PSN was 
continually delayed because the funding was not available. I was told numerous times to 
"wait until the new budget" for items needed immediately. In reality, this was ludicrous 
because the "new" budget year began in July, 1988 and the project was to have been 
completed in August 1988. This resulted in numerous personnel and equipment delays 
which inevitably caused time delays. When the new budget was finally developed, it was 
triple the previous budget and by that time, delays had engendered significant animosity 
from the very groups needed for budget approval. 
Eddie Wiseman was also a major cause of project difficulties. His almost total 
incompetence combined with direct hostility toward the PSN resulted in a six month delay 
of the principal programs. In addition to the delay in the computer system which served as 
a foundation to the PSN, his antagonistic opposition caused PMCT and myself divert our 
energy from other program developments as we tried to counter his disruptions. Pete 
Thibeault, by allowing this situation to continue month after month, fully aware of Eddie's 
incompetence and hostility, himself played an indirect role in the project failure. If Eddie 
Wiseman had not been employed at Hillcrest, the PSN would have been implemented far 
11UJre successfully. 
No one could have foreseen the administrative upheaval which transpired. Mr. 
Maccallum played a crucial role in the PSN success because of his eminent stature in the 
eyes of the Board and the medical staff. When he left, those who opposed the project were 
free to attack with tacit approval from the new administrator. It is amazing how fast the 
PSN unraveled once this process began. 
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Finally, I made several errors because of inexperience. I was not able to engender 
support from other managers or from physicians and this resulted in little cooperation from 
these groups. Because of time constraints, I made several key incorrect decisions. For 
example, I did not consult the appropriate department or physician group before making a 
decision directly affecting them. Instances like these compounded the problems from other 
sources. 
Overall, the Physician Support Network development and implementation at Hillcrest 
Health Center was unsuccessful. The hospital benefitted significantly from the programs 
which were successfully implemented but when compared to the original objectives, the 
final results fell woefully short. 
A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
1. Unless otherwise indicated, all information on the early background of Hillcrest 
Osteopathic Hospital issued from a personal interview with Dr. Leon Silvers, January 12, 
1989. 
2. Jones, Bob E. (1978). The Difference a D.O. Makes. Oklahoma City: Oklahoma 
Educational Foundation for Osteopathic Medicine. p. 35. 
2. Weiss, Laura Burstein and Spence, Ann Bennett (1973). Osteopathic Medicine (Chapter 
reprint by the American Association of Colleges of Osteopathic Medicine from A Guide to 
the Health Professions originally published by the Harvard University Office of Career 
Studies and Off-Campus Learning: Cambridge, Massachusetts.) p. 3. 
3. Mills, Lawrence W. (1965). The Osteopathic Profession and Its Colleges. Chicago, 
lliinois: American Osteopathic Association. p. 3. 
4. Silvers, ibid. 
5. Jones, Bob E. pp. 52-53 
6. Jones, ibid. 
7. Weiss, Laura Burstein and Spence, Ann Bennett, p. 7. 
8. State of Oklahoma Worker's Compensation Court Annual Report, 1986/87, p. 75. 
9. Unless otherwise indicated, information on the founding of PMCI issued from a personal 
interview with Michael Bernstein, February 24, 1989. 
10. Unless otherwise indicated, information about the current status of Hillcrest was 
obtained from personal interviews with Nicholas Hahalis on April 3, 1989, Cathy Adams on 
April 4, 1989 and numerous telephone conversations with Betty Overstreet. 
11. Information about Data Processing Department developments issued from interviews 
with Gary McElwee, Local Area Network Administrator and his assistant, Glenna Coultas 




AGREEMENT BETWEEN HILLCREST HEALTH CENTER AND PMCI 
AGREEMENT 
THE FOLLOWING AGREEMENT is being executed between PROFESSIONAL 
MARKETING CONSULTANTS, INCORPORATED, a Colorado Corporation, 
hereinafter referred to as ''PMCI" located at 11479 South Pine 
Drive, Parker, Colorado; and HILLCREST HEALTH CENTER, hereinafter 
referred to as "HHC" located at 2129 S.W. 59th Street, Oklahoma 
City, Oklahoma, for the purposes as defined below and pursuant to 
the terms and conditions as stated herein: 
1.0 PROJECT DEFINITION 
1.1 PMCI shall act as the primary marketing contractor to HHC 
for the purpose of implementing a Physician Support Network 
(PSN) at HHC as well as other specific product lines defined 
in Appendix I(A) - I(H). 
1.2 A Physician Support Network (PSN) as referenced in this 
Agreement shall mean, "the implementation of an integrated 
marketing program designed to strengthen primary care and 
remote physician alliances to HHC through the creation, 
promotion, and enhancement of HHC programs and services." 
1.3 For purposes of this Agreement, HHC's primary or immediate 
service area shall be described as a geographic area 
encompassing the counties identified in Appendix II of this 
Agreement, and by this reference shall become a part of this 
Agreement. 
2.0 PROJECT SCOPE 
2.1 The scope of work to be performed by PMCI shall include, but 
may not be limited to, the following specific projects: 
A. The design of a Physician Support Network 
Business/Action Plan; 
B. The design, implementation, and promotion of a Physician 
Referral and Program Information Service; 
C. The design, implementation, and promotion of a 
Occupational Health-Case Management program; 
D. The design, implementation, and promotion of a 
comprehensive Emergency Department Marketing program; 
E. The design and implementation of a Physician Practice 




F. The design of an integrated Network Data Information 
program; 
G. The design, packaging, and promotion of the HHC Women's 
Health Services Program; 
H. The design, packaging, and promotion of the HHC 
Behavioral Medicine Center. 
2.2 Action steps for projects identified in Section 2.1 shall be 
included in Appendix I(A) - I(H) of this Agreement and by 
this reference shall become a part of this Agreement. 
2.3 The substitution of projects as outlined in section 2.1 
shall be at the discretion of HHC and projects defined in 
section 2.1 and Appendix I(A) - I(H) may be altered, 
amended, deleted, and/or other projects may be incorporated 
providing PMCI and HHC arrive at a mutually agreeable 
implementation schedule for such alterations, amendments, 
deletions, and/or other projects. Such alterations, 
amendments, deletions, and/or other projects not originally 
defined in Appendix I(A) - I(H) of this Agreement shall be 
documented by PMCI and shall become, by reference, a part of 
this Agreement when accepted by both parties. 
2.4 The scope of this project shall also include the necessary 
and required training by PMCI of designated HHC personnel 
associated with the Physician Support Network (PSN) to 
insure the program's long term success. 
2.5 The scope of the work to be performed by PMCI shall include, 
may not be limited to: 
A. The program design and documentation; 
B. The program packaging and pricing; 
C. The establishment of acceptable program policies and 
procedures; 
D. Assisting with the designing of appropriate program 
collateral and promotional materials; and 
E. The training of persons associated with program 
operations. 
3.0 DUTIES AND WARRANTIES 
3.1 PMCI shall use its best efforts to perform and implement the 
components as described in this Agreement, and warrants to 
use its full power, legal and authoritative right to 





the officer executing this Agreement on behalf of PMCI has 
th~ full right and authority to do so. 
3.2 PMCI and its personnel shall demonstrate its most 
profe~sional manner in the design, development, 
implementation, training, and execution of this Agreement 
and shall be held accountable to James Maccallum, Executive 
Vice President, or his designee, for the manner of the 
duties of this Agreement. 
3.3 Costs of services and/or materials {i.e. computer hardware, 
software, printing, postage) supplied by third party vendors 
are not reflected in the costs defined in Section 5.0 of 
this Agreement, and PMCI cannot be held liable for any 
services and/or materials not directly provided by PMCI or 
its subsidiaries. 
3.4 PMCI makes no warranty or representation, expressed or 
implied, that the Physician Support Network Programs as 
defined in the Agreement and the referenced Appendix I(A) -
I{H} will, after being implemented, have a specified impact 
on the utilization of HHC's physicians or 
inpatient/outpatient facilities affiliated, owned, and/or 
managed by HHC. 
3.5 PMCI shall take full responsibility for the execution of 
this Agreement and shall work with and/or assist others 
within the HHC organization to provide an atmosphere 
conducive to the harmonious implementation of this project. 
4.0 TERM 
4.1 The length of term of the Agreement shall be for a period of 
twelve (12) months. This twelve month period shall commence 
after PMCI's first HHC authorized site visit, and shall 
occur following receipt of HHC's executed Agreement and 
deposit amount as defined in Section 5.0 of this Agreement. 
PMCI reserves the right to extend the length of this 
Agreement in the event that HHC should fail to provide the 
requested information in a timely fashion per Section 6.1 of 
this Agreement. 
4.2 Notwithstanding the foregoing, either party may cancel this 
Agreement only after 6 months from the date of execution, 
provided the terminating party notifies the other party in 
writing at least thirty (30) days prior to the intended date 
of cancellation. Said termination shall become effective 





4.3 Should this Agreement be cancelled by either party, all 
monies and fees must be paid to the appropriate parties 
prior to the date of cancellation and cannot be held by the 
terminating party pending resolution of any dispute which 
may require arbitration or legal action. 
5.0 PROJECT COSTS 
5.1 PMCI shall invoice HHC and HHC agrees to pay such invoicing 
within fifteen (15) days following receipt of invoice from 
PMCI according to the following schedule: 
TOTAL PROJECT COST 
DEPOSIT DUE WITH AGREEMENT 
MONTHLY AMOUNT TO BE INVOICED 
(for 12 consecutive months beginning 
thirty {30) days following the execution 




5.2 All costs stated in this section shall represent "Total 
Costs" to HHC as it relates to all training and PMCI 
materials as described in Section 2.0, and all PMCI 
personnel necessary to fulfill the terms and obligations of 
this Agreement. 
5.3 Costs outlined in Section 5.1 do not include the actual cost 
of reasonable travel, lodging, and per diem of PMCI staff 
incurred on behalf of HHC. These direct out-of-pocket 
expenses will be invoiced to HHC as a separate line item on 
the monthly invoice and are due and payable with the monthly 
invoice. PMCI shall receive pre-approval on all expenses to 
be invoiced to HHC. 
5.4 Costs stated in this clause shall not include costs incurred 
by HHC personnel, third party personnel, or other persons 
who participate in this project including but not limited to 
personnel time, travel, lodging, per diem, training, and 
materials. 
5.5 PMCI warrants the costs stated herein shall not be increased 
during the term of this Agreement unless HHC chooses to 
expand the scope of this project. Alterations, amendments, 
deletions, and/or other projects as defined in Section 2.3 
shall be considered "substitutions" and therefore shall not 





6.0 GENERAL TERMS 
6.1 HHC shall make available to PMCI and its representatives any 
HHC personnel and financial, demographic, or utilization 
information deemed appropriate to the success of this 
project providing reasonable notice has been given by PMCI. 
6.2 Both parties to this Agreement recognize the sensitive 
nature of this project and the proprietary relationship of 
the information deemed important to the success of this 
project; therefore both parties to this Agreement shall 
treat all information regarding this project as confidential 
and shall exercise due care and caution with its use. This 
statement of confidentiality shall survive the term of this 
Agreement. 
6.3 Due to the magnitude and scope of these projects, both 
parties understand and agree that a cooperative effort 
between the parties is required for successful 
implementation. Both parties agree to dedicate appropriate 
manpower as well as other resources required to execute the 
terms of this Agreement. 
6.4 If either party institutes arbitration or legal proceedings 
to enforce any portion of this Agreement, the prevailing 
party shall be entitled to receive all costs and fees, 
including reasonable attorney's fees, incurred in the 
enforcement of this Agreement. 
6.5 PMCI is acting as an independent contractor under this 
Agreement and no act shall be construed to any employee, 
officer, or board member of either party which violates the 
independent contractor status of PMCI. 
6.6 This Agreement represents the entire agreement between the 
parties and supercedes all prior oral and written 
communications. No representation or statement made by 
either party to the other not stated herein shall be binding 
on either party. 
6.7 This Agreement shall be construed and interpreted in 
accordance with the laws of the State of Colorado. 
6.8 If any provision in this Agreement is held by a court of 
competent jurisdiction to be invalid, void, or 
unenforceable, the remaining provisions will nevertheless 
continue in full force without being impaired or invalidated 






6.9 HHC recognizes that as long as there is no breach of this 
Agreement and providing this Agreement is not terminated 
prior to the end of the twelve (12) month period, PMCI shall 
not take part in any business, association, or affiliation 
that competes with HHC within HHC's service area, as defined 
in Appendix II of this Agreement, for a period not to exceed 
three (3) years from the original termination date of this 
Agreement. HHC recognizes that a portion of PMCI's fee 
described in Section 5.2 of this Agreement reflects the 
inability of PMCI to market its services, programs, and/or 
employees within the service area of HHC for the period 
defined herein. 
BE IT HEREBY Agreed and Approved as written by the following duly 
authorized representatives of both parties: 
THIS __ /_day of 
HILLCREST HEALTH CENTER 
'es 
ecutive Vice President 
PROFESSIONAL MARKETING CONSULTANTS, INCORPORATED 
Micnael Bernstein 







PHYSICIAN SURVEY INSTURMENT AND 
DATA COLLECTION WORKSHEETS 
HILLCREST HEALTH CENTER 
PHYSICIAN SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
SEPTEMBER 1987 
1. What is your specialty? 
GB 101 
2. How long have you practised within Hillcrest Health Center's 
primary service area? 
Years 
3. On average, how many total patients to you admit to hospitals on 
a monthly basis? 
~~~~~~ 
average patients per month 
4. What are the main reasons you support Hillcrest Health Center? 
5. What are the characteristics about Hillcrest Health Center that 
you like least? 
6. Do you presently use the ER department to treat your patients? 
In what way? What is your impression of ER? 
7. What specific services/programs can the hospital offer your 
practice specialty to help you competitively? 
8. Are you presently working with area employers to provide 
industrial/occupational health services? 
Yes No 
If yes, what type of services are you providing? 
9. Have other hospitals approached you seeking an affiliation? 
yes No 
Which hospitals? 




11. What is your main reason for admitting to hospitals other than 
Hillcrest Health Center? 
12. What does Hillcrest Health Center need to do differently in the 
next three years to stay competitive? 
13. In general, do you feel you have easy access to the 
administration at Hillcrest Health Center? 
14. Are you accepting new patients into your practice? 
Yes No 
15. Has your practice volume increased, decreased or remained the 
same in the past 2 years? 
Increased D~creased Same 
16. Would you support Hillcrest Health Center marketing area 
residents and referring them to your practice? 
Yes No 
FORM 7 INSTRUCTIONS 
1. Indicate the year covered as the Last Year. 
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EMERGENCY ROOM PROFILE 
R Visits 
umber Admitted 
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ercent Admitted 
ercent of Hospital 
Admissions 
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~orm 7 continued 
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SURGICAL PROFILE 
~otal Surg. Visits 
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Revenue 
-- ... - ...... ·····-···-······ ·······-····-·· -~~,,...,...-.. -. -..... ~--.---. ~=---.. --.. -··:-•···:-··---:--='""'.;··-·--::--~~:-.........--::= ..... ,,-~ ..~-~-~···--:---:·-~-. --~·-=---=-=---· = 
urgeries/100 Admits 




FORM 11 INSTRUCTIONS 
1. Enter all .information requested for all patients discharged 
during the sample period. Please code the physician 
specialties and destination of the patient from the code 
list below. 
Specialty Codes: 
01 - Family/General Practice 
02 - Internal Medicine 
03 - Obstetrics/Gynecology 
04 - Pediatrics 
OS - Allergy 
06 - Cardiology 
07 - Dermatology 
08 - Endocrinology 
09 - Gastroenterology 
10 - Hematology/Oncology 
11 - Infectious Disease 
12 - Nephrology 
?" 
13 - Neurology 
14 - Phy Med/Rehabilitation 
15 - Pulmonary Medicine 
16 - Rheumatology 
17 - General Surgery 
Destination Codes: 
1 - Home/Family 
2 Nursing Home 
3 Other Hospital 
4 Expired 
18 - Neurosurgery 
19 - Ophthalmology 
20 - Orthopedic Surgery 
21 - Otolaryngology 
22 - Plastic Surgery 
23 - Proctology 
24 - Urology 
25 - Vascular/Thoracic Surgery 
26 - Dentistry 
27 - Psychiatry 
28 - Podiatry 
29 - Anesthesiology 
30 - Emergency Medicine 
31 - Pathology 
32 - Radiology 
33 - Nuclear Medicine 
34 - All Other 
5 - Retirement Facility 
6 - Home Care 
7 - Other 
2. Use the above information and codes to fill out forms 12 and 
13, concerning outpatients and emergency room patients, 
respectively. On these forms, however, substitute the CPT 
code (Current Procedural Terminology) for the DRG. This 
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Age Snecial tv Guarantor Coverage ~C0de~ 
FORM 15 INSTRUCTIONS 
Information for this form is available from your state or local 









For each zipcode or city in your service area, record the 
t6tal number of physici~ns in each specialty category. 
Form 14, the medical staff analysis, will show the count of 
your medical staff by zipcode. Enter this in Column E. 
Add columns A through D and enter the sum in Column G. 
Column F is equal to the difference between Columns G and E. 
Column H data can be found on Form 2. 
Dividing Column H by Column G will give you the population 
to physician ratio. If this ration is greater than 2000 to 
1, then some very real opportunities exist in that area. 
Total each page, then add these subtotals to get a grand 
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Your Hosp. Other Total Area Popula't 
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-
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Form A 
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA REQUEST 
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reas. 
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PATIENT DISCHARGE ANALYSIS 
EMERGENCY ROOM PATIENTS 
Sample Period: 
(A ~~q month sample is recommended) 
(~Ii!,.;- I ·~ /i· • / C, _..,_·, JC~, lo_) 
)-·-···--····· ····- .... ··----······- ) 
"') ---- .. ·---.... ______ -
~ij~ie\- ~~R Patient Inpat Outpat /''I Patient Zip Code ·~· Age Employer Insurer Admit Admit 
EMERGENCY ROOM UTILIZATION 
Number of Visits 















* Projected Year to Date 
EMERGENCY ROOM UTILIZATION 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 to Da 
ED Visits 
ED Patients 1(-
Admitted to Hospital 
Percent of ED Patients 
Admitted to Hospital 
Total Hospital 
Admissions 
ED Admits as a Percent 
of Hospital Admits 
PROFESSIONAL MARKETING CONSULTANTS, INC. 
tiWLTI-VARIABLE WEIGHTED 
~ALYSIS.MATRIX 
HILLCREST HEALTH CENTER 
E:c=======~=============:======~=:=====:=====z:======:======:=~==~=: 
Criteria 
. . . . Weight Value . . ALL 
. . . . CARD . . CR SURG 
. . . . DERM . . ENDO 
. . . . 
========================:========:=====:====~=:======:======:======: 
~ospital Mission 
. . . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . . 
. . . . 
------------------------·--------·-----·------·------·------·------· 
?ercent of Revenue 
:ollected (Commercial) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
------------------------·--------·-----·------·------·------·------· 
?ercent of Overall 
~evenue 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . . . 
. . . . 
------------------------·--------·-----·------·------·------·------· 
racility Investment 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
------------------------·--------·-----·------·------·------·------· 
~quipment Investment 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
------------------------:--------:-----:------:------:------:------: 
Physician Affiliations/ 
)eals in Progress . . 
. . . . . . 
. . . . 






. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 




. . . . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . . . 





PROFESSIONAL MARKETING CONSULTANTS, INC. 
MULTI-VARIABLE WEIGHTED 
ANALYSIS MATRIX 
HILLCREST HEALTH CENTER 
========================:========:====:======_:======:=~===:=====: 
Criteria 
. . . . Weight Value 
. . 
FP . . GAST 
. . . . 
. . GEN 
SURG : HEM 
. . . . INF : DIS : 
========================.:========:====:======:======:=====:=====: 
Hospital Mission 
. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
. . 
------------------------·--------·----·------·------·-----·-----· 
Percent of Revenue 
Collected (Commercial) 
. . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . . . 
. . . . . . 
------------------------·--------·----·------·------·-----·-----· 
Percent of Overall 
Revenue 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
------------------------·--------·----·------·------·-----·-----· . . . . . . . . 
Facility Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . 
------------------------·--------·----·------·------·-----·-----· 
Equipment Investment 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
------------------------:--------:----:------:------:-----:-----: 
Physician Affiliations/ 
Deals in Progress 
. . . . 
. . . . . . 




. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
. . 









PROFESSIONAL MARKETING CONSULTANTS, INC. 
MULTI-VARIABLE WEIGHTED 
ANALYSIS MATRIX 





. . . . IM . . 
. . 





. . . . 
========================:========:====:======:=======:=======:=====: 
aospital Mission 
. . . . . . 
. . . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
------------------------·--------·----·------·-------·-------·-----· 
Percent of Revenue 
:ollected (Commercial) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
------------------------·--------·----·------·-------·-------·-----· . ' . . . . . . 
?ercent of Overall 
itevenue 
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . . . 
. . . . 
------------------------·--------·----·------·-------·-------·-----· 
~acility Investment 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
------------------------·--------·----·------·-------·-------·-----· 
~quipment Investment 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
------------------------·--------·----·------·-------·-------·-----· 
?hysician Affiliations/ 
)eals in Progress 
. . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 




. . . . . . . 
. . . . 





. . . . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . . . 





PROFESSIONAL MARKETING CONSULTANTS, INC. 
!ofULTI-VARIABLE WEIGHTED 
~NALYSIS MATRIX 
HILLCREST HEALTH CENTER 
========================:========:=======·:=======:=====:=====:=====: 
Criteria 
. . . . Weight Value 
. . . . OPHTH 
. . . . OR THO SURG 
. . . . r;-JJ'I: OTO : PED 
. . . . PHY MED 
. . . . 
========================:========:=======:=~=====:=====:=====:=====: 
lospital Mission 
. . . . 
. . . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
------------------------·--------·-------·-------·-----·-----·-----· 
>ercent of Revenue 
:ollected (Commercial) 
. . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . . -. 
. . . . . . 
·-----------------------·--------·-------·-------·-----·-----·-----· 
•ercent of Overall 
~evenue 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
·-----------------------·--------·-------·-------·-----·-----·-----· 
'acility Investment 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
·-----------------------:--------:-------:-------:-----:-----:-----: 
:quipment Investment . . . . . . . . . . 
·-----------------------:--------:-------:-------:-----:-----:-----: 
'hysician Affiliations/ 
1eals in Progress 
. . . . . . 
. . . . 




. . . . . . . . . .. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 




. . . . . . . . . 
. . 
. . 
. . . . . . . . 





PROFESSIONAL MARKETING CONSULTANTS, INC. 
~TI-VARIABLE WEIGHTED 
lLYSIS MATRIX 
HILLCREST HEALTH CENTER 
======================:========:======:=====:=======:=====:======:======: . Weight . PLAS . . p.ftll!.- . PUL . . THOR . . . . • . . . . 
Criteria . Value . SURG . POD . PSYCH . MED . RHEU . SURG . . . • . . . . . 
======================:========:======:=====:=======:=====:======:======:: 
ipi tal Mission 
. . . . 
. . . . 
. . 
: 
. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
·---------------------·--------·------·-----·-------·-----·------·------·· 
·cent of Revenue 
. lected (Commercial) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
·---------------------·--------·------·-----·-------·-----·------·------·· 
·cent of Overall 
·enue 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
·---------------------·--------·------·-----·-------·-----·------·------·-
~ility Investment 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
-------~-------------·--------·------·-----·-------·-----·------·------·-
.ipment Investment 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
---------------------·--------·------·-----·-------·-----·------·------·-
sician Affiliations/ 
ls in Progress 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. • . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 




. . . . . . . . 
. . 
. . . . . . 
. . . . . . 
. . . . . . 




. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . 
. . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 







....... ""1-i&;;u 1 nc.- .1-1 n \.ICN I t:H 
IMPLEMENTATION ACTION PLAN 
Physician Support Network 
JMPl..DGDITA"ftON TAllCI UQVIRED RESPONSIBLS 1887 1988 PARTY 
9 rtO 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
A. HIT!()gg ADllINISTJlATIOH 
Coordinate with HHC executive management -
Appoint/coordinate with physician 
adviaory coamittee(s) 
Develop iapleaentation strategy/timing --
Deteraine aanagement priorities 
a. BUSINISS PLAlf 
Collect internal/external market data • 
Interview •elected phyaiciana -
Analyse data/identify needs and/or trend 
Draft aini-plan• by program 
l.OI by progr-
C. PllQttQTION 
Deteraine pbya~cian affiliations by 
location 
Integrate aarketing effort 
- Boapital progr-/departmenta 
- Ooo4 Keiabbar/O~h•• ft~-~~-·--
HILLCREST HEAL.TH CENTER 
IMPLEMENTATION ACTION PLAN 
Physician Support Network 
IMPLDISMTA'ftON TASICI UQUU\SD 
RBSPONllBLS 1187 
PARTY 
9 ,10 11 
D. STAFFING 
rree-up Marketing Director time 
Recruit Healthcare Public Relation• 
Manager 
B. IMPLBHBNTATION OF PROGRAMS 
Phyaician Referral System ---
Baergency Department Marketing --- _,. ---
Occupational Medicine --- --
Practice Management/aupport i--
Woaen'• Health .... ---· 
Behavioral Medicine 
Network inforaation -- --
1188 





-- .... - -
--- -- ,__ 
HILLCREST HEALTH CENTER 
IMPLEMENTATION ACTION PLAN 
Physician Referral/Program Information Service 
IMPl.DdNTATION TAIJCI UQVIRSD 
RESPONSDSLS 1987 PARTY 
9 110 11 rl2 1 
A. APHINISTgATIQN 
Obtain pbyaician coamitment to PRS 
- Syatea requirement• 
- Level of participation 
- Weighting for referral 
- Appointaent confirmation 
- Reporting to physician 
Obtain department commitment to 
prograa information service 
- Inventory programs 
- Inventory minor emergency/physician 
off ices 
Select PRS 
- Manual veraus automated 
- Site vi•it(a) 
- Negotiate contract(•) 
Order bardware/aoftware/maintenance 
1988 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
MILL~Ht:~ I Ht:AL.I H (;ENTER 
IMPLEMENTATION ACTION PLAN 
Physician Referral/Program Information Service 
IMPLDIDITATION TASXI UQVJRSD RESPONllBU 1187 PARTY 
9 10 11 12 1 2 
B. QISIGH 
Draft operator protocol• 
Gather physician data 
Gather prograa data -
Coapute ROI 
- deteraine benefit• 
- deteraine volume 
- deteraine operating coats 
- deteraine capital coats 
Deteraine aource• of undoctored patients 
and how to link them into PRS 
Draft aaintenance (info change) forms -- aedical ataff off ice 
- phy•ician aupport 
- departaenta/program• with 
coaaunity education requirement• 
C. PgQMQTIOlf 
Deteraine name of service -
Deteraine telephone number(s) for aervice -Develop promotional •trategiea 
- advertiaing copy 
- collateral• 
1988 
3 4 5 6 7 8 
-
- -----· ·-""' I I ''-"'.._ .. n Vl:;I~ I en 
IMPLEMENTATION ACTION PLAN 
Physician Referral/Program Information Service 
IMPUDIDITA110N TAIXI RSQVIRSD 
RBSPONllBU 1187 
PARTY 
9 10 11 12 1 
-
o. STAPPING 
Provide telephone receptionist job 
deac:ription 
-




- file maintenance 
- referral/appointment 
- program registration 
- protocols 
Enter "maater" data 
"Go live" with PRS 
"Go live" with program information service 
F. FOLLOW-UP 
Fine-tune protocols 
Review/update promotion as required 
Review phyaician/program maintenance 
tor compliance 
Incorporate new program cross reterral 
aa appropriate 
1988 




MILL\.il'1C~ I t1t:A ... I H CENTER 
IMPLEMENTATION ACTION PLAN 
Emergency Department Marketing 
JMPLDIDITATION TAllCI RSQVJRSD 
RBIPONSlllLS 1187 PARTY 




- facility considerations 
- staffing 
- training 
Recommend general facility improvements 
Assess whether to coordinate with good 
neighbor prooram/urgi-care centers 
Determine BR activity/profile in other 
consumer programs 
8. DESIGN 
Review/update standing order protocols . 
Develop policies and procedures for new 
programs 
Prepare benefit package 
Determine BR cross-sale capability 
1988 
t12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
.__ 
n11 .. a..vnco 1 ncl'\1- • ,., vc1-,i 1 en 
IMPLEMENTATION ACTION PLAN 
Emergency Department Marketing 
-
IMPUDdNTA'ftON TAllCI UQUIRSD 
RBSPONllBLS 1187 1988 
PARTY 
9 10 11 r12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Review BKS relation• program 
Deaign Hellipad strategy 
Draft program coordinator role/procedure --
Develop guest relations 
procedure/follow-up 
Coapute ROI 
- operating coats 
- capital coats 
- collection history 
C. PJ!OMOTION 
Develop promotion strategies 
- EMS 
- direct mail 
- electronic/print media 
- coaaunity interface 
- physician referral 
- boapital newaletter 
- hospital public relation 
Develop croaa-aale opportunities 
D. 
B. 
HILLCREST HEALfH CENTER 
IMPLEMENTATION ACTION PLAN 
Emergency Department Marketing 
IMPl.DdNTATIOH TAllCI RSQVIRSD RBSPONSIBLS 1187 PARTY 
9 10 11 
STAFFING 
· Identify fast track/pre-registration 
coordinator 
Identify guest relations representative 
INSTALLATION 
Train staff on new procedures 
Start-up programs identified in 
step A and B 




"Fine-tune" promotion as appropriate 
1988 
12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
-
·-
IMPLEMENTATION ACTION PLAN 
Occupational Health Program 
IMPLDIDTA110N TASJCI RSQUIRSD RBSPONSIBLS 1987 PARTY 
9 10 111 
A. APHINISTltATION 
Enhancement analy•i• of current package 
Deteraine provider access site• 
Coordinate interdepartment participation 
Deteraine f eea 
Deteraine discounting 
B•tabliah market penetration goals -
8. DESIGN 
Draft c~mponents of program 
- work•ite nursing 
- worker'• compensation 
- card program 
De•ign interface with pre-registration 
and PRS 
Draft policies/procedures/protocols 
Prepare benefit package 
Select bu•iness/industry targets 
Compute ROI 
Define ••l•• incentives 
Integrate with PRS 
-" 
1988 
12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
-- -· 
IMPLEMENTATION ACTION PLAN 
Occupational Health Program 
JMPl..DdNTATION TAIXI UQVIRKD RBSPONllBLS 1187 1988 PARTY 
9 10 11 112 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
C. P&OMOTION 
Develop promotion strategies 
- advertising copy 
- collateral• 
- coami••ions/incentives 
Draft/update promotional material 
-
Deteraine/capitalize on cross-sale 
potential 
Baployee participation component 
D. STAFFING 
Identity/recruit •ales force 
Identity program coordinator/medical 
director 
B. INSTALLATION 
Create phyaician network interface 
Aaaure BR coordination 
Begin individual sales campaign 
Develop cooperation/coordination with 
appropriate agencies/payors 
IMPLEMENTATION ACTION PLAN 
Occupational Health Program 
IMPLDISHTATION TAUi UQVJRSD 
RUPONllBU 1117 PARTY 
9 110 11 
Train ••rvice ace••• location• 
Track prograa finance•/referral•/•arket 
penetration 
Link progr .. with other practice building 
progr ... 
r. FOLLOW-UP 




i12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
- -----· --- •• ·- ........ • ~._,, 1 ... n 
IMPLEMENTATION ACTION PLAN 
Physician Practice Management/Support Program 
IMPl..SMSHTA110N TAllCI RSQVIRm 
RUPONllBLS 1117 PARTY 
9 10 11 ~ 1 
A • .ADMINISTRATION 
Determine programs/services to 
offer/broker 
Coordinate with marketing task force 
Determine participation requirement• 
Determine pricing schedule 
Select initial targets 
B. DESIGN 
A••••• current support strengths -
Draft policies/procedures 
A••••• high demand needs -
Access low risk programs 
Compute ROI 
Design coordinating function with 
other network programs 
Deaign tracking mechanisms 
.__./ 
1988 
z 3 4 5 6 7 8 
IMPLEMENTATION ACTION PLAN 
Physician Practice Management/Support Program 
JMPLDISHTATION TASXI UQVIRSD 
RDPONllBLS 1187 .PARTY 




Develop distribution strategies 
D. STAFFING 
Recruit physician liaison 
Recruit remote physician liaison 
E. INSTALLATION 
Train physician liaison/support personnel 
Phase in support programs (on small 
scale/low risk at first) 
Track referrals/admits 
1188 
3 4 5 6 7 8 
IMPLEMENTATION A~TION PLAN 
Women's "Health Services 





Appo:l.Dt aedical director for woaen'• 
center progr-
DeYelop pricing package 
Det•rain• logo/iaage for progr-
Deterain• facility arrangeaenta for 
education/a•••••••nt/coapliance program• 
Appo:l.Dt product line coaaitt•• 
Deteraine progr- f eatur•• 
Coordinate interdepartaent participation 
B. QISIGH 
Draft policiea/procedur•• 
Deaign interface witb pre-regiatration/PRf 
rrepare benefit package 
Link pediatric/total f aaily aervic•• 





12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
IMt'LEMENTATION ACTION PLAN 
Women's Health Services 
RUPONllBIS 1117 Dal.SNDITATION TAIXI UQVIRSD PARTY 
9 10 1'1 
c. •lottOUOI 
D•••lop proaotion atrat•GJ" 
- collateral 
- .... ••dia 
- tree ••rvic•• 
Develop coaaunication format with primary 
care ph:r•iciana 
Develop proaotional "prize•" for 
attendance/referral• 
D. IWfIHG 
Identif:r prograa coordinator 
B. IHITllLATIOH 
Develop cooperation/coordination with 
appropriate agenci•• 
Train aervice ace••• location• 
Install network/PRS linkage 
Track prograa progr•••/ref erral• 
Train unit ataff 
·-· 
1988 
12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
IMPLEMENTATION ACTION PLAN 
Behavioral Medicine Center 
IMPl.DdNTA110N TAIXI UQVJRSD RESPONDU 1187 PARTY 
9 ria 11 
A. ADMINISTgATIQN 
Aa•••• priaary care pby•ician involveaent 
in treataent prograa 
All•••• current program• 
a. DISIGN 
Bnbance/add appropriate progra .. 
Draft new policie•/procedurea 
De•ign interface with PRS and other 
network program• 
Review payaent mecbani•ma 
Coapute ROI 
C. PBOMQTIOH 
Develop aarketing/promotion atrategie• 
Develop di•tribution •trategie• 
1988 
12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
- ------ --- • • ·- •-. • 1 '11._,, I .._n 
IMPLEMENTATION ACTION PLAN 
Behavioral Medicine Center 
DOLIDGllTA110N TAllCI RSQVIRSD RBSPONllBLS 1117 PARTY 
9 10 111 
D. STAFFING . 
Recruit BE/BC psychiatrist 
B. INSTALLATION 
Train unit staff in new programs 
a• applicable 
Enhance cooperation/coordination 
with appropriate agencies 
Track program progress/economics 
-·· 
1988 
r12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
IMPLEMENTATION A~TION PLAN 
Network Data/Information Design 
IMPl.DIDTA'DON TAUi llSQVllmD RUPONllBLS 1187 PARTY 
9 110 11 
A. ADMINISTRATION 
Finalize network information 
systems strategic plan 
Determine info systems priorities 
B. DESIGN 
Complete network functional design 
Design interim manual system 
- patient tracking 
- referral tracking 
- marketing/competitor intelligence 
Evaluate hardware/software acquisition 
option• 





Manual tracking clerk 
DP ataf f ing a• developed in overall 
~ft#----·----~--
1188 
12 1 z 3 4 5 6 7 8 
- --~-- --- -
IMPLEMENTATION ACTION PLAN 
Network Data/Information Design 
JMft.DtDTA'ftON TAIXI l\SQVIRSD RUPONIDLS 1117 1188 PARTY 
g 10 1:1 12 t 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
S • INIT!l,J,tTJOlf 
Link network progr .. • 
- referral• 
- tracking 
- f iDanc•• 
Train adJliaaiona/regiatration peraonnel 
Link pre-regiatration to tracking •Y•t•• 
LiDJc P&a to adaitting/regiatration 
tracking •Y•t•• 
r. POLLQW-VP 




VII. RETURN ON INVESTMENT 
It is imperative that the Hillcrest Board and management clearly 
identify and clarify Return on Investment expectations and how 
they will be measured and evaluated. 
As stated earlier in this Business Plan, without an integrated 
tracking information system, manual and "base line" tracking 
assumption techniques must be used to measure network results. 
Admission patterns per specialty are recommended as the primary 
indicator for base line measurement. PMCI experience indicates 
that it will take a full-blown network commitment of 
approximately three years to reach various desired occupancy 
levels. This three year period begins when all core programs are 
in place. 
A network is not a "quick fix" tool for hospital performance. It 
will take Hillcrest a full year to become completely operational, 
and even longer for physician relationships to become concrete. 
The Physician Support Network is a long term program, and takes 
time in which to build momentum. 
Revenue Projections 
The physician support network revenue projections are based upon 
admissions as reported to PMCI. Projections are based upon the 
additio~al admissions required to reach overall hospital 
occupancy levels of 70% one year after core programs are fully 
installed and 80% in three years. HHC's current occupancy rate 
was computed at 65%. Revenue (inpatient and outpatient) at 





HHC financial department. Incremental Revenue was ·based on. 49% 
of projected revenue, and is extremely conservative in that 1987 
charges are used to project revenues for the next three years 
with no increased assumptions. In addition, expenses projected 
considered cost of living increases and inflation. 
Exhibit 1 indicates that with an increase of occupancy from 65% 
to 70%, Hillcrest will realize 685 additional admissions. This 
translates to $1,651,734 in incremental revenue. The third year 
goal is 80% occupancy. Thus, HHC is projected to take three 
years to gain 15% occupancy. The three year program goal is to 
gain 1,600 admissions above the 1987 admission level. 
It should be noted that years one and two are not as productive 
as year three due to start-up cost and the amount of time it 
takes to build relationships with physicians. 
Exhibit 2 is a total three year program breakQown of incremental 
gross revenue, program cost, and net margin. Ultimately, for 
every dollar invested, $5.68 will result in returned incremental 
revenue. This ratio, however, will need to be adjusted when the 
BMC and Womens' Health plans are adopted. Exhibit 3 shows a 
breakdown by project of years one, two, and three. 
Projected Revenues 
Exhibits 4 through 9, show projected revenue calculations for all 
the core programs. 
Direct Contracting/Occupational Health - {See Exhibit 4) 
This projection assumes that 15% of the south Oklahoma City 





realistic considering that this requires only 4,400 
employees to sign up per year. This projection also assumes 
that each pre-registrant will have 1.5 dependents. A few 
larger employers per year could literally accomplish this 
goal. 
This calculation also assumes that only 15% of the employees 
who pre-register will actually use HHC network physicians 
and programs. Projected hospitalizations from these pre-
registrants are then reduced by HHC's market share so as not 
to include enrollees who would have used HBC regardless of 
the program. 
Telemarketing/Physician Referral - (See Exhibits 5 & 6) 
This projection is extremely conservative in that it only 
assumes around five calls per day. Of these, only 75% of 
the calls or about four physician appointments are assumed 
to be made per day. Only 80% of physician appointments 
actually show at the physician's office, thus, three patient 
visits result per day. Of total patients who visit the 
physician, about 5% actually are hospitalized for the cause 
of visit. PMCI also reduced anticipated hospitalizations by 
HHC's market share, to account for patients who would have 
gone to HHC regardless of the program. 
Exhibit 6 indicates that if half the undoctored patients 
visiting the emergency department were referred to 
physicians, and if 60% actually showed, 153 hospital 
admissions, less 9 to account for HHC's market share, or 144 
would be hospitalized over a three year period. Both 





referral service projected revenues. 
Workers' Compensation/Employee Physicals - (See Exhibit 7) 
Exhibit 7 projects the total market that exists in south 
Oklahoma City for Workers' Compensation visits and employee 
physicals. These projections were made using standard 
industrial code estimates, and U.S. Department of Labor 
incidence statistics. PMCI has not included these revenues 
as hospital income, as most of these cases would be directed 
to physicians in the network. Realistically speaking 
however, a portion of these revenues will be directed to 
HHC's emergency department. 
Pre-Registration - Emergency Room Volume - (See Exhibit 8) 
Exhibit 8 forecasts emergency room volume increases as a 
result of HHC's Emergency Room Marketing Plan. This project 
assumes a 10% increas~ in emergency room utilization each 
year. 
Program Expenses 
It should be noted that program expenses shown in this report 
reflect all the extra expenses per the recommendations in this 
Business Plan. As indicated earlier in this document, the 
hospital currently spends less than 1% of total net operating 
revenues on marketing activity. The first year total costs for 
this plan are $367,556 or 1.5% of HHC's net operating budget 
(this does not include consultant installation costs). ·Even the 
inclusion of first year consultant installation costs total less 
than 2.3% of the total operating budget. PMCI's recommendation 
for marketing in a hospital like HHC, with its competitive 






Exhibit 10 reflects the costs associated with the Physician 
Support Program. This includes a full-time physician liaison 
representative, brochures and printing, practice management 
services, and a communications representative. Exhibit 11 
outlines the Occupational Health Program, which includes the 
program manager and sales/contracting representative. Exhibit 12 
outlines the Telemarketing/Physician Referral Services Program. 
This includes 50% of the expense of hardware and software for an 
automated system. The remaining 50% of the cost for this system 
appears in the pre-registration program budget, as the same 
equipment can be used for pre-registration (software for pre-
registration is slightly extra). Exhibit 13 includes the Prc-












8ouroe: PMCI Computatlon1. 
HILLCREST HEALTH CENTER 
REVENUE PROJECTIONS 
~ 70% @ 75% 



















HILLCREST HEALTH CENTER 








Coat/Benefit Ratio 1:5.68 












HILLCREST HEALTH CENTER 
INCREMENTAL REVENUE 
PSN Occ Hlth PBS 
YEAR I 
Incremental Revenue $564,294 $373,750 $226,661 
Admissions 254 165 97 
YEAR II 
Incremental Revenue $1,236,304 $7 4 7,500 $238,718 
Admissions 526 330 102 
YEAR HI 
Incremental Revenue $1,897 ,894 $1, 118,838 $250,774 
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$590,558 g: ..... 
205 Vl 
Exhibit 4 
SOUTH OKLAHOMA CITY 
DIRECT CONTRACTING REVENUE 
LABOR FORCE (1985) 






HOSPITAL DEMAND (100 
AOMITS/1,000) 
MARKET SHARE CAPTURED 
ADDITIONAL ADMISSIONS 
















HILLCREST HEALTH CENTER 
PHYSICIAN REFERRAL SERVICE 
TOTAL CALLS (150/MONTH 
FOR 36 MONTHS) 
ACTUAL TELEPHONE 
REFERRALS (75%) 
ACTUAL SHOW REFERRALS 
(80%) 
ADMISSIONS (5% RATE) 
MARKET SHARE CAPTURED 
ADDITIONAL ADMISSIONS 














HILLCREST HEALTH CENTER 
PHYSICIAN REFERRAL SERVICE 
TOTAL ER VISITS FOR 
3 YEARS) 
UNDOCTORED PATIENTS 
(25% PER YEAR) 
FAVORABLE ACCOUNTS 
(50% PER YEAR) 
PHYSICIAN REFERRALS 
(60% PER YEAR) 
ADMISSIONS (5% RATE) 
MARKET SHARE CAPTURED 
ADDITIONAL ADMISSIONS 
















Exhibit 7 ft 
SOUTH OKLAHOMA CITY 
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH OUTPATIENT REVENUE 
1. WORKERS' COMPENSATION - BASED ON 
EACH CASE INVOLVING TWO OFFICE 
VISITS, ONE EACH FOR TREATMENT AND 
FOLLOW-UP. (8,560 CASES) 
2. PRE-EMPLOYMENT PHYSICALS - BASED ON· 
38% OF COMPANIES CONDUCTING PRE-
EMPLOYMENT PHYSICALS AND A 10% 
ANNUAL TURNOVER RATE. (3,344 
EXAMS) 
3. COMPREHENSIVE PHYSICALS - BASED ON 
29% OF COMPANIES PARTICIPATING IN 
PROGRAM, COUNTING ONLY EXECUTIVES, 
PROFESSIONALS, PROTECTIVE SERVICES, 
AND SALES, (6,992 PHYSICALS) 
,, 
Source: PMCI Computation•. 
Exhibit 7 
SOUTH OKLAHOMA CITY 
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH OUTPATIENT REVENUE 
PROGRAM 
W/C TREATMENT ($50) 

















HILLCREST HEALTH CENTER 
EMERGENCY ROOM UTILIZATION 
TOTAL ER VISITS (1987 
ANNUALIZED) 11,270 
ADDITIONAL ER VISITS 
(3 YEAR TOTAL) 3,731 
ER VISITS ADMITTED 
(15%) 560 
ADDITIONAL INPATIENT I 
OUTPATIENT REVENUE 
( $4,921/ ADMIT) $2.755.760 
ADDITIONAL ER REVENUE 
($144/VISIT) $537,264 
ADDITIONAL REVENUE $3,293,024 
INCREMENTAL REVENUE ~1.s1a.5el 
76 
Source: PMCI Computation•. . 
Exhibit 9 
HILLCREST HEALTH CENTER 
PHYSICIAN SUPPORT 
YEAR I YEAR II YEAR 
INCREMENTAL REVENUE 
PROJECTIONS $564,294 $1,236,304 $1,897 
EXPENSES 
Liaison Representative 30,000 51,250 53 
(2 FTE's) (2 F' 
Benefits 6,000 7,688 8 
Brochures/Printing 8,000 10,000 12 
Training/Equipment 4,000 2,000 2 
Entertainment/Travel 4,800 9,000 12 
?enefit Package 15,000 20,000 30 
Sales Productions 5,000 1,000 1 
Practice Management 
Services 10,000 12,000 14 
Communications 15,000 15,750 16 
Benefits 2,250 2,363 2 
TOTAL EXPENSES 100,050 131,051 152' 
NET INCREMENTAL REVENUE $464,244 $1,105,253 $1,744, 
77 







Program Manager 32,000 
Commission Potential 10,000 
Benefits 5,700 
Print Media/Drop Package 12,500 




Pre-Reg. Processing 5,000 
TOTAL EXPENSES 85,000 



























HILLCREST HEALTH CENTER 






Telephone Expenses 5,500 
Salary Expenses/Benefits 20,700 
Educational Allowance 500 
Continuous Feed/Cards/Forms 4,000 
Letters/Postage - In/Out 2,000 
Postcards/Letters to Phys. 500 
Surveys/Return Postage 400 
Newcomer Letters 1,500 
Advertising/Printing/ 
Electronic Media 12,000 
Yellow Pages 15,000 
Brochures/Direct Mail 4,000 
Computer Installation/ 
Monthly Maintenance 1,092 
Software 8,500 
Hardware 8,361 
TOTAL EXPENSES 84,053 








































HILLCREST HEALTH CENTER 
PRE-REGISTRATION/ER 
YEAR I YEAR II YEAR III 
INCREMENTAL REVENUE 
PROJECTIONS $487,029 $535,994 $590,553 
EXPENSES 
Product Line Coordinator/ 
Worksite Nurse 11,000 24,000 26,000 
Design/Production/Pre-Reg. 
Card Design 48,000 50,000 52,000 
2-Track Staffing 10,000 20,000 22,000 
Pre-Reg. Hardware 8,361 -0- -0-
Pre-Reg. Software 4,000 -o- -0-
Computer Installation/ 
Monthly Maintenance 1,092 1,092 1,092 
Data Specialist 16,000 16,000 22,000 
TOTAL EXPENSES 98,453 111,092 121,092 
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This Business Plan has been commissioned by James Maccallum, 
Executive Vice President of Hillcrest Health Center in Oklahoma 
City, Oklahoma. Hillcrest management worked in conjunction with 
Professional Marketing Consultants, Inc in the development of 
this Business Plan. Without the enthusiastic support of the key 
management of Hillcrest, this report would not have been 
possible. Several other department heads also were extremely 
helpful in contributing to this document. Finally, key medical 
staff members and board members were instrumental to the Business 
Plan process. 
Purpose 
The purpose of the Physician Network Business and Action Plan, as 
stipulated in the contract, is to: 
A. EstablisQ and implement a strong physician support 
program to include practice management; 
B. Address financial responsibility and return on 
investment; 
C. Generate a strong action plan which clearly defines 
roles, responsibilities, and time frames; 
D. Base physician affiliation needs on ideal HHC inpatient 
bed mix goals; 
E. Address interface with occupational health, emergency 





and other appropriate programs and services; 
F. Measure outlying physician needs and design involvement 
strategy; 
G. Incorporate data system design; 
H. Structure the network as part of HHC, but so it can be 
viewed as a separate physician support advocate. 
In order to fulfill this purpose, PMCI representatives reviewed 
the status of existing services at Hillcrest and its major 
competitor hospitals. PMCI gave particular consideration to the 
status of relationships between physicians and hospitals. In 
that process, individual interviews were held with members of the 
medical staff, the hospital board of directors, and rural 
referring physicians. 
In addition, a detailed internal analysis was conducted. 
Inpatient and emergency patient records were abstracted and 
reviewed. Financial data was scrutinized and applied to revenue 
projections. Hospital personnel were interviewed to assess 
operational aspects of marketing. 
At the present time, Hillcrest does not have an overall strategic 
plan or action plan delineating activities required to develop 
and implement a physician network marketing program. By 
developing this plan, this process can be updated and evaluated 





Business Plan Objectives 
The objectives of the Physician Network Business Plan and Action 
Plan, are to: 
A. Increase utilization of tarqeted inpatient and 
outpatient HHC services. 
B. Provide for a phased sequence of implementation for a 
reqional health delivery system. 
C. Develop and maintain stronq hospital physician bondinq 
able to benefit from non-inpatient diversified revenue 
opportunities. 
Scope of Project 
The scope of this Business Plan includes the following: 
A. Data collection and analysis pertaining to financial 
trends, utilization trends, patient origin, payor mix, 
ideal service mix, service area analysis, applied 
demand factors, and patient mix strategies; 
B. Development of a medical staff analysis to include 
admission patterns, location analysis, supply and 
demand, and physician recruitment needs; 
C. A competitive analysis taking into consideration the 
strenqths and weaknesses of other healthcare providers; 






E. Program recommendations on competitive positioning, 
service access locations, recommended organizational 
approaches, revenue projections, marketing goals and 
objectives, product strategies, and promotion and_ 
marketing strategies; 
F. Product development reporting systems, sales 
approaches, and database development; 
G. An Action Plan outlining specific responsibilities and 
timetables; 
H. Budget development and return on investment. 
The design, packaging, and promotion of Hillcrest's Women's 
Health Services Program, and Behavioral Medicine Center are being 
addressed separately after the core programs associated with this 
plar. are installed. 
Role of PMCI 
In the course of this project, PMCI worked with Hillcrest staff, 
physicians and board members and jointly collected information 
necessary to accomplish the objectives outlined above. PMCI 
interviewed appropriate management personnel and medical staff as 
well as board members to determine the most effective strategies. 
The emphasis of this document is to create a work plan for 
specific completion and to assign appropriate responsibilities 
for program recommendations. PMCI has incorporated action steps 






PMCI has also been very sensitive to assure that appropriate 
personnel are involved in the development of this document to 
promote a sense of ownership and departmental commitment. One of 
the other major roles PMCI has played in the development of this 
Business Plan is to facilitate a series of meetings in which 
strategy was formulated. PMCI incorporated all of the results of 





II. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
This plan is the culmination of a thorough review of data, 
intensive strategy sessions, interviews, and analysis of many 
sources of information pertaining to Hillcrest Health Center and 
its marketplace. Physicians, board members, area residents and 
management personnel contributed to its content. 
HHC is now at the crossroads of either ensuring itself as a full 
service hospital well into the future, or placing itself at the 
mercy of some very aggressive competitors. PMCI considered 
several general strategy options for HHC, including its becoming 
a specialty service hospital and no longer functioning as a full 
service acute care facility. However, we found these options to 
be impractical, particularly because of its important identity as 
the only Osteopathic facility in Oklahoma City. During the past 
few years, HHC management has taken admirable steps to improve 
the hospital through managerial excellence. 
It is clear, however, that if HHC does not take some considerable 
competitive actions, it is on a disastrous course. Between 1982 
and 1986, inpatient utilization declined 4% at Hillcrest. 
Further, HHC is financially vulnerable in terms of maximizing 
optimum service and pay mix due to the lack of a well supported 
business plan. 
The final recommendations of this plan outline a three-year 
marketing effort that is conservatively projected to realize a 
total of $8,268,314 in incremental revenues, with a $7,031,435 
margin after program costs for a three year period. For every 





incremental revenue. This cost/benefit ratio will slightly 
change when marketing expenses are added for Women's Health, BMC, 
and Outpatient Surgery. However, any cost/benefit ratio in 
addition to 1:4 is considered to be within industry standards. 
This goal is not unrealistic. In fact, this plan only calls for 
an average of 5% bed occupancy increase each year. 
Three-Year Marketing Effort 
This plan first outlines the ideal service mix for HHC by medical 
specialty, and then indicates the physician referral patterns 
that are necessary to realize goal levels of bed occupancy and 
program utilization. In order to realize these goals, several 
key actions must occur. 
1. The Board of HHC must come to the realization that it 
must spend ~oney to make money, or it will see its 
revenue base slowly erode away year after year. 
Currently HHC spends less than 1% of its net op~rating 
revenues on marketing. It needs to spend closer to 
2.5% to 3.5%. 
2. A new marketing infrastructure, with resources backing 
it, must be developed to build a physician support 
network. Current marketing efforts are built around 
hospital programs rather than the medical staff. 
3. HHC needs to receive the additional equivalent support 
that 13 full-time practices would provide if all of 
their patients were directed to one hospital. 
Particular specialties include Oncology, General 





4. HHC must strengthen its primary care referral base and 
include new affiliations with approximately four 
General Medicine physicians, three Ob/Gyn's, and one 
Pediatrician. On an average, these physicians need to 
refer one-half of their patients to loyal targeted HHC 
sub-specialists. 
6. A series of critical "Feeder Programs" must be 
initiated that will attract patients to targeted 
physicians so the above goals can be realized. These 
"Feeder Programs" include: 
A Physician Support Department 
A Pre-registration Program 
An Occupational Health Progra~ 
An Intensified Emergency Services Marketing 
Program 
A Telemarketing/Physician ?efe~ral Program 
The above programs are the "work horses" that make this program 
succeed. They require adequate financial backing, or they should 
not be attempted. If done properly, there is excellent market 
demand potential in the Oklahoma City area to support their 
success. 
This document outlines specific information on physician 
affiliations, strategies, marketing organization, budgets, 
projected revenues, return on investment, and timetables. A 
detailed set of recommendations and key observations are included 





In closing, HHC has a unique set of opportunities in many areas, 
but it must act immediately, or these opportunities will most 







1. HHC marketing efforts should be guided by the ideal 
desired bed and service mix and the physician 
affiliations necessary to sustain those services. 
Rationale: The financial security of HHC is dependent upon 
the success of specific inpatient and outpatient services. 
Physician referrals by far have the most profound impact 
upon those services, especially in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. 
2. HHC should focus its growth efforts upon the following 











Rationale: A multi-variable review of services by PMCI and 
hospital management was conducted considering hospital 
mission, estimated profitability, market strength, revenue 
base, physician affiliations, facility and equipment 
investment, and market opportunity. These services were 
then confirmed by intense physician and board interview 
activity. 
3. Outpatient surgeries and outpatient procedures should 





Rationale: HHC has a strong physician base for those 
specialties dependent on outpatient procedures, such as 
Orthopedic Surgery, General Practice, General Surgery, and 
Ob/Gyn. Third party payors will also continue to encourage 
outpatient treatment. 
4. During the next 3 years, HHC should increase physician 
loyalty and/or establish new affiliations in the 
following specialties with commensurate full-time 

















Rationale: The above additional affiliations or increased 
referral equivalents will result in an 80% occupancy level, 
with HHC's desired bed mix. It will result in over 8 
million dollars of additional incremental revenue over a 
three year period. 
5. In order to support the necessary additional specialty 
affiliations, it will be necessary for HBC to affiliate 
with the following additional primary care physicians 











Rationale: The sub-specialist physicians HHC needs to 
attract during the next three years will require about 8,600 
patient referrals from other physicians in order to generate 
an additional 3,429 patient admissions for HHC during the 
next 3 years. New physician referrals will come from a 
combination of affiliating further with physicians who in 
the past did not refer much to HHC physicians, or by 
affiliating with new physicians and building practice volume 
as necessary. 
6. HHC should establish primary care affiliations with 
physicians in areas located throughout south Oklahoma 
City. Areas recommended per each specialty in this 
report are: 
Northeastern South OKC 
(Midwest City/Del City) 
Southern South OKC 
(Moore) 
Northwestern South OKC 
GM 
GM, OB/GYN 
GM, OB/GYN, PED 
Rationale: Multi-variable weighted formulas explored each 
zip code in Hillcrest's service area for physician loyalty, 
demand, population density, income, proximity to 
competition, transportation, etc. Access to all areas will 
be necessary if physician referral services are established, 
and if HHC is to have success in managed care contracting. 





presents multiple opportunities. 
Note: Information regarding remote affiliation areas was 
not provided by HHC, but upon a preliminary analysis of 
information available, PMCI recommends investigation of 
primary care and specialty physician affiliations in 
Mustang, Tuttle, Newcastle, Choctaw, and Harrah. These 
areas offer significant affiliation opportunities for 
Hillcrest Health Center. 
Physician Marketing Strategies 
1. HHC marketing strategies should center around each 
medical specialty. For example, in promotina 
Cardiology, HHC should: 
Conduct high risk heart disease screening with 
employers. 
Conduct media features on its Cardiologists. 
Promote a "chest pain clinic" through the 
emergency room. 
Form a cardiology marketing task force with 
physicians, department heads, and HHC management 
participation. 
Have cardiologists conduct more educational 
seminars for the rest of the medical community, 





Promote cardiologists through an aggressive 
physician referral service. 
Consider affiliating with a tertiary facility that 
provides open heart and other high acuity 
procedures. 
Note: Detailed strategy recommendations for each medical 
specialty are found in Section II (F). 
Rationale: When interviewed, physicians expressed a strong 
need to be more directly involved in hospital marketing •. 
Current marketing programs are centered around "hospital 
programming" and not directly focused on getting patients 
through the doors of its medical staff offices. 
2. A network of loyal primary care physicians should be 
promoted to the public and marketed throuah a common 
tradename. Ultimately, HHC should have about 20 
convenient locations dispersed throughout Hillcrest's 
service area. A primary care marketing task force 
should convene to determine the types of community 
promotion it wishes to conduct, which could include 
special screening events, common office hours, special 
promotional fees (flu shots, school physicals, 
immunizations, etc.) and contracts with managed care 
providers, employers, and insurance companies. 
Rationale: It is prohibitively expensive for an individual 
physician to successfully advertise himself. The strength 





be successful at managed care contracting, it must 
demonstrate that it is capable of organizing such a system. 
Erograms to Build Market Share 
1. An organized Telemarketing Service should be 
established to receive return calls on programs 
promoted by HHC. This service should accommodate calls 
pertaining to Physician Locator Services, Occupational 
Health Services, Behavioral Medicine/Chemical 
Dependency Units, Women's Health Services, Patient Pre-
registration, Physician-to-Physician Referral and 
information, etc. 
Rationale: Currently, HHC has no permanent focal point for 
the consumer or physician to respond to when programs and 
physicians are promoted. Marketing program coordination and 
communications are fragmented at best. A centralized 
tele~arke~ing service is cosc effect~ve in that one operator 
can handle several programs at once, without disrupting the 
operations of clinical departments. A physician referral 
service alone has a potential of over 5,400 calls in three 
years according to PMCI. With the referral of over 3,000 
undoctored residents, and follow up with favorable accounts 
undoctored patients in the ER, over $720,000 in incremental 
revenue could be generated over three years. 
2. A formalized Occupational Health sales initiative and 
direct contract program should be focused upon as a top 
priority. This should center upon a workers' 
compensation program, employer cost containment, and 





outpatient services. Employees should be pre-
reaistered and given a HBC enrollment card that 
entitles them to a variety of benefits they are unable 
to attain elsewhere. The Good Neiahbor Clinics need to 
be tied into this effort. 
Rationale: Approximately 88,000 employees are within 
Hillcrest's service area. HHC is well positioned to service 
mid-sized to large employers and has unlimited market 
opportunity. PMCI calculations (see ROI sections} indicate 
a market demand of nearly 2.5 million dollars in outpatient 
worker's compensation and employee physicals. If HHC were 
able to penetrate just 15% of the potential market over 
three years, it could net over 2.2 million dollars in 
incremental revenue for inpatient and outpatient services. 
3. A strong Pre-registration program, entitling card 
holders to medical benefits such as pharmacy discounts, 
non-acute immediate ER treatment and registration, 
screening, special preventive check-up discounts, etc. 
should be developed immediately. This pre-registration 
program should be marketed to BR patients, employees, 
former HBC patients, HBC physician patients, etc. 
Rationale: A pre-registration system could net 1.6 million 
dollars in incremental revenue during the three-year 
marketing program. (See ROI section). 
Operational Issues 
1. HHC must resolve some internal medical staff 





A. Hospital Red-Tape and Politics 
B. "Unfair" surgical scheduling 
c. .Inadequate staffing and staff training 
D. Difficulty in patient registration 
Rationale: When physicians were interviewed, PMCI detected 
the above perceptions. The comments PMCI heard about these 
issues were voluntary and unassisted, making them even more 
significant. 
2. A cost accountina system should be installed, or at 
minimum a profitability of service portfolio study 
should be conducted. 
Rationale: While management is doing all it can to evaluate 
the financial consequences of different services, it is 
impossible to accurately determine program profitability 
with current information accounting systems. 
Marketing Organization 
1. A physician network model of oraanization should be 
established to build marketing programs around the 
medical staff instead of around hospital programs. 
(See Marketing Organization, and Return on Investment). 
Rationale: Hospital contact with physician offices and 
physician involvement in marketing activity builds census 
far more effectively than advertising and image campaigns. 
Recent national surveys indicate that physicians will 
increase patient referrals to the hospital if the hospital 






2. A physician liaison representative will be necessary to 
reach out to local and remote practices. This function 
must be backed with a commitment from HBC to provide 
physician services as in demand from the medical staff. 
Rationale: South Community and other hospitals have already 
developed the above services. HHC physicians are already 
being approached by them. 
3. HHC must commit itself to dedicating close to 2.5% of 
its net operating revenues toward marketing in order to 
have a significant impact on market share. 
Rationale: In the final analysis, HHC's conviction about 
marketing will be tested by financial allocation. In 1987, 
HHC's current marketing expenditures fell under 1% of its 
net operating revenues. This is a fraction of what can 
today be considered to be adequate when HHC faces 
considerable adversity such as negative public perception 
and considerable competition from South Community, Baptist, 
HCA and other organizations. If HHC is to achieve the goals 
set forth in this plan, the Board will have to come to grips 
with the reality that you have to spend money to make money. 
4. Programs such as the Good Neighbor Clinic Promotions, 
Good Neighbor Health, BMC, ER, etc. are worthy of 
continuance, but need to be strengthened with product 
line management, better cross sold, better coordinated 





referral and participation. 
Rationale: HHC's grassroots position with the Pediatric 
market, Women's Health, Alcohol Rehab, and Outpatient Care 
make it a strong candidate for intensive marketing in these 
areas. However, these must all be strengthened with the 
appropriate physician involvement, resources, outreach, and 
telemarketing. 
5. HHC's information systems and public relations 
resources need to be upgraded and intensified in order 
to successfully support the formalization and 
strengthening of a successful physician network. 
Rationale: As it becomes more and more essential for HHC to 
invest in a prudent marketing effort, it will be 
increasingly important to track return on investment. ADS 
systems will also demand more specific marketing and 
financial information in the future. As for public 
relations, it is now obsolete for HHC to depend on such 
services on an outside contractual basis. - It is also more 





IV. KEY OBSERVATIONS 
General Competitive Observations 
While Hillcrest has experienced slight declines in inpatient 
admissions and occupancy between 1983 and 1986, their competitors 
have experienced much greater decreases. At the same time, 
Hillcrest experienced increases in several areas such as patient 
days, average daily census, births, surgical procedures, and 
emergency room utilization. 
Between 1983 and 1986, Hillcrest experienced only a 1% inpatient 
admissions decline compared to declines of from 9% to 30% by 
their competitors. 
In spite of this relative success, there is considerable reason 
fo~ HHC to be concerned about its future security. In addition 
to "macro-environmental" competitive forces, hospitals such as 
South Community, Baptist, St. Anthony, and Presbyterian can be 
expected to take increasingly competitive postures~ 
Alternative delivery "managed care" systems will continue to 
grow, putting additional pressure on HHC to minimize health care 
delivery costs, and increasing pressures to find more traditional 
commercial indemnity patients. 
Changing reimbursement patterns will continue to force physicians 
to provide services on an outpatient care basis. Physicians will 
increasingly be in direct competition with hospitals for 
ambulatory services unless win/win affiliation relationships are , 





HHC still has a respectable market share penetration in south 
Oklahoma City, however, this will continue to decline unless it 
takes aggressive action immediately. 
HHC is at the crossroads of making major marketing investment 
decisions that will determine its future as either a competitive 
full service hospital, or a hospital that will have a series of 
fragmented "niche" programs. 
Ironically, as many opportunities as threats exist in HHC's 
service area, demand for several physician services exists. A 
large employee population base presents a market virtually 
untapped, though competitors are now selling occupational health 
services aggressively. 
Internal Analysis of HHC 
HHC has a strong primary care base, allowing for development of 
sub-specialties. General Practice, Internal Medicine, 
Pediatrics, and Ob/Gyn account for about 73% of all admissions 
and 61% of all revenues generated. 
HHC has a booming outpatient procedure market. Primary care 
specialties were responsible for 65% of all procedures. As 
primary care physicians become more plentiful in south Oklahoma 
City, this market will be threatened as more physicians compete 
with the hospital. This can be prevented if HHC forms stronger 
bonds with its physicians. 
Surgical procedures are declining on an inpatient basis and 
growing on an outpatient basis, resulting in a relatively 





in outpatient procedures, and has good market share considering 
its size in its service area compared to inpatient care. 
General Practice inpatient admissions, Pediatric inpatient 
admissions, and Behavioral Medicine/Mental Health inpatient 
admissions increased between 1986 and 1987. Pediatrics 
experienced a 4% increase, while BMC/MH and General Practice 
experienced 3% and 1% increases respectively. 
General Surgery and Ob/Gyn were the only specialties resulting in 
increased surgical procedures between 1986 and 1987. General 
Practice, Orthopedic Surgery, General Surgery, and Ob/Gyn 
accounted for nearly 86% of 1987 surgical procedures. 
HHC's Market Place 
Almost 70% of HHC's patients originated from Oklahoma City in 
1987. The southern portion of Oklahoma City accounted for over 
60% of HHC patient origin. 
HHC has significant market share in the central portion of south 
Oklahoma City. Though HHC has a lower market penetration in 
northern Oklahoma City, it still has meaningful market share in 
southwest and southeast Oklahoma City. 
Nearly 41% of Hillcrest's inpatient admissions came from 
commercial accounts in 1987. Medicare represented nearly 25%, 
while medicaid accounted for 20%. In the emergency room, 35% of 
visits were from commercial accounts, with 33% from self pay 
accounts. Compared to other hospitals, these are relatively 
positive levels. 





56 years of aqe. The families of these aqe groups need to be 
communicated with to attract their attention to HHC services. 
Conversely, nearly 58% of ER patients are between the aqes of 17 
and 55, indicating a tremendous opportunity to cross sell other 
services to this "captive audience". 
HHC is located in a relatively high pediatric and female 
concentration area, with a respectable median household income 
level in its immediate service area and particularly to the 
immediate south. This offers many opportunities for Hillcrest in 
terms of programs and physician affiliations. 
HHC has a significant employer base, and is positioned extremely 
well to successfully provide major occupational health service 
programs in south Oklahoma City. 
Current Marketing/Advertising Efforts at HHC 
Prior to PMCI's involvement, HHC had a marketing director. 
Programs such as the Good Neighbor Clinics, and Good Neighbor 
Care had been initiated but not highly developed. The BMC 
program and ER departments both had demonstrated very positive 
marketing potential and success. Excellent new management 
expertise had contributed positively to the hospital's bottom 
line. A high level of physician loyalty existed through 
osteopathic and historical bonding. 
However, no PR resources were existent internally, and no 
continuity existed in terms of hospital program promotion or 
graphics. The hospital had no master plan for marketing or pro-





been centralized, and there was no marketing database. 
Physician Analysis 
Overall, Hillcrest has a very young medical staff with an average 
age of 41. There are only 5 physicians on HHC's medical staff 
over 55 years of age, representing over 4% of all admissions and 
over $764,000 in revenue, based on inpatient/outpatient revenue. 
A total of 10 physicians are responsible for nearly 45% of 
Hillcrest's admissions and 53% of Hillcrest's revenues. 
There is no cost accounting system or profitability portfolio 
study available at HHC, making it difficult to specify what 
services are financially desirable. Such a system study is 
sorely nEeded. 
~sing a multi-variable formula, HHC management and PMCI chose the 











Criteria used: Mission, perceived profitability, physician 
affiliations, facility and equipment investments, distinctive 
marketing competency. 





Oklahoma City. These shortages exist in all the primary care 
specialties. 
Age/sex breakdowns of the population in south Oklahoma City 
indicate that there is a significant maldistribution of physician 
office locations with surpluses clustered around hospital 
locations. 
Primary care shortages largely due to maldistribution exist in 
all of the south Oklahoma City area, except for those areas 
surrounding the hospital. 
If HHC were able to attain the following additional primary care 
practice affiliations fillSJ maintain its current referral patterns, 
in the next three years, it could realize an addition of 
approximately 3,429 admissions, and $8,268,314 in incremental 
revenues: 
General Medicine - 4 
Pediatrics - 1 
Ob/Gyn - 3 
In order for HHC to attain a 70% occupancy rate, or an additional 
685 inpatient admissions, it will be necessary to attain the 
full-time equivalent support of approximately 7 additional 
physician practices. HHC must also retain its existing market 
share. With an aggressive marketing effort, this goal can be 
attained in one year. 
Average full-time equivalent physician practice support per 
physician is currently 86%. In order to attain 70% occupancy, 





With a full blown marketing effort, HHC could achieve an 80% 
occupancy rate in three years. This will require approximately 
13 additional full-time practice equivalents, and average 
practice support would need to increase from 86% to 118%. 
Significant hospital marketing resource commitment must take 
place for this to occur. 
Operational Issues 
HHC's current information system lacks patient tracking 
capabilities, market data capabilities, and cost accounting 
capabilities. 
Physician perceptions of hospital red-tape and politics, unfair 
surgical schedules, and inadequate staffing and training need 
improvement. 
Attitude Research 
Thirty-two Oklahoma City area physicians were personally 
interviewed by PMCI. Most of the questions on the survey were 
open-ended allowing for unassisted responses by physicians. 
Major findings were as follows: 
o Both primary care and specialty physicians listed 
Hillcrest as their primary hospital. While primary 
care physicians viewed Moore as their secondary 
hospital, specialty physicians listed Moore and South 
Community. 
o Primary care physicians listed patient preference, 
unavailable services, and location as main reasons for 





listed equipment/services, referral, and location as 
their main reasons for admitting to a hospital other 
than Hillcrest. 
o Physicians have extremely strong influence in terms of 
directing patient hospital selection. 
o Physicians felt that Hillcrest's emergency room, while 
needing renovation, was clinically very good and 
provided good back-up coverage. 
o Most physicians stated that the quality of Hillcrest '.s 
medical staff was one of its greatest assets, and 
viewed the staff as being young and aggressive. 
o Concern regarding the quality of Hillcrest's dietary 
services was voiced, both on the patient level and the 
general public level. 
o Ancillary services need improvement and enhancement, 
especially regarding lab service costs and response. 
o Physicians voiced concern regarding difficulties with 
the outpatient department and surgical department in 
both scheduling and admitting. 
o Physician were extremely supportive about hospital 
marketing. 
o Physicians felt that the hospital needed to do more to 





o Physicians expressed the need for the hospital to 
affiliate with additional specialists, particularly in 
Cardiology and Neurology. 
o Physicians stated that some patients had bad 
perceptions of the hospital, and Hillcrest needed to do 
more in the way of positive public relations. 
o There was little opposition to HHC being involved in 
Occupational Health Programs, so long as physicians are 
closely involved. 
o Most physician's practice volume was increasing, but 
only slightly. Several doctors stated that their 
practice volume was decreasing, by their own choice. 
o There are four physician practice support services that 
a large majority of physicians felt they needed. These 
were practice marketing, physi~ian office staff 
training, financial services, and physician 
referral/traffic building services. 
o Most of the physicians involved in the Good Neighbor 
Clinic expressed concern regarding the program. Most 
physicians stated they did not receive referrals from 





V. PHYSICIAN SUPPORT NETWOR!t 
A. DEFINITION 
The Physician Support Network (PSN) is a comprehensive, dynamic 
health care delivery system which is specifically designed to 
meet Hillcrest's goals: maintaining existing markets as well as 
creating new patient demand for the hospital and its medical 
staff. Designed to capture and retain patients at the primary 
care physician level, the network serves to unite Hillcrest's 
individual program components in a coordinated manner. 
Composed of existing and newly targeted primary care practices, 
the PSN is based on the concept that primary care physicians will 
serve as the "gatekeepers" of patient referrals to Hillcrest 
Health Center and its medical staff. 
With.a well-defined package of services and benefits, marketed to 
targeted physician practices identified using sophisticated 
supply and demand formulas, the network will tie into and build 
upon the existing strengths, programs, facilities, and the 
specialty medical staff of Hillcrest Health Center. 
The PSN strengthens the visibility of each participating 
component of the network by exposing a greater number of patients 






There are five primary objectives for Hillcrest's Physician 
Support Network: 
o To create a network of primary care physicians 
strategically located in Hillcrest's service area who 
will utilize the hospital's facilities and support the 
specialty physicians through a strong and long-term 
referral program: 
o To create an awareness and comfort level with patients 
in Hillcrest's service area through targeted and 
sustained marketing programs that will develop, retain, 
and increase the market share for inpatient and 
outpatient services; 
o To provide the market with an integrated health care 
system comprised of physicians, programs, and services 
appropriately designed to satisfy the demands of the 
marketplace (examples include: Occupational Health 
Services, Physician Referral Programs, Women's Health 
Services, and Emergency Department Programs); 
o To attract high quality physicians into the network to 
maintain the high standards of the institution, and to 
increase the quality of care provided in remote areas; 
o To create a strong relationship between physicians, 
programs, and hospital services that will be self 






Achievement of these objectives will lead to the accomplishment 
of the Physician Support Network's primary goal: 
"An affiliated organization capable of increasing the 
utilization of Hillcrest's physicians, programs, and 





C. THE APPROACH 
The development and implementation of a PSN is gen~rally a three 
phase program. Each phase has special components contributing to. 
the overall success of the PSN implementation. Because of the 
complex nature of ·a PSN including the program design, internal 
politics, physician marketing programs, and the data management 
systems, this project requires absolute commitment from the 
onset. Each phase must be planned, managed, and monitored by 
highly experienced professionals if the project is to be 
implemented successfully. 
Phase I involves the development of a marketing and strategic 
plan that will support and guide the implementation process. It 
includes: 
o Collecting and evaluating pertinent hospital, 
physician, and financia~ data with advanced PMCI 
software packages; 
o Performing a competitive review of the hospital's 
service area; 
o Projecting supply and demand calculations for actual 
network design; 
o Identifying profitable program opportunities, 
competitive threats, and recommended action plans. 
The strategic plan will be developed by analyzing the data 





calculate the number of primary care physicians and specify their 
location by zip code; (3) identify advertising programs and 
public relations activities; (4) project a realistic budget for 
the first year and subsequent two years; and (5) detail a program 
by program "return-on-investment". Phase I becomes the action 
plan for implementing the PSN. A majority of this activity will 
be completed in January. 
Phase II is the actual implementation of the hospital's PSN. 
This phase includes the installation of the PSN data processing 
systems, product specific programs, advertising programs, and 
physician support systems. Physician support programs defined in 
Phase I are created and consolidated into a package which is 
discretely marketed to the targeted primary care providers. 
Affiliation agreements for facilities, programs, and physician 
participation are furnished by PMCI and utilized. Patient 
awareness and referral programs are implemented and finally, 
tracking programs critical to d2termining the success and impact 
of the PSN are developed. The Physician Referral Service and 
Occupational Health Program components of this Phase will begin 
in January. 
Phase III is the ongoing management and support phase which is 
crucial to the eventual long-term success of the PSN. As the PSN 
matures and competitors react to its success, constant monitoring 
of each program, physician, and facility is required. The system 
is dynamic, and therefore, requires an ongoing evaluation of 
supply and demand trends. Phase III focuses on the placement of 





D. HOSPITAL COMMITMENT 
The establishment of a physician support network will be a major 
undertaking for HHC. This network will demand high level 
commitment from the. hospital's Board of Directors and its 
physicians and administrative staff. The program must have the 
respect of each primary care and specialist physician targeted. 
Most importantly, the success of the physician support network is 
totally dependent upon the medical and residential community's 
perception of the values of membership in the network. 
The implementation of a valuable, self-sustaining network is not 
inexpensive. It requires financial commitment and, as with any 
program of this scope, a physician support network must have the 
appropriate funding, staffing, and resources to be successful. A 
network under-financed, under-staffed, and lacking total 
coremitment would be more detrimental to HHC than no program 
impl e::ien tat ion. 
The consumer of health care is a major target of the physician 
support network. If the consumer is not treated servingly during 
his first encounter with a promoted program, all the effort and 
expense utilized to create the network will be wasted. The 
quintessential marketing adage certainly applies: "one bad 
experience is worth ten good references". Consumers have 
friends, family, and employers. Consumers relate their 
experiences to those around them proficiently and constantly. 
Conversely, a network properly constructed, financed, and staffed 
can yield tremendous benefits. The overall cost of securing a 
new patient is far outweighed by future utilization dollars to 





Direct benefits can be measured as new targeted patients are 
admitted to the hospital and more patients receive care from the 
medical staff. Even the primary care member physicians will 
receive direct benefits as their practices grow and prosper. All 
of these monetary benefits contribute heavily which more than 
justifies the cost associated with implementing a physician 
support network program. A preview return on investment analysis 
is included in this document. 
The indirect benefits of a network can be even more important. 
While it is difficult to accurately measure these benefits, they 
strongly influence the success of HHC, its medical staff, and the 
primary care member physician. Enhanced community awareness, the 
delivery of better quality care, and the development of an 
efficient well-organized health care delivery system will 
ultimately benefit Hillcrest Health Center in many intangible 
ways. 
Physician Support Network Approach 
The Physician Support Network is designed to dramatically affect 
multiple components of the hospital programs and staff: 
o Specialty and Primary Care Physicians 
o Ancillary Department Services 
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o Develop all Business/Action Plans with PMCI 
o Execute Action Plan with PMCI 
o Communicate all Program Activity to Board, Management, 
Physicians 
o Negotiate Employer Contracts 





Occupational Health Coordinator 
Physician Liaison Representative 
Telemarketing Representative 
Communications Coordinator 
o Track ROI and Referral Activity 
o Implement and Execute: 
Physician Support Program 
Occupational Health 
Public Relations Program 
















Physician Referral Services 
Womens' Health 
Other 
o Pre-Registration Mail Fulfillment 
o Guest Relations Training 
Point of Entry 
Physician Off ice Staff 
o Physician Practice Promotion 
o ADS Relations 





PHYSICIAN SUPPORT LIAISON 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
o Hospital/Physician Communications 
o D.eliver Physician Benefit Package 
o Physician Needs 
o Practice Management Support 
o Targeted Physician Visits 
o Recruitment as Appropriate 
o Staff Training Services 





OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH COORDINATOR 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
Program Development with PMCI 
Sales Quota Activity 
Case Management/Policies and Procedures 
Patient Tracking and ROI 
Employee and Employer Training 
Execute Brokerage Programs 
Good Neighbor Clinic Coordination 
ER Coordination 
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I. MARKET ASSESSMENT 
A. COMPETITIVE PROFILE 
Hillcrest Health Center operates within a competitive environment 
that has the following general characteristics: 
1. The Oklahoma City health care market is impacted by 
changing delivery patterns towards increased ambulatory 
and outpatient care. The national trends of decreasing 
inpatient care utilization rates along with increased 
bedding continue to apply significant pressure on 
Hillcrest to increase its competitive posture. 
2. Hospital competition, declining admission rates, and 
declining length of stay places additional pressure to 
decrease HHC's occupancy. 
3. In addition, to "macro-environmental" competitive 
forces, hospitals such as South Community, Baptist, 
Presbyterian, and St. Anthony's can be expected to 
continue extremely competitive postures. 
4. Alternative delivery systems will continue to grow, 
putting additional pressure on HHC to minimize health 
care delivery costs. 
5. Changing reimbursement patterns will continue to force 
physicians to provide services on an outpatient basis 
which used to be provided in an inpatient setting. 
Unless given options, physicians will increasingly be 





outpatient services as they try to further develop 
secure practices. 
Acute Care Hospital Competitors 
Hillcrest Health Center has several 
primary and secondary 
South Community Hospital, 
Hospital, and St. Anthony 
service areas. 
key competitors in its 
These hospitals include 
Baptist 
Hospital. 
Medical Center, Presbyterian 
See Exhibits 1 through 4 for 
hospital locations, facility assessments, and admission trends. 
South Community Hospital 
South Community Hospital is the only other hospital located 
in south Oklahoma City. This hospital is a 391 bed facility 
located east of Hillcrest Health Center. In 1986, this 
facility had admissions in excess of 11,000, a 30% decrease 
from their 1982 admissions. South Community Hospital offers 
several programs that are 
these programs are Open 
Cardiac Catheterization. 
not found at Hillcrest. Some of 
Heart Surgery, Hemodialysis, and 
Hillcrest, on the other hand has 
several programs that are not offered by South Community. 
These include Skilled Nursing, Psychiatric Services, and 
Inpatient/Outpatient Alcohol/Chemical Dependency. 
Baptist Medical Center 
Baptist Medical Center is located north of Hillcrest on the 
other · side of the North Canadian River. This 577 bed 
hospital had admissions in 1986 of 20,000, a decrease of 6% 
from 1982. Baptist offers a very large cross-section of 
programs, many of which are not offered at Hillcrest. Some 
of these programs include Cardiac Intensive Care, Open Heart 
Surgery, Hemodialysis, Organ Transplant, Burn Care, 
Inpatient/Outpatient Rehabilitation, Cardiac 
Catheterization, and Neonatal Intensive Care. Hillcrest, 
however, does provide services not covered by Baptist 
including a Trauma Center, Skilled Nursing, Home Care, and 
Inpatient/Outpatient Alcohol/Chemical Dependency. 
St. Anthony Hospital 
St. Anthony Hospital, which is also located northeast of 
Hillcrest, is a 684 bed facility. This hospital had 
admissions in excess of 16,000 in 1986, nearly a 15% decline 
from 1982 admissions. St. Anthony Hospital offers many 
programs not available at Hillcrest. Some of "these programs 
include a Cardiac Intensive Care Unit, Open Heart Surgery, 
Organ Transplant, Hemodialysis, Outpatient Rehabilitation, 
Geriatric Services, and Cardiac Catheterization. Hillcrest 
does, however, offer several programs not available at St. 
Anthony, programs such as a Trauma Center, Skilled Nursing, 
Inpatient/Outpatient Psychiatric, Birthing Rooms, and Home 
Care. 
Presbyterian Hospital 
Presbyterian Hospital is located north of the river, just 
northeast of Hillcrest. This hospital is a 407 bed 
facility. Between 1982 and 1986, Presbyterian's admissions 
fell nearly 28%. Presbyterian Hospital also offers a full 
range of programs, some of which are not offered at 
Hillcrest. Some of these programs include Open Heart 
Surgery, Organ Transplant, Hemodialysis, Outpatient 
Rehabilitation, Recreational Therapy, Family Planning, 
Genetic Counseling, Cardiac Catheterization, and Neonatal 
Intensive Care. Hillcrest offers several programs not 
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Exhibit 2 
Facilities Hillcrest s. Callllmity Presl1Jterian st. Antlmys Baptis1 
Ambilatory SUrgery x x x x x 
Intensive care (cardiac ()Uy) . x . x . . 
Intensive care Ofixed) x x x x . x . 
~ Heart SUrgery x . x x . x . . 
Trama Center . x x x . 
tn.trasoom . x x x x . x . . 
X-ray Radiaticm '1berapy . x . x x x . . 
Kega1oltage Radiaticm '1berapy x . x x x . 
Radioactive J.Dlplants . x . x x . x . . . 
Diagoostic Radioisotqie x x . x x . x . . 
hrapeutic Radioisotope x . x x . x . . 
Bistq>atml.ogy Laboratory . x x x x . x . . 
Organ Transplant x x •· x . 
Blood Bank x x x x x 
Health Pram>ticm x x . x x . x . . 
Respiratory 'lberaP'} x x x x .. x . 
Bum care . . x . . 
Skilled Nursing x . . . . 
Beoodialysis x . x x x . 
Physical 'lberaP'} x x . x x x . 
Occupatiooal. 'lberapy . x x x x . x . . 
Rebabilitaticm Inpatient : x . : x . 
Rebahilitaticm Oltpatient x x x . x . 
Psydrl.atric Inpatient x x x 
Psychiatric Qltpatient x : x 
Psychiatric Partial lk:>sp : . x . 
Psychiatric DDergency Services : x x x 
Psychiatric Caisult/F.d x . x . 
Clinical ~ogy Services . x x x : x x . 
Organj zed Qltpatient Depart . x x . x x . . 
Dnergency Department x x x x : x 
Birthing Roen . x x . x . x . 
Cbstetrics . x x . x x . . 
Ible care Program . x : x . 
Recreatiooal '1berapy x x 
Day lblpital . x . x x . . 
Speech Pat:OOlogy . x x . x . x . . . 
li::lspital Anzjl i ary x x x x 
Volunteer Services x x . x x x . 
Patient Representative . x x x x . 
Alcd¥>1/Cbem Depend Inpatient x x 
Alcohol/Clem Depend Qltpatient : x x x 
Geriatric Services x 
Pediatric Inpatient x x x x 
er Scanner x x x x x 
Cardiac catheterizaticm x x x x 
Family Plam:ing x x 
Genetic Coonseli~ I 
Neooatal IaJ . x x . . . 
Soorce: AHA lb;pital Guide, 1987. 
Exhibit 3 
~IDL'lHCUll'm 
CCIR'I'Il«; lmPITAL PRa'IIE 
1986 
Licensed 1975 1982 . 1983 1984 1986 
bpi.ta! Beds Mm:issi.Clls Mmi.ssicm Admissicm Mmissicms Mm:issicms 
Baptist Medical Center of ac 577 19,929 21,266 21,957 21,785 20,558 20,002 
Billcreast Health Center 186 5,710 5,754 5,561 5,387 5,339 5,497 
Presbyterian lbspital 407 10,545 18,212 18,249 16,919 14,592 13,149 
South Cc11111mi ty bpital 391 11,887 16,185 15,362 13,432 11,659 11,391 
St. Anth:ny lbspital 684 25,269 19,392 18,886 19,685 17,802 16,526 







HILLCREST HEALTH CENTER 
COMPETING HOSPITAL PROFILE 
20.0021 
10.54$ 





~ 1975 I<><<! 1982 ~ 1986 
Source: Acute Care Hospitals Report. 
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B. INTERNAL ANALYSIS 
Major Services 
Hospital services in this marketing -plan will be analyzed 
according to admitting physician specialty. The purpose of this 
approach is to analyze services according to admission patterns, 
so these admission patterns can be controlled on a proactive 
basis. While it is understood that many admitting physicians 
ultimately refer the patient in the form of a consult to other 
medical specialty physicians, this represents the most consistent 
approach to physician referral tracking possible given HHC's 
current information system. In addition to inpatient admission 
patterns, PMCI also conducted analyses of outpatient procedures 
surgical procedures, and inpatient/outpatient revenues by 
specialty. 
Inpatient Services 
Based upon an analysis of Hillcrest's admissions by physician 
specialty for July 1986 - June 1987, General Practice was 
responsible for the largest percentage of specialty admissions, 
representing nearly 50%. General Practice admissions in Fiscal 
Year 1987 totalled 2,812, a 1.4% increase from Fiscal Year 1986. 
The specialty responsible for the second largest percentage of 
admissions was Internal Medicine with 11%. Internal Medicine 
admissions for 1987 decreased just slightly from Fiscal Year 1986 
by around 1%. Other specialties responsible for significant 
percentages of 1987 admissions included Orthopedic Surgery at 9%, 
BMC/Mental Health with nearly 8%, Pediatrics with 7%, and Ob/Gyn 
with almost 6%. While Pediatrics and BMC/Mental Health 
represented increased admissions from the previous year, 
Orthopedic Surgery arid Ob/Gyn both experienced decreased 





Internal Medicine, Pediatrics and Ob/Gyn) represented nearly 73% 
of all 1987 Fiscal Year specialty admissions, an increase of only 
1% from 1986. (See Exhibits 1 through 4). 
Outpatient Procedures 
Outpatient procedure data was obtained from Hillcrest Osteopathic 
Hospital Doctor Analysis Report, Fiscal Year July 1985 - June 
1986. Emergency Medicine outpatient procedures were excluded to 
reflect specialty procedure trends. General Practice was 
responsible for the greatest number of outpatient procedures in 
Fiscal Year 1986 with 4,470, or nearly 53% of all procedures. 
Orthopedic Surgery, with 1,333 procedures, represented almost 16% 
of total 1986 procedures. Internal Medicine outpatient 
procedures were responsible for nearly 7% of outpatient 
procedures, while Gastroenterology and Ob/Gyn, with 377 and 314 
procedures respectively, represented around 4% of total 
outpatient procedures each. All primary care specialties 
combined were responsible for almost 65% of all outpatient 
procedures at Hillcrest Health Center in Fiscal Year 1986. (See 
Exhibit 5). 
Surgical Procedures 
Surgical Procedures were obtained for Hillcrest Health Center by 
physician specialty for Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987. Nearly 33% 
of all surgeries performed at Hillcrest during Fiscal Year 1987 
were performed by General Practice. This represented a decrease 
of nearly 16% from the previous year. Orthopedic Surgery, 
accounting for almost 24% of 1987 surgical procedures, declined 
by 26% from 1986. The largest growth in procedures between 1986 
and 1987 was found in General Surgery, with a 24% increase. 
General Surgery accounted for 10% of surgical procedures in 1986 





substantial decline in surgical procedures between 1986 and 1987 
occurred in Gastroenterology, going from 158 procedures in 1986 
to 42 procedures in 1987, a decrease of over 73%. Overall, 
surgical procedures declined nearly 18% between 1986 and 1987. 
(See Exhibits 6 through 8). 
Revenues 
A profile of revenues generated by physician specialty for 
inpatient/outpatient procedures was prepared based upon Hillcrest 
Health Center Doctor Analysis Report by Specialty for Fiscal 
Years 1986 and 1987 (July - June). General Practice was 
responsible for nearly $11.9 million in revenue for Fiscal Year 
1987, representing over 44% of total specialty revenues. Over 
12% of specialty revenues came from BMC/Mental Health, with over 
$3.2 million, while Internal Medicine, with nearly $3.2 in 
revenues, represented almost 12% of all specialty revenue. The 
four primary care specialties combined accounted for 61%, or over 
$16 million of the nearly $27 million of revenue generated by all 
special ties. Other special ties responsible for substa.ntial 
revenues included Orthopedic Surgery with 8%, Emergency Medicine 
responsible for nearly 5%, General Surgery representing 4.5%, and 
Gastroenterology and Ob/Gyn with around 3% each of total 
specialty revenues. Overall, specialty revenues increased by 1% 
between Fiscal Year 1986 and 1987. (See Exhibits 9 and 10). 
Inpatient Origin 
Oklahoma City accounted for almost 70% of all Hillcrest's 
admissions based on a sample of 826 discharges from 1987. The 
areas within Oklahoma City with high patient origin were 
predominately found in the southern portion of the city. It is 
interesting to note that over 60% of Hillcrest's patients come 





areas with the highest inpatient origin include zip codes 73129 
and 73119 with around 10% each. (See Exhibits 11 and 12). 
Inpatient Market Share 
Market share by zip code was estimated by calculating the county 
utilization rate, using 1987 population and 1986 hospital 
admissions. An inpatient utilization rate of 153 admissions per 
thousand population was derived. In order to determine Hillcrest 
Health Center's market share, PMCI annualized the inpatient 
discharge sample used in the inpatient origin analysis. 
Hillcrest captures its largest market share in those areas south 
of the North Canadian River. Those areas where Hillcrest has 
high market share include zip code 73108 with nearly 14% and zip 
code 73129 with over 13%. (See Exhibits 13 and 14). 
ER Patient Origin 
PMCI sampled 1,000 ER patient discharges from 1987 in order to 
determine Hillcrest Health Center's ER patient origin. Nearly 
67% of Hillcrest Health Center's ER patient origin comes from 
those areas south of the North Canadian River. Only 8% of 
Hillcrest's ER patients come from those areas north of the river. 
The remaining 25% come from areas outside of Oklahoma City. 
Those areas directly surrounding the hospital have the highest ER 
patient origin. Over 50% of ER patient origin come from zip 
codes 73108, 73119, 73159, 73139, 73109, and 73129 in south 
Oklahoma City. Over 11%, or 113 of the sampled ER patients from 
1987 were admitted to the hospital. Around 58% of those admitted 
ER patients came from areas south of the North Canadian River. 
Zip code 73119, where Hillcrest is located, was responsible for 
over 12% of ER admissions. Nearly 5% of the ER patient 





River, with over 37% of the ER patients admitted coming from 
outside Oklahoma City. (See Exhibits 15 through 18). 
Inpatient Payor Profile 
Payor information was obtained from a sample of 826 inpatient 
admissions for Hillcrest in 1987. During this time period, 
nearly 41% of HHC's inpatient admissions were Commercial 
patients. Medicare patients were responsible for the second 
largest percent of admissions with almost 25%. Medicaid was 
responsible for nearly 21%, with the remaining 14% of inpatient 
discharges from Self, HMO/PPO, Workers' Comp, Blue Cross, and 
Welfare. (See Exhibits 19 and 20). 
Emergency Room Payor Profile 
Emergency Room payor information was taken from the sample of 
1,000 ER visits in 1987. Commercial patients were responsible 
for 35% of all ER visits, with Self Pay representing 33% of 
patients. Blue Cross patients were responsible for nearly 10%, 
Medicare patients represented nearly 7%, and Welfare patient 
accounted for over 6% of ER visits. Workers' Comp and Hillcrest 
Health Center represented 5.5% and 3.5% of ER patient visits 
respectively. Of the 113 ER visits admitted in the sample, over 
27% were Medicare patients. Commercial patients represented the 
second largest group, responsible for nearly 25% of ER 
admissions, followed by Self Pay with 22%. Blue Cross patients 
were responsible for 15% of the ER admissions, with the remaining 
11% going to Welfare, Workers' Comp, and Hillcrest Health Center. 
(See Exhibits 21 through 24). 
Inpatient Employer Analysis 
Admissions by employer were also obtained from the 1987 sample 





having No Employer, or Unknown. Around 8% of those sampled were 
Retired, nearly 2% were Self Employed, and nearly 1% were 
Disabled. Those employers responsible for the most discharges 
were General Motors with 4%, Tinker Air Force Base with 3.5%, and 
Hillcrest Health Center with nearly 3%. (See Exhibits 25 -26). 
Emergency Room Employer Analysis 
Emergency Room visits by employer were obtained from the 1,000 ER 
visit sample for 1987. Of those sampled, 471 or 47% were listed 
as having No Employer, Unemployed, or Unknown. Those employers 
responsible for the largest number of ER visits were Hillcrest 
Health Center with nearly 5%, Self Employed with over 3%, General 
Motors with 2.5%, Tinker Air Force Base with nearly 2%, and 
AT & T and FAA with 1% each. Of the 113 ER visits admitted, 61% 
were listed as having No employer, Unemployed, or Unknown. 
General Motors was responsible for the largest number of ER 
admissions with 3.5%, followed by Self Employed with nearly 3% 
and US Post Office with nearly 2%. (See Exhibits 27 through 29). 
Inpatient Age Analysis 
The 1987 inpatient discharge sample data was also analyzed by age 
cohort. Those patients between the ages of 0 and 17 were 
responsible for 16% of inpatient admissions. The largest number 
of admissions belonged to those patients between the ages of 18 
and 45 with 43%. Patients age 46 to 64 represented 17%, with 
those aged 65 and older responsible for nearly 23%. (See 
Exhibits 30 and 31). 
Emergency Room Age Analysis 
Based on the 1,000 sampled ER visits, nearly 51% of all ER 
patients at Hillcrest are between the ages of 18 and 45. 





the age of 45 were responsible for 17%. While 17% of ER patient 
visits are age 45 and older, over 445 of those ER patients 
admitted fall into this age category. Patients between the ages 
of 18 and 45 represented nearly 42% of ER patient admissions, 
while patients under age 18 were responsible for 14%. (See 
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C. EXTERNAL ANALYSIS 
Utilization Review 
Hospital utilization reports were reviewed for Hillcrest Health 
Center and its closet competitors, South Community Hospital, 
Baptist Medical Center, Presbyterian Hospital, and St. Anthony 
Hospital for 1983 - 1986. Information regarding Hillcrest's 
surgical utilization was reviewed for Fiscal Years 1985 through 
1987, as well as emergency room utilization for Calendar Years 
1983 through 1987 (annualized) . The following summarizes these 
trends. 
Admissions 
Between 1983 and 1986, Hillcrest experienced a drop of 
approximately 64 admissions, only 1%. Between 1985 and 
1986, Hillcrest actually saw an increase in admissions of 
nearly 3%. During the same four year span, the other 
hospitals in Hillcrest's service area saw greater declines 
in admissions. Presbyterian experienced a loss of 30% in 
admissions between 1983 and 1986, the greatest of which 
occurred between 1984 and 1985 with a loss of 2,327 
admissions. South Community's admissions fell drastically 
between 1983 and 1986, by nearly 4,000, a loss of nearly 
26%. Like Presbyterian, South Community experienced its 
greatest decline between 1984 and 1985 with a loss of 13%. 
Baptist with the greatest admissions, experienced nearly a 
9% decline between 1983 and 1986. Baptist admissions went 
from 21,957 in 1983 to 20,002 in 1986. St. Anthony 
experienced a 12% decline in admissions between 1983 and 
1986, going from 18,886 to 16,526. Between 1983 and 1984, 





Anthony's admissions actually increased by 4%. But by 1986, 
its admissions proceeded to fall 16%. (See Exhibit 1). 
Patient Days 
While Hillcrest's admissions decreased between 1983 and 
1986, its patient days increased by over 8%. Between 1983 
and 1985, Hillcrest's patient days fell nearly 7%, but 
increased by over 16% between 1985 and 1986. South 
Community had patient days in excess of 95,000 in 1983, but 
by 1986 the hospital's patient days had dropped to around 
77,000, a loss of nearly 18,000 days, or 19%. South 
Community decreased by nearly 23,000 patient days between 
1983 and 1985, but increased in patient days by 7% between 
1985 and 1986. Baptist with the highest number of patient 
days in 1983, went from 162,716 days to 138,891 days in 
1986, a loss of over 23,800 days. Between 1983 and 1985, 
Baptist's patient days declined by over 13%, but between 
1985 and 1986 these days fell only 1.5%. St. Anthony had 
patient days just over 150,000 in 1983, by 1985 its patient 
days dropped by 11,000, a loss of over 7%. Between 1985 and 
1986, however, St. Anthony's patient days increased by over 
1%. Presbyterian experienced by far the greatest decline of 
these hospitals, going from 125,398 patient days in 1983 to 
82,851 patient days in 1985, a loss of over 42,500 patient 
days or 34%. The greatest portion of this decline occurred 
between 1984 and 1985 with a 23% loss. while experiencing 
large decreases between 1983 and 1985, Presbyterian 






Average Daily Census 
Hillcrest is the only one of the five hospitals to 
experience an increase in average daily census between- 1983 
and 1986. Hillcrest's ADC increased by over 8%, going from 
93.7 to 101.4. Between 1983 and 1985, however, Hillcrest 
experienced a 7% decline in ADC, but increased by over 16% 
between 1985 and 1986. Between 1983 and 1986, South 
Community saw nearly a 19% decline in its ADC. South 
Community's ADC actually dropped nearly 24% between 1983 and 
1985, before rebounding 7% in 1986. Baptist had the highest 
ADC in 1983 with 445.8, this fell to 380.5 by 1986, nearly a 
15% decline. St. Anthony's ADC decreased 6% between 1983 
and 1986. Like Hillcrest and South Community, St. Anthony's 
ADC declined between 1985 before rising in 1986. It 
experienced a 7% decline between 1983 and 1985, with a 1% 
increase in 1986. Presbyterian also experienced a great 
decline in ADC, going from 343.6 in 1983 to 227 in 1986, a 
loss of nearly 34%. (See Exhibit 3). 
Average Length of Stay 
Hillcrest's ALOS has fluctuated between 1983 and 1986, and 
has increased nearly 10% since 1983, to an ALOS of 6.7. 
South Community's 1986 ALOS was 6.8, a gain of nearly 10% 
from 1983's ALOS of 6.2. Baptist's ALOS went from 7.4 in 
1983 to 6.9 in 1986, a decline of nearly 7%. St. Anthony 
has the highest ALOS of the five hospitals. Its ALOS 
increased by over 7% between 1983 and 1986, going from 7.9 
to 8.5. Presbyterian's ALOS fell nearly 9% between 1983 and 
1986, but increased by nearly 9% between 1985 and 1986. 






Hillcrest's occupancy level fell nearly 14% between 1983 and 
1986, going from 63.3% to 54.5%. Hillcrest did experience a 
very slight increase in occupancy from 1983 and 1984, but 
then started on a downward trend. South Community's 
occupancy level, while going from 67% in 1983 to 54.5% in 
1986, actually increased 7% between 1985 and 1986. 
Baptist's occupancy declined by over 13% between 1983 and 
1986. Its occupancy went from a high of 76.2% in 1983 to a 
low of 65.9% in 1986. The occupancy level at St. Anthony 
fell the least between 1983 and 1986, going from 60.1% to 
56.4%, a decrease of only 6%. St. Anthony's occupancy fell 
7% between 1983 and 1985, before increasing 1% between 1985 
and 1986. Presbyterian had the highest 1983 occupancy level 
of the five hospitals at 77. 2%. By 1986 ·this rate fell to 
55.8%, a decline of nearly 28%. (See Exhibit 5). 
Births 
Births at Hillcrest increased 4% between 1984 and 1986, 
going from 449 to 468. Hillcrest experienced nearly an 8% 
decline between 1984 and 1985, before gaining nearly 13% by 
1986. South Community's births went up 3% between 1984 and 
1986. It experienced a slight decline between 1984 and 
1986, before gaining 4% by 1986. Births at St. Anthony's 
fluctuated greatly between 1984 and 1986, going from a low 
of 617 in 1984 to a high of 990 in 1985, a gain of 60%. 
Between 1985 and 1986, however, St. Anthony's births fell by 
nearly 26%. Its births in 1986 were still 19% higher than 
births in 1984. Baptist also experienced some fluctuation 





births in 1985 to 1,849 births in 1985, and 1,748 births in 
1986. Births were 7% higher in 1986 than in 1984. (se·e 
Exhibit 6). 
Surgical Procedures 
Total surgical procedures at Hillcrest were up nearly 3% in 
Fiscal Year 1987 from 1985. This, however, did represent a 
5% decline from 1986 surgical procedures of 3,058. While 
inpatient surgical procedures declined 24% since 1985, 
outpatient procedures rose 81%, going from 722 in 1985 to 
1,308 in 1987. (See Exhibit 7). 
Emergency Room 
Emergency room visits for Hillcrest in 1987 (annualized) are 
projected at 11,270, an increase of 31% from 1983. This 
1987 figure represents a 1% decline in visits from 1986. 
The percent of emergency room visits admitted at Hillcrest 
has stayed constant since 1984 at 15%. The percent of ER 
visits admitted as a percentage of total hospital admissions 
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II. PHYSICIAN ANALYSIS 
This medical staff analysis has been prepared for Hillcrest 
Health Center. In establishing a Physician Support Network, it 
is essential that all physicians be closely monitored in terms of 
referral patterns, percent admissions contributed to their 
specialty, the "life cycle" of their practice, and other factors. 
It is also important to the success of any Physician Support 
program that physician specialty composition in the network be 
closely tracked. A delicate balance of primary care physicians 
and specialists in each specialty must be readily available to 
the public to make the network a marketable commodity to 
consumers, employers, and insurers. 
The primary intent of the medical staff analysis in this section 
is to furnish Hillcrest Health Center with a tool that can be 
used on an on-going basis to monitor physician status. The 
following specialty assessments will highlight findings of the 





A. MEDICAL STAFF PROFILE 
An analysis of admissions by physician specialty was compiled for 
Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, July - June. Surgical procedures by 
physician specialty were also analyzed for the same time periods. 
Outpatient procedures by physician specialty based on July 1985 
through June 1986 were obtain.ed from Hillcrest's Doctor Analysis 
report. This report also included revenue by physician for 
Fiscal Year 1986, and Fiscal Year 1987 physician revenue data was 
obtained from the July 1986 through June 1987 Doctor Analysis 
report. Detailed reports by physician specialty can be found in 
the Addenda of this report. Ob/Gyn admissions for Fiscal Years 
1986 and 1987, while being admitted under Dr. Dieter's name also 
include admissions by Dr. Motz. Because PMCI was unable to 
distinguish between those admissions, all Ob/Gyn activity will be 
listed as Drs. Dieter/Motz. 
There ar.e 5 physicians on Hillcrest's medical staff who are 55 
years of age or older. These 5 physicians represented almost 4% 
of the hospital's total admissions in 1987. The hospital has an 
overall average age for its medical staff of 41 years of age, 
which is lower than national averages. (See Exhibit 1). 
Admissions 
The top 10 physician admitters in 1987 were responsible for 
nearly 45% of all physician admissions at Hillcrest. Drs. 
Dieter/Motz and Marcus each were responsible for around 6% of 
total physician admissions, with Drs. Leply and Abston 
representing almost 5% each. The remaining doctors each 
accounted for around 4% of admissions. Only Drs. T. King and 






year. Exhibits 2 through 4 show a breakdown of these top 
admitters. 
General Practice 
General Practice with 2,812 physician admissions, 
represented over 53% of total physician admissions in 1987. 
These admissions represented a 1% increase from the previous 
year. In 1987, nearly 9% of General Practice admissions 
came from Dr. Abston with 244. His 1987 admissions 
represented nearly a 19% decline from his 1986 admissions. 
Dr. T. King, with 229 admissions, was responsible for 8% of 
total physician admissions, while Drs. Blue and T. Moore 
accounted for around 8% each. Drs. T. King and T. Moore 
experienced slight increases in admissions between 1986 and 
1987, while Dr. Blue's admissions represented nearly a 39% 
decline. Together these four doctors accounted for almost 
31% of General Practice's 1987 admissions. 
Internal Medicine 
In 1987, Internal Medicine physicians were responsible for 
nearly 12% of all physician admissions. Internal Medicine 
admissions declined by 1% between 1986 and 1987. Dr. 
Marcus, with 305 Internal Medicine admissions, was 
responsible for nearly 49% of this specialty's total 
admissions. His 1987 admissions represented a slight 
increase from his previous year's admissions. Around 32% of 
Internal Medicine's admissions came from Dr. Anderson, who 
increased admissions by 20% between 1986 and 1987. 
Together, Drs. Marcus and Anderson were responsible for 81% 






Orthopedic Surgery physicians accounted for 10% of physician 
admissions in 1987, and experienced a 21% decline in 
admissions between 1986 and 1987. Dr. Hughes was 
responsible for 220 Orthopedic Surgery admissions in 1987, 
or 41%, while Dr. Cruse admitted 192, nearly 36% of 
Orthopedic Surgery admissions. Combined, these two doctors 
were responsible for 77% of Orthopedic Surgery admissions. 
Both of the above doctors experienced a decline in 
admissions from the previous year. 
Pediatrics 
Between 1986 and 1987, Pediatric physician increased 
admissions by 4%. In 1987, Pediatrics represented nearly 8% 
of physician admissions. Dr. Leply with 257 admissions, was 
responsible for 63% of these Pediatric admissions. This 
represented a 20% decline from his previous year's 
admissions. 
Ob/Gyn 
Ob/Gyn physicians accounted for 6% of physician admissions 
in 1987, which represented a 3% decrease from 1986 
admissions. Drs. Dieter/Motz, with 319 admissions, were 
responsible for 100% of these Ob/Gyn admissions in 1987. 
General Surgery 
In 1987, General Surgery physicians were responsible for 4% 
of all physician admissions. Between 1986 and 1987, 
however, General Surgery admissions fell nearly 12%. Dr. 
Schelle represented over 39% of General Surgery admissions, 
while Dr. Benien accounted for 35%. Together, these two 





admissions. Dr. Benien experienced a 30% decline in 
admissions between 1986 and 1987, while Dr. Schelle 
increased admissions by 8%. 
Gastroenterology 
Gastroenterology physicians accounted for nearly 3% of total 
physician admissions in 1987. Between 1986 and 1987, 
Gastroenterology admissions fell by over 39%. Dr. Hogin, 
with 140 admissions, accounted for 100% of Gastroenteroloqy 
admissions. 
Neurology 
In 1987, Neurology physician admissions represented just 
over 2% of total physician admissions. Neurology admissions 
declined 15% between 1986 and 1987. Dr. Robbins with 126 
admissions, accounted for 100% of Neurology admissions. 
Cardiology 
Cardiology physician admissions in 1987 totaled 78, 
representing over 1% of total physician admissions. Between 
1986 and 1987, Cardiology admissions fell over 20%. Dr. 
Mowdy was responsible for 100% of these Cardiology 
admissions. 
Surgical Procedures 
Nearly 64% of surgical procedures performed at Hillcrest Health 
Center in 1987 were by 10 physicians. Almost 14% of surgeries 
were performed by Drs. Dieter/Motz, with 278 procedures. This 
represented a 5% increase in procedures since 1986. Drs. Hughes 
and Cruse each accounted for around 9% of surgical procedures, 
and both experienced a decline in procedures from the previous 





since 1986, represented over 6% of total surgical procedures. 
Drs. Benien and G. Smith, with over 5% of total surgical 
procedures each in 1987, experienced a decline from 1986. The 
remaining 14% of surgical procedures by the top 10 physicians 
came from Drs. Marcus, Keith, Blue, and T. Moore. Both Drs. 
Marcus and Blue increased surgical procedures from the previous 
year. A breakdown of surgical procedures by the top ten 
physicians can be found in Exhibits 5 through 7. 
General Practice 
Over 32% of surgical procedures in 1987 were performed in 
General Practice. General Practice surgical procedures 
declined by over 15% between 1986 and 1987. Drs. Blue and 
T. Moore were each responsible for 10% of General Practice 
procedures, with Dr. T. King accounting for 9%. Ors. Blue 
and T. King both experienced decreases in surgical 
procedures between 1986 and 1987. Nearly 15% of General 
Practice surgical procedures came from Drs. Tomlinson and 
Nickels, while 6% came from Dr. Goodmon. All three of these 
doctors showed a decline in procedures from the previous 
year. 
Orthopedic Surgery 
Nearly 24% of surgical procedures in 1987 were in Orthopedic 
Surgery. This specialty had a decrease in procedures of 26% 
since 1986. Dr. Hughes with 187 surgical procedures, 
accounted for nearly 40% of specialty procedures, while Dr. 
Cruse was responsible for 177, nearly 38% of procedures. 
These two doctors had a combined decrease in surgical 
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C. FULL-TIME PHYSICIAN EQUIVALENT ANALYSIS 
One of the most important tools that PMCI uses to determine the 
need for physician affiliations is the Full-Time Physician 
Equivalent Analysis. This analysis is used nationally by leading 
hospital chains, and it has been significantly upgraded in 
methodology by PMCI. 
The "unit of measurement" used in this analysis is the average 
number of visits per specialty per full-time practice of a loyal 
physician. The number of patients a physician admits to a given 
hospital from a "full-time" practice varies according to type of . 
practice, physician age, office hours, and the individual habits 
of each physician. However, it is possible for a hospital to 
anticipate the average number of admissions its fully loyal 
physicians should be expected to refer. Hillcrest management 
worked closely with PMCI in order to identify the average 
physician referrals per full-time practice given HHC's market 
climate. The latest regional averages of admissions per 
specialty were reviewed, along with current admission patterns at 
HHC. 
Next, HHC management was asked to identify the "ideal" inpatient 
bed mix based upon such variables as profitability, specialty 
programs, services it wishes to offer the medical community, 
managed care providers, etc. The number of full-time practices 
necessary in each specialty to refer this case mix is then 
identified through the Physician Equivalent Analysis. The full-
time Physician Practice Equivalent Analysis is a "yardstick" that 
determines the type of specialty practices that need to be 
referring patients to the hospital in order to attain desired 





Average Support per Physician/Methodology 
The first computation table for the above process can be found in 
Exhibit 1. The first column lists Fiscal Year 1987 admissions 
based on July 1986 through June 1987 data. The second column 
lists the average admissions that can be expected from a full-
time practice physician in Hillcrest Health Center's service 
area. This number was computed by taking PMCI national averages, 
Jackson and Coker survey averages (1986), and comparing them to 
most physicians who are currently expressing full-time or near 
full-time loyalty to HHC. Several factors have an impact on the 
"averages" in column 2. Some of these factors include: 
o Medical Specialty Procedures of Practice 
o Loyalty to more than one hospital 
o Physician age 
o Outpatient Procedures 
o Personal work habits of each physician 
The third column of this report indicates how many Full-Time 
practices are supporting HHC. For example, the hospital is 
currently receiving 2,812 General Practice admissions. The 
average General Practice physician at HHC admits about 140 
patients on a full-time basis. Therefore, Hillcrest Health 
Center is benefitting inpatient admissions in the amount of 
approximately 20.1 full-time practices (2,812 divided by 140). 
The fourth column of Exhibit l indicates the number of active 
admitting physicians at HHC. Physicians admitting fewer than 1% 






The fifth and final column of this Exhibit reflects what 
percentage of admissions from an average full-time practice HHC 
is receiving from its specialists on the active medical staff. 
If the number is greater than 100%, this indicates that on an 
average, the hospital is receiving excellent support from its 
physicians. If this number is less than 100%, this indicates 
that physicians on average are either sending their patients 
elsewhere, or that they have exceptionally low practice volume. 
Exhibits 2 - 4 indicate the new percentage of support per active 
physician at HHC that would be required to achieve 70%, 75% and 
80% occupancy with current physicians. Exhibits 5 and 6 
summarize the physician support levels necessary. 
Average Full-Time Physician Support-Results 
The physician specialties below are providing HHC with support 






















* Note: Support at greater than 100% indicates that 
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E. AFFILIATION ACTIONS NEEDED 
Exhibit 1 summarizes affiliation needs according to practice 
replacement needs, additional physicians needed to attain bed mix 
and occupancy goals, and new primary care affiliations needed to 
"feed" desired sub-specialties. 











* To include Dr. McKinney 










Additional Loyalty/Affiliations Needed to Refer to Desired 
Specialists: 
Specialty No. of Physicians 





Strategies to Build Physician Support 
In order to attain desired utilization patterns, HHC must use a 
customized strategy for each physician specialty. In some cases, 
particularly when a surplus of a particular specialty exists, 
aggressive physician support and liaison is advisable as a way to 
increase loyalty. See Exhibit 2. 
In the case of "consumer driven" services and primary care, it is 
of ten advisable to intensify marketing programs and "build 
traffic" in each practice. When certain regional programs are in 
the best interest of HHC, development of satellite offices or 
"circuit riding" might be advisable. 
Clearly, HHC's versatility to use different strategies for each 
specialty will determine success or failure of affiliation and 
physician loyalty. PMCI has prepared a matrix of physician 
support strategy in the following section which outlines specific 
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September 21, 1987 
Mr. Jim Maccallum 
Chief Executive Officer 
Hillcrest Health Center 
2129 S.W. 59th Street 
Oklahoma City, OK 73119 
Dear Jim: 
It was a pleasure meeting you last week. After my 
initial assessment, I feel most confident that successful 
program development can occur with the combined efforts 
of management, medical staff, and PMC. Consequently, we 
are looking forward to receiving the information 
necessary for us to complete the business/action plan as 
soon as possible. Below, I am outlining activities from 
my September 16th and 17th visit. I am also outlining 
the follow-up activities that are necessary from that· 
visit, and those activities that are recommended for our 
next visit. As we discussed, Frank Dingler is the PMC 
project coordinator at Hillcrest. He will be visiting 
Hillcrest Health Center on September 28, 29, and 30. 
During that time, he and one of our research specialists 
will be interviewing a number of physicians on your 
medical staff. 
ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED ON SEPTEMBER 16th and 17th 
Project orientation with Jim Maccallum. 
Discussed programs support activities, and 
business/action plan preparations. 
Began ideal bed mix/occupancy identification 
process. 
Met with Gary Brown, Director of Marketing. 
Conducted initial program inventory. 
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Submitted data collection requests pertaining to 
the following: 
Medical staff profile 
Inpatient discharge analysis 
Area physicians by zip code and specialty 
Inventory of non-hospital competition 
Demographic data by zip code (age and sex 
specific) 
Major employer information 
Hospital utilization trends 
Other information as requested 
Met with Dr. Dale Askins, Emergency Department 
Director. 
Completed questionnaire in preparation for 
emergency department marketing activities. 
Met with Dr. John Hughes, Chief of Staff. He 
discussed several items including: the need for 
more community education about Hillcrest Hospital; 
physician programs; the interest the medical staff 
has in electronic claims processing services; the 
promotion of outpatient surgical services; and, 
the need to provide marketing services to 
physicians, especially general practice 
physicians. Dr. Hughes was informed about the 
upcoming physician interviews. Upon the 
completion of these interviews, he was informed 
that he would be given a summary report. We will 
of course review this summary with management 
prior to presenting it to any members of the 
medical staff. 
A "product/program inventory" was conducted on 
such programs as Good Neighbor Care, the Good 
Neighbor Clinic, Sick and Save, and the Behavioral 
Medicine Center. 
Toured Hillcrest Health Center, its surrounding 
community, and visited South Community Hospital to 
assess their emergency services and the rest of 
their physical plant. 
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FOLLOW-UP ACTIVITY 
The information requests for the business 
plan/action plan need to be responded to no later 
than October 9th in order for us to keep the 
program on schedule. We normally allow 
approximately three weeks for this information 
collection process, and would remind you that a 
great deal of attention must be placed upon this 
activity if we are to meet this time frame. 
Physician interview appointments for September 28, 
29 and 30 need to be scheduled immediately. Your 
reinforcement as to the importance of this 
activity is appreciated. 
Under separate cover, a Physician Survey 
instrument has been sent to you for your review. 
This survey instrument is a comprehensive 
inventory of a number of questions that can be 
asked during our interviews with your physicians. 
Frank Dingler will be in contact with you to make 
sure that all the questions that are of concern to 
you are being asked during the course of the 
interviews. 
RECOMMENDED ACTIVITY FOR NEXT VISIT 
1. Conduct physician interviews 
2. Frank Dingler to meet with Jim Maccallum and Gary 
Brown to draft the overall program timetable as it 
pertains to the following: 
a. Physician Network/Business Plan 
b. Physician Referral and Program Information 
System 
c. Emergency Department Marketing Program 
d. Occupational Medicine Program 
e. Outpatient Surgery Marketing Program 
f. Womans Health Services Marketing Program 
g. Behavioral Medicine Center Marketing Program 
h. Data Processing 
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3. Work with management team to assure that data 
collection process is going smoothly. 
4. Discuss occupational health research needs. 
I know that Frank is looking forward to meeting you 
during his visit on September 28. In the meantime, we 
will remain in continual contact with you and your staff 
in order to make sure the project remains on schedule. 
Again, it was a pleasure meeting you last week, and we 
look forward to a most exciting project. 
~;;:;:;;;~It~) lfJ 
Kenneth Arf a 
Executive Vice President 
KA:pp 
cc: Gary Brown, Director of Marketing 
Frank Dingler, Director of Client Services 




:o S Pine Dr;ve 
October 2, 1987 
Mr. Jim Maccallum 
Chief Executive Officer 
Hillcrest Health Center 
2129 s.w. 59th Street 
Oklahoma City, OK 73119 
Dear Jim: 
It was a pleasure meeting you Monday, September 28. 
I was impressed with your management team and their 
dedication to Hillcrest. 
As you know, we spent the entire visit interviewing 
physicians. Once we have reviewed our notes, we will 
summarize the findings and forward the summary to 
you. I do not think there will be any additional 
findings from those I reviewed with you prior to my 
departure. 
In a conversation with Gary Brown today, he indicated 
there was confusion on the part of Hillcrest 
management as to who the PMCI contact is. I am the 
primary contact for Hillcrest and will be responsible 
for coordinating the installation effort. If you 
have urgent problems and I am not in, discuss them 
with Ken. He will inform me of any issues I need for 
coordinating the installation. 
Before I left on Wednesday, September 30, I told 
Carol I could return October 16 to meet with you, 
Pete, Gary and the Price Waterhouse principal about 
data requirements for the network. If the date is 
convenient for Price Waterhouse please let me know. 
Jim, I look forward to this very exciting project. 
With the level of interest I saw during my last 




Director Project Services 
FD:pp 
cc: Gary Brown 
Ken Arf a 





7Q S Pne Drive 
October 19, 1987 
Mr. Jim Maccallum 
Chief Executive Officer 
Hillcrest Health Center 
2129 S.W. 59th Street 
Oklahoma City, OK 73119 
Dear Jim: 
It was a pleasure being in Oklahoma City again. As I 
told you, I am very excited about the Good Neighbor 
Clinic program potential. I believe it will become the 
backbone of your network. I was also pleased to hear 
that your latest occupational health sale will be 
serviced through the Good Neighbor program. 
The following is a synopsis of my visit. 
Activities Conducted October 16, 1987: 
Interviewed Occupational Health sales candidate, 
Vicki Mathews. Discussed her background and how 
she would approach the Occupational Health 
program. Vicki seems motivated and knowledgeable 
about the healthcare industry, hospitals, 
physicians and their interaction. Ken Arfa will 
meet Ms. Mathews during his visit on October 21 
and 22. 
Met with Ed Wiseman, P. Thibeault and Gary Brown 
about Hillcrest's information systems direction. 
Discussed needs for network support from data 
systems. Discussed pre-registration data base 
conceptual design. 
Interviewed Dr. Deiter. He was unable to keep his 
interview appointment during PMCI's physician 
visit. 
Reviewed draft of implementation action plan with 
G. Brown and J. Maccallum. Decided to start 
immediately with Physician Referral System and 
Occupational Health. Emergency Department 
Marketing will follow Occupational Health. 
ker ·=~ioroao 3012J 
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Discussed need for "Good Neighbor" clinics to be 
focus of initial network marketing effort. Need 
perception that hospital is moving and doing 
something positive for doctors. Resolved that 
pre-employment physicals and minor worker's 
compensation injuries will be directed into Good 
Neighbor clinics. G. Brown will develop coupon 
book for occupational health customers to redeem 
free visits. Coupon will be presented to Good 
Neighbor physician who will turn it over to 
hospital for payment. 
Foliow-Up Activity: 
G. Brown, E. Wiseman and c. Adams will visit Tulsa 
on November 18 to view Physician Referral program. 
As soon as site visit is over, Hillcrest needs to 
decide which referral system they will use. The 
service is to be of high priority to help build 
volume to primary care, and especially to Good 
Neighbor clinics. 
G. Brown to visit D.O. primary care locations in 
South Oklah~ma City during October. He will 
explain Occupational Health program and ·how it 
feeds primary care. Only Good Neighbor clinics 
will be reimbursed for providing free occupational 
health services. After a couple more occupational 
health sales, hopefully more practices will see 
the benefit of joining the Good Neighbor program. 
K. Arfa to review Occupational Health program to 
date on his October 21 and 22 visit. After this 
visit, PMCI will prepare specific recommendations 
of program enhancements or changes prior to major 
sales efforts. 
Recommended Activity for Next Visit: 
K. Arfa to interview Occupational Health sales 
candidate and review program. 
Finalize action plan priorities with J. Maccallum 
and G. Brown. 
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Decide next visit for F. Dingler. First or second 
week of November. 
Review November through February's Good Neighbor 
promotions. Decide promotion media and who will 
develop copy. 
Conduct initial assessment for Womans Health 
Services. 
Assess public relations service provisions for 
network programming. 
I will be back again early in November. By that time. 
you should have the next three to four months of Good 
Neighbor promotional campaigns identified. We can then 
tie them into the action plan. 
FD:pp 
cc: Gary Brown 





479 S Pine Drive 
November 12, 1987 
Mr. Jim Maccallum 
Executive Vice President 
Hillcrest Health Center 
2129 s.w. 59th Street 
Oklahoma City, OK 73119 
Dear Jim: 
Below is a synopsis of my November 5-6 visit. Gary and I 
covered our planned agenda, and he and I have agreed on 
the actions that must be accomplished in November. 
General: 
1. Reviewed the initial medical staff data with 
J. Maccallum and G. Brown. Stated that PMCI is 
analyzing the demographic data to pinpoint which 
zip codes are under/over served. J. Maccallum 
agreed to review the initial data, and contact F. 
Dingler if there were any results he did not 
understand or agree with. 
2. Determined the three new marketing/network 
positions. Occupational Health Manager, Physician 
Liaison and Public Relations Director have been 
approved by J. Maccallum. Since their salaries 
will be a significant budget variation, the 
expenditure must be approved by the Board at their 
November 24 meeting. 
3. J. Maccallum and G. Brown will interview a public 
relations candidate on November 10. 
Occupational Health: 
1. Hillcrest has made an offer to Y. Mathews as the 
Occupational Health Manager. Salary and 
commission negotiations are in process with offer 
slated for November 10. F. Dingler reviewed the 
proposed off er and suggested a minor change in the 
commission formula. Suggested the formula be 
reviewed in six months and one year. 
2. Discussed proposed Occupational Health shingled 
folder with G. Brown. He will draft content and 
gain approval before sending it out for design, 
type setting and printing. Idea is to finalize 
content to help reduce production costs. 
Jrker. Colorado 80134 
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3. G. Brown ordered list of South Oklahoma Businesses 
of 30 plus employers. Awaiting delivery of report 
from State Employment Agency. 
Pre-registration: 
1. Outlined contents of the network pre-registration 
data base with E. Wiseman and G. Brown. Also, 
discussed how and who uses the data. Discussed 
possible entry points into data base and their 
needs, including: Hospital inpatient, hospital 
outpatient, marketing, business office, physician 
offices, consumer promotional programs, etc. 
2. Discussed progress in developing consumer benefits 
with G. Brown. He has investigated Amcare and eye 
glass discounts. G. Brown will be meeting with 
YMCA next week. Waiting on a lead from K. Arfa 
before contacting pharmacies. 
3. G. Brown and E. Wiseman will visit Tulsa on 
November 18 to view St. John's PRS. G. Brown will 
be looking at functionality while E. Wiseman will 
concentrate on the pre-registration data base 
aspects. Decision to proceed with PRS must be 
made immediately after visit as ROI needs to be 
prepared for Board approval of hardware and 
software. There is a 60-day lead from order to 
installation (minimum), so any delay could push 
PRS back significantly. 
Emergency Services: 
1. As part of the building project, a new buildinq 
will be constructed in present doctor's parking 
lot. This building will be first phase of 
construction, with completion slated for August 
1988. ER will be moved to new building while old 
ER is remodeled. Signage will be used in interim 
to inform patients of construction and ask 
indulgence. No temporary changes to present ER 
are planned in interim. 
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fhYsician Support: 
1. G. Brown is to visit each Good Neighbor Clinic 
physician and as many other general practice 
physicians as_ possible between now and year end. 
He will explain Occupational Health program and 
other planned programs. He intends to solicit 
suggestions, complaints and answer questions. - He 
will also use the opportunity to sign up 
additional physicians in Good Neighbor Clinic. 
2. Toured Dr. Nichol's vacant office. Facility is 
modern and very well layed out with good location. 
The hospital should assist in finding a 
physician(s) who wants a practice location. Once 
an individual is found, PMCI can work with 
Hillcrest in developing an appropriate support 
package for the new doctor as part of the 
physician support program. 
3. Interviewed Dr. Keith, general surgeon. Dr. Keith 
was unavailable during PMCI's initial interviews. 
Dr. Keith's comments were in line with comments 
made by previously interviewed doctors. 
4. Good Neighbor Clinic doctors are responding very 
positively to initial consumer promotions. 
G. Brown will solicit additional ideas for 
promotion campaigns during his clinic visits. 
Goal is to have a different promotion monthly. 
Hillcrest will try to get agreement on 10-12 
promotions, so the promotions are not repeated to 
often. 
Women's Health: 
l. Performed a women's health audit with L. Sewell, 
RN. F. Dingler will send audit questions to 
L. Sewell as a tool for what needs to-be done in 
designing women's health. 
Follow-Up Activities: 
....-:- K. Arf a will attempt to discover status of South 
Communities Occupational health program and 'report 
results to J. Maccallum. 
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Presentation of network potential occupancy 
increases and financial impact on hospital to· 
Finance Committee at their November 24 meeting. 
G. Brown and F. Dingler to review progress to date 
via telephone conversation. 
4. G. Brown to pull a sample of ER undoctor patients 
and determine how many were referred and results. 
ER says they refer these patients, primary care 
complains they only get poor paying patients 
through the program. 
is Finalize consumer benefit package. 
-P:- Send womens health audit to L. Sewell. 
~ Call Dr. Mobley on phone. Unable to meet with him 
this last visit. 
Draft shingle content of Occupational Health Phase 
I package. 
Begin V. Mathews orientation. 
Jim, we are making real progress - particularly in 
Occupational Health and Good Neighbor Clinic physician 
acceptance. The next month will see continued progress 
in these programs, as well as major progress in selecting 
and planning the installation of PRS. If you have any 
questions or problems, please call. 
Sincerely, 
-r~~tfngler 
Director, Project Services 
FD:pp 
cc: Ken Arf a ''7 
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December 23, 1987 
Mr. Jim Maccallum 
Chief Executive Officer 
Hillcrest Health Center 
2129 S.W. 59th Street 
Oklahoma City, OK 73119 
Dear Jim: 
I hope you have a wonderful holiday break, and I enjoyed 
visiting with you last week. I am listing below those 
activities that were conducted on December 17 and 18. I 
am also outlining the follow-up activities that need to 
occur in preparation for next months programing. 
ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED ON DECEMBER 17th and 18th 
Met with Dr. Mobley to discuss potential practice 
acquisition. Dr. Mobley currently has an office 
with four treatment rooms, plus an emergency 
treatment area. The patient waiting area has 
enough seating for approximately 20 persons. 
There is an x-ray unit and a separate lab area, 
along with an x-ray technician. Dr. Mobley 
desires to either sell his practice or to divest 
it altogether. His incentive to scale down his 
practice is the numerous hours of management 
required by the practice. Dr. Mobley would be 
willing to continue working at that location if he 
did not have to dedicate his time to practice 
management. He would be willing to either, (a} 
sell the practice, (b} have an entity manage the 
practice, or (c} have a new intern take over the 
practice and purchase the practice based on a 
percent of revenue collected. I indicated that I 
would speak to Hillcrest management about 
performing the following services for him: 
a. The Physician Liaison Representative would 
assess his practice and distribute sale 
information to other physicians in the 
community. 
b. We will contact the OU Medical School, and 
the UC.Medical School in Tulsa to identify 
potential candidates for practice buyout. 
c. Hillcrest Health Center will speak with all 
interns to determine their interest in the 
practice. 
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d. Hillcrest Health Center will inquire into 
potential management companies that might be 
willing to provide management of the practice 
in exchange for a percentage of revenues 
collected. 
Dr. Mobley appeared to be very satisfied in terms of 
the follow-up work that we reviewed, and he understands 
the hospital's position in term of being unable to 
purchase his practice due to political and financial 
constraints. 
Furnished Gary Brown with Physician Liaison 
advertisement to fill that position when 
appropriate. 
Review the status of the letters that were sent to 
HHC physicians to inquire about their willingness 
to participate in various marketing programs. 
Worked on the development of the Consumer Benefit 
Package and Occupational Health Package. 
Discussed Physician Referral Program. South 
Community Hospital will be receiving the Baxter 
Travenol Software package any day now. Our market 
intelligence sources indicate that they are in the 
process of installing the IBM System II, however, 
they are awaiting delivery which may take several 
months. The Baxter Travenol software will thus 
not be put into effect until they receive the 
delivery of hardware. 
Created final name recommendations for the 
Consumer Health Package "Connection Card", along 
with other recommended names such as "The Senior 
Connection", The VIP Connection", "The Womens 
Health Connection", etc. 
Completed final recommendations for the yellow 
pages ad, and other promotion related to PRS. 
Met with the physician marketing committee, and 
explained the marketing program proposals. 
Received initial support for all programs 
including Occupational Health Marketing, Emergency 
Services Marketing, Physician Referral Services, 
and the Physician Liaison function. The 
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physicians reviewed major services they felt would 
be in demand, and stressed the importance of 
laying the ground work for an information system 
which would support reimbursement activities in 
their offices. Thus, computer support services 
were heavily supported. PMC recommends that HHC 
consider the installation of two or three test 
sites. 
During the meeting, the physicians also expressed 
their initial endorsement of using the name "South 
Oklahoma City Physician Referral Service". 
Met with Dr. Dieter and partner to discuss the 
marketing of OB services. In brief, follow-up 
activities were listed as follows: 
1. Intensified marketing to general 
practitioners to invite their referrals. 
This should include continuing medical 
education activity. 
2. Encourage increased referrals from the 
emergency department of paying patients. 
3. Promote OB services through targeted 
occupational health accounts that have a high 
percentage of females in the working force. 
4. Explore affiliations with tertiary hospitals 
that can provide backup services for high 
risk delivery cases. 
5. Promote $50 mammographies and other health 
specials to employers and the general public. 
6. Offer discounts on gynecology assessments 
promoted to the public and occupational 
health accounts. 
7. Heavily promote Ob/Gyn physicians through the 
physician referral services. 
8. Utilize HHC agreements such as the Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield PPO provider and Prucare 
contract to increase Ob/Gyn referrals. 
Mr. Jim Maccallum 
December 23, 1987 
Page -4-
9. Survey remote DO physicians to see if they 
wish local Ob/Gyn's to perform diagnostic 
procedures such as Colposcopies and 
ultrasounds, possibly at reduced or no 
charge. Also, survey physicians to assess 
demand for Indametrio Biopsies. 
10. Explore Ob/Gyn needs in communities such as 
Shawnee, El Reno, Harrah, and Mustang. 
FOLLOW-UP ACTIVITIES 
Complete remote survey instrument, and mail out 
first few weeks in January. 
Advert~~r the Physician Liaison position. 
Collect and tabulate the results of the physician 
marketing letter that was sent out. 
Complete the consumer benefit package including 
Amcare benefits, and complete the Occupational 
Health package. 
Have Pete review discounting percentage package, 
and finalize this benefit. 
PMC to furnish HHC with "Health Yourself" 
document. 
PMC to furnish HHC with remainder of the general 
business plan package. 
HHC to determine hardware and software for PRS 
system, along with pre-registration hardware and 
software package. 
~dical Coordinator needed for physician support 
0rogram. /I'm):,~ ? 
(~~cupational Health Medical ,Di~ector needs to be 
~rmally endorsed. ]}:de . .1'>/:j11,f. ; 
The Network Physician Advisory Committee needs to 
be finalized and endorsed. C»UE' 
The finance committee needs to approve a budget 
for the physician support network program. 
Mr. Jim Maccallum 
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Graphic work for the "Connection Card" and all 
related collateral materials need to be developed. 
The Public Relations Director needs to be 
recruited as soon as possible, and in the interim 
materials immediately necessary need to go into 
production through contractual arrangements. 
The Physician Referral Service ads and 
announcements to the community need to take place 
as soon as possible. 
Patient lists from the emergency room for 
undoctored patients need to be finalized. 
The employee and employe~ zip code analysis needs 
to be completed. C LrJS£.IC 
Practice Management contract resources in the 
community need to be identified. 
Collection agencies need to be assessed for 
inclusion in the physician benefit package. 
In January, Deborah Martin from PMCI needs to 
visit with HHC to draft the Woman's Health 
Promotion plan. 
Thank you for your attention to the above matters, and I 
will be looking forward to seeing you next month. 
Sincerely, 
Kenneth Arfa 
Executive Vice President 
KA:pp 




January 12, 1988 
Mr. Jim Maccallum 
Executive Vice President 
Hillcrest Health Center 
2129 s.w. 59th Street 
Oklahoma City, OK 73119 
Dear Jim: 
I wish I could say I enjoyed the wonderful weather last 
week! I never thought I'd ever look forward to getting 
back to the winter weather in Denver - as they say, 
there's always a first time! Below is my trip report. 
Activities Conducted on January 5-7: 
- Completed remote physician mail-out survey instrument. 
- Determined automation system plans for PRS. 
- Helped acquire approval for preliminary network 
staffing from Mr. Myro. 
- Met with Mike Reger (market intelligence). 
- Furnished HHC with vendor agreement guidelines for the 
consumer benefit package. 
- Provided HHC with the Manual Physician Referral System. 
- Provided HHC with the Employer Cost Containment program 
to be included with the consumer benefit package. 
Follow-Up Activities: 
- Complete Phase I of the Occupational Health Promotional 
package. 
- Meet with ER medical Director re: Occupational Health 
program and Emergency Marketing. 
- Meet with Dr. Hughes and Dr. King for update session. 
- Meet with Pete regarding Occupational Health program. 
- Plan next meeting for Network Physician Advisory 
Committee. 
- Coordinate as appropriate with Board Finance 
479 S Pine Drive Committee/Chairman. 
~rker. Colorado 80134 
03) 841-3393 
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- Help HHC prepare master marketing budget. 
- Deborah Martin, of PMCI, to meet with Ors. Dieter and 
Motz, and OB Coordinator to prepare Womens Health 
Marketing plan. 
- Meet with new PR Coordinator and Practice Liaison 
candidates. 
- Meet with Practice Management contract candidates. 
- Work on completion of Connection Card Campaign and all 
related promotional pieces. 
- Arrange for BMC marketing plan initial marketing audit. 
- Gary Brown needs to send follow-up letter to Dr. Dieter 
and partner (see December 23rd trip report}. 
I am scheduled to arrive on my next trip at approximately 
10:30.a.m. on Thursday, January 21st .. I expect to be on 
site until Friday at about 3:00 p.m. I'll look forward 
to seeing you then! 
Sincerely, 
<)--/ .. · 
/JA/ -
Kenneth Arf a 
Executive Vice President 
KA:pp 




479 S Pine Drive 
February 12, 1988 
Mr. Jim Maccallum 
Executive Vice President 
Hillcrest Health Center 
2129 S.W. 59th Street 
Oklahoma City, OK 73119 
Dear Mr. Maccallum: 
I would like to recap the activities of my visit to your 
hospital on February 10. First, however, I was disappointed 
that I did not get to meet you. Nevertheless, I was given a 
thorough tour of the hospital and was introduced to many of 
your managers by Gary Brown. 
Physician Referral 
I met with Gary Brown at length to set strategies for 
promotion and support of the PRS line. I suggested rev~sions 
to the yellow pages ad which Gary adopted. I met with Setty 
Overstreet to provide initial training and advice regarding 
operation of the PRS line. This proved to be a very timely 
intervention on our part which will enhance her ability to 
handle inquiries on kickoff day, February. 15, 1988 •. I also 
met with Pete Thibeault regarding the "Advanced Revelations" 
alternative to the System 36. PMCI does not object to this 
alternative, if it can be shown to operate as promised. Its 
projected cost-effectiveness is dramatic. 
Behavioral Medicine Center 
I met with Betty Chase and discussed the key ingredients of 
our contract to provide marketing support to BMC. She gave 
me a briefing on the organization, operations, and strengths 
of her department. She also related the perceived new 
threats in the market. Since 1988 is a very critical year 
for BMC, it is important to intervene quickly to increase the 
involvement of the medical staff in BMC. The interface with 
the PRS line was discussed as one mechanism for that purpose. 
Occupational Medicine 
Vicki Matthews briefed me on the development of collateral 
materials for sales calls. Gary Brown provided me with 
copies of the draft materials: a three-fold brochure and a 
re-formatted loose folder version of the bound document. 
Vicki's goals are to enroll four companies per month between 
February and April. We discussed the advisability of 
concentrating on companies located in the general vicinity of 
Hillcrest. 
Jrker. Colorado 80134 
>03] 841-3393 
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AmCare 
I discussed with Gary Brown strategies for attaining closure 
with AmCare for the benefits package. After some 
brainstorming, I recommended that Mr. Maccallum contact the 
Executive Director to propose the following: Connection Card 
holders will be encouraged to subscribe to AmCare. Since 
AmCare's annual subscription runs October, 1988 - September, 
1989, Connection Card holders who pre-pay for 88-89 this 
spring would be covered free prior to October. 
If you cannot effect this or a similar agreement, Mr. Myro 
should be asked to intervene. 
Connection Lines 
I would like to clarify one point regarding the telemarketing 
program. Three separate lines will be promoted: South 
Oklahoma City Physician Referral, the Women's Connection 
Line, and a multipurpose Connection Line. All would be 
answered by the PRS operator, and all would employ the same 
hardware/software configuration. 
Follow-up Activities 
I will continue to advise the PRS operator as needed. I will 
also schedule a return visit to advance the Behavioral 
Medicine component of our marketing contract. 
My compliments to Hillcrest. The hospital and personnel made 
for an enjoyable and productive visit. 
Sincerely, 
Todd Hamilton 
Director, Client Services 
TH:pp 
cc: Gary Brown 





M E M 0 R A N D U M 
Jim Mccallum 
!Cen Arf a ~ 
February 25-26, 1988 Trip Report 
February 26, 1988 
============================================================== 
Below are those activities that were conducted, and those that 
need to take place before my next visit. Jim, there are some 
areas concerning project action delays which I would like to 
address in this trip report. They relate to Network Information 
Systems, Print Media Production, and project focus regarding Gary 
Brown's time. 
NETWORK INFORMATION SYSTEMS: 
Two weeks ago we were advised that Hillcrest did not wish to 
select the System 36. In that there was a preferred local 
alternative. While we seriously hope this alternative is the 
right answer for Hillcrest, we need more information about the 
progress being made with the physician referral software 
development, and with pre-registration software development. 
Please under.stand that the St. John's software we recommended 
took us almost one year to develop in conjunction with that 
hospital. While I hope the "advanced revelations" package is 
able to meet your needs, Rich has some serious concerns that the 
development of these programs will require excessive time demands 
on your staff. Consequently, this could result in delays to our 
action time table. 
Finally, please remember that our contractual committment in 
Network Data Systems is limited to the review of software 
requirements and the identification of development requirements. 
As for the physician referral program, our contractual obligation 
is to "select a computer software package". As HHS has choosen 
not to adopt our selection and rather develop its own software, 
we cannot be responsible for any resulting delays or program 
consequences in the action plan. 
Next week, you, Pete, and Gary will be receiving our functional 
design recommendations for the Network Control System with 
response to Appendix I(H) in our contract. At this point we 
await internal decisions at Hillcrest regarding your hardware and 




made, it is important that your information systems department 
coordinate with Rick Ekwall to further discuss interface with the 
various components of the Physician Network Program. If you have 
any questions ab9ut this, please let me know. 
PRINT MEDIA PRODUCTION 
The HHC PR coordinator internal budget vacancy delays and 
employee turn-over has delayed the design and production of the 
following: 
o Pre-registration materials 
o Physician referral brochure 
o Occupational health materials 
Even with a full-time PR Director, it is unreasonable to expect 
design of all these materials to be done in-house. The time and 
equipment is simply not available. I am glad that you have 
agreed to proceed with this activity on a contractual basis. It 
is imparative that these materials be ready for production in two 
to three weeks, so we can share them with the Physician Marketing 
Committee, and not lose precious timing. 
MARKETING DIRECTOR'S TIME 
Gary's time is continuing to be pre-occupied with many non-
network distractions. These include special events, public 
relations functions, etc. While I hope that the new PR Director 
position will resolve t~is problem, it is imparative that these 
distractions be cut to a minimum. Our plans have always called 
for a full-time director on-site. HHC agreed to commit to this 
at the onset of the project. 
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH 
There are three target markets that Viki Matthews needs to focus 
her attention upon. These three markets should be quite 
lucrative for HHC: 
o Vendor companys in Oklahoma City that supply HHC 
o Board member contact companies 
o Company contacts through the medical staff 
HHC should also consider a "business advisory board" for the 
occupational health program. This advisory board should help HHC 




PHYSICIAN MARKETING STEERING COMMITTEE 
Follow-up: 
o Eligibility criteria for the Physician Referral Service 
needs to be discussed and approved at the next meeting. 
o A special inventory of physician capabilities at HHC. 
that can be promoted to remote areas needs to be 
conducted. 
o Patient lists for the connection card need to be 
collected from participating physicians. 
o Physician office brochures and application forms for 
pre-registration need to be distributed. This function 
will eventually be performed by the physician 
representative. 
o Physician front off ice staff need to be educated 
regarding the physician referral service and the pre-
registration program. 
o The Good Neighbor Clinic promotions in Diabetes 
Screening and Mammography this Spring need to be tied 
into the Connection Card mail-out and promotions. 
NETWORK ADMINISTRATIVE TASK FORCE 
We are at the point in the project that it will be extremely 
important for an on-going Network Administrative Task Force to 
meet each time we visit. This task force will be involved in 
every facet of network activity, and I would recommend that you 
consider the following participants: ·CEO Chief Financial 
Officer, Marketing Director, Director of Information Systems, 
Director of the Business Office, Occupational Health Manager, 
Public Relations Director, Physician Liaison Representative, 
::P.r:~:~:~r ~i~e;t;1i:1~~1r;;z.:~o~~:!.J ~~f~s~v~~~a~~1ili::~~~~S~1"~:~~~ .. :~:~;KKe 
Wt~1 L~t,,Kf/-<i..- J (ic.f:r'UAs·eiJ)1,/<'<- f!>((;....,,vr..-11 1 17':.'fh, Ci'-"'1)~· 
This committee will meet for the purpose of being directly 
involved in network activity, and for the purpose of providing 
input into the process. We need to instill a sense of ownership 
among all participants and make sure that all participants are 
well educated about the importance of the program. At each 
meeting, appropriate tasks will be assigned to make sure that the 
program has continuity. If there are any revisions, additions, 
or deletions that you feel need to be made on this list, please 
let me know. 
WOMAN'S HEALTH PROGRAM 
I am enclosing a copy of the Woman's Health Report relating to 




exception of the budget figures has been forwarded to Dr. Deiter 
tor his review and comment. 
BEHAVIORAL MEDICINE CENTER 
Todd Hamilton is planning on visiting BMC to work on the BMC 
Marketing Plan within the next few weeks. He will coordinate his 
visit with you, Gary Brown, and Betty Chase. When he arrives on 
this visit, it is important that the following information be 
ready: 
o Census by month per unit 1986 - 1987. 
o Number of admits by referral source and category 1986 -
1987. 
o Number of a~issions by admittor. 
o Patient orgin of admissions. 
o Any previous attitude studies, awareness studies, 
level satisfaction reports. 
o Current physician relations strategy. 
o Data on crisis line calls and disposition. 
We have concerns over the low percentage of direct physician 
referrals to the BMC. Other site programs dealing with general 
adult, adult CD and adolescent CD has much higher percentages of 
direct physician admissions. As a part of our contract 
obligation, Todd Hamilton will also plan to interview several 
·physicians to learn more about referral issues. I am enclosing-a 
draft outline of the Marketing Plan for your review. 
Jim, I will be speaking with you soon to schedule my next visit, 
which will hopefully be in conjunction with your next board 
meeting. At that time we can also discuss Debbie Martin's next 
site visit. Thank you for your attention to these matters, and 
please contact me if you have any questions. 
KA:sm 





M E M 0 R A N D U M 
TO: Jim Maccallum 
FROM: Ken Arfa~tf/. 
SUBJECT: Trip Report, March 16 through March 18, 1988 
.. 
DATE: March 25, 1988 
============================================================ 
Below are the activities conducted during our recent visit, and 
the follow-up activities that need to be addressed: 
Activities Conducted: 
o Reviewed pre-registration, physician referral, and 
occupational health promotional materials with Denise 
York, Teresa, and Gary. 
o Met with Physician Marketing Committee. 
o Met with Ob/Gyn physicians to discuss Women's Health 
Plans. 
o Discussed Occupational Health Sales Strategies with 
Viki Mathews. 
o· Discussed PRS program with Betty Overstreet. 
o Met with Wanda Lewellen to prepare for employee 
orientation regarding Connection Card. 
o Presented orientation to the Network Administrative 
Task Force. (Rich Ekwall was present.) 
o Met with Pete to discuss System 36 VS Advanced 
Revelation Package. (Rich Ekwall was present.) 
Follow-Up: 
Pre-Registration: 
1. F·a-..erable account patient listings need to be generated as 
soon as possible, and keyed in. 
2. Denese ¥erk needs to have all printing completed within ~he 
~next two to ~hree weeks. 
- ., I Profession< 
·. ~ Marketing 
1111" Consultan 
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3. Arrangements need to be made for mail-out preparation and 
fulfillment. 
4. Physician office patient lists need to be collected through 
a request from Dr. Hughes and purged from hospital master 
list. 
5. PrewRegis-tration app-1-ieation forms need to be printed. 
6. eonnection Cards ne-e-d-- -to go into final production (Gold 
eards need-to-be-ordered). 
7. Mailinq lists -troJILthird party insurers need to be obtained 
if possible, -,. and duplicate names !)Urged from HHC mas-ter 
.l-is-t-.--- . \) c (. . .-~)I~ "" 
8. A special insert for the Connection Card mail piece on 
family screening at Good Neighbor Clinics, physician 
referral, and Woman's Health Screening Special, needs to be 
developed. 
9. The copy on the Connection Card brochure and direct mail 
piece program description needs to be changed to include 
a basic description of non-health related discount 
benefits (Anthony's, Tires, etc.). 
10. ~Wanda Lewellen-· needs to follow-up on non-health related 
.., discounts. -
11. Todd Hamilton or Cindy Martinez need to visit to "train 
the trainers" for the Connection Card orientation program. 
Physician Referral Services: 
1. ER uudo~s must be provided to Betty Overstreet. 
F-or--s-ome-rn-son·, there- is a lack of cooperation which needs 
"to--be I ectified. 
2. ·The hardwar-e----a-nd. software for the System 36 needs to be 
~--
3. Newsrrapet prome-t-ion .• _ and the posters, needs to be placed on 
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Occupational Health: 
1. Viki needs to have the HHC purchasing director make 
appointments for her off the vendor list. 
2. Employee contacts through HHC employees need to be 
acquired during the Connection Card orientation session. 
3. A drop package needs to be produced by April 15. This 
should include independent summary sheets that can be 
used interchangably. (This should also include the discount 
program.) 
4. The employee nurse program needs to be discussed at the 
next Physician Marketing Committee meeting. 
Physician Marketing Committee: 
Follow-up letter from Dr. Glensky needs to be sent outlining: 
a. Policy on physician eligibility. 
b. Rights of committee to modify participation 
requirements in order to protect the integrity of 
the program. 
c. Screening program offer as recommended by the 





The Physician Marketing Committee and Ob/Gyn department 
needs to write letters to the Med Executive Committee 
and Board requesting support for a Women's Health Center 
Program. 
Women's health special promotion needs to be developed 
put into the direct mail piece for the May Connection 
d campaign. 









1. Betty Overstreet to have Physician Sub-Specialty list and 
outpatien~ diagnostic inventory completed by March 31st. 
/k/C.. 
2. Physician benefit package needs to be developed. 
3. Liaison position needs to be filled in April. 
4. Physician purchasing company issue needs to be explored. 
I am looking forward to the Board presentation on March 22nd, and 
will see you then. In the meantime, if I can answer any 
questions regarding the above items, please let me know. 
Sincerely yours, 
Kenneth I. Arfa 







April 8, 1988 
Mr. Jim Maccallum 
Administrator 
Hillcrest Health Center 
2127 SW 59th Street 
Oklahoma City, OK 73119 
Dear Mr. Maccallum: 
Following is a recap of marketing activities at Hillcrest on 
April 6 and 7, 1988. It was especially productive to attain 
closure on the software issue for the Connection Card and I am 
very hopeful that Information Services will be able to provide 
the promised support. 
Activities Conducted 
o Start-up conference with Mr. Maccallum. 
o Planning conference with Betty Chase and Lou Neimens. 
Subsequently drafted objectives and instrument for 
interviewing referring physicians. Obtained their review of 
instrument. Obtained list of target physicians. Also, 
discussed role of Dr. Mel Kolb. BMC's present need is for 
his technical assistance and advice regarding the open staff 
model. Their preference is to schedule his on-site visit 
tor July, when Dr. Neller can be on-site. 
o Conducted series of meetings with Mr. Maccallum, Mr. 
Thibeault, Mr. Weisman, Mr. Brown and Mr. Vanderwater re: 
Connection Card Software. The executive decision was to 
assign Information Systems the responsibility for developing 
the software with their recommended D-base code. Earlier, 
Mr. Maccallum decided to defer installation of the Advanced 
Revelation Physician Referral Software until such time as it 
can be demonstrated that automation is required (by volume 
of calls, complexity of referrals, and tracking 
requirements). 
o Composed letter for Dr. Hughes signature requesting 
physicians to provide mailing lists for the Connection Card. 
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o Provided report of remote physicians survey to Mr. Maccallum 
and Mr. Brown. 
o Provided proposed job description of Data/Benefits 
Coordinator to Mr. Maccallum and Mr. Brown. 
o Met with Ms. Wanda Lewellen re: a) assessment of project 
progress: b) non-health discounts package from recreational 
areas: and c) Connection Card orientation. "Training the 
Trainers" is scheduled for April 25. Employee orientation 
is scheduled for the following days. 
o Met with Drs. Motz and King re: Women's Health Center, Baby 
Express, and Connection Card incentives for women. 
o Met with Dr. Glinsky re: Physician Referral, Pre-
registration, Women's Health Center, Employee Nurse 
Programs, Business Office Staff Training, Physician 
Marketing Committee Meeting Agenda, and communication with 
MEC and Board. 
Follow-up: 
Pre-registration (Connection Card) 
1. Information Services to develop D-base code for the 
Connection Card with outside support as required to meet 
deadlines. PMCI and Marketing to define features for 
inclusion. 
2. Marketing to provide copies of prepared materials and status 
report/schedule of remaining materials. 
3. Marketing to confirm mailing house, embossing, and 
fulfillment arrangements. 
4. Data/Benefits Coordinator needs to be recruited and placed. 
For the interim, Betty Overstreet will input lists. 
However, this must be limited or it will adversely affect 
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5. Marketing to obtain Dr. Hughes' signature for letter to 
physicians re: mailing lists. 
6. Marketing to prepare "Initial Ob/Gyn Screening" invitation 
for inclusion in package. Thia will be reviewed by the 
Ob/Gyn staff on April 13. 
Physician Referral 
1. Marketing to prepare media plan and budget. 
Occupational Health 
1. Vicky Matthews needs to make use of Jim Osborn's assistance 
re: vendor contacts. 
2. Drop package MUST be produced. 
Behavior Medicine Center 
1. Betty Chase and Lou Neimens to review final interview 
instrument (attached). 
2. Administration to schedule interviews per attached list and 
schedule, for April 27-28. 
3. Todd Hamilton and Dr. Kolb to provide consultation re: Open 
Staff Model. 
4. Dr. Kolb to consult on-site in July (tentative) per BMC 
request. 
5. Interim Marketing Strategies recommendations to be submitted 
within 10 days of physician interviews. 
Physician Support 
1. Betty Overstreet to continue obtaining Physician 
Subspecialty list and outpatient diagnostic inventory. 
r-,. - Professional Marketing Consultan~ 
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2. Benefits for Physician Services Directory need to be 
drafted; Jim Osborn to review and edit/enhance draft re: 
group purchasing opportunities. 
3. 
4. 
PMCI and Marketing to submit memorandum re: implicationsl 
for the Network of the Rural Physicians Survey. r-J 
Administration should contract with Nicholas Hahalis, for 3 
months, for physician liaison. Mr. Hahalis should initially 
identify specific "coding for reimbursement" concerns of 
doctors. This should be communicated to Sonja Hooks prior 
to May ~nd workshop. During Ms. Hooks on-site visit she 
should interview Mr. Hahalis and provide her assessment of 
his strengths and weaknesses to Administration. 
Women's Health 
1. Ob/Gyn meeting on April 13 to address: 
a) representation on Physician Marketing committee (PMCI 
recommends nominating Dr. Motz to Dr. Hughes) 
b) rename "Baby Express" 
c) review proposed "initial visit invitation" for Connection 
Card mailing 
d) endorsement of Women's Health Center plan to MEC and 
Board 
Budgets 
1. Per Mr. MacCallum's direction, PMCI and Marketing will 
prepare an all-inclusive marketing budget for FY 88-89 
addressing all PMCI recommendations, as well as routine 
hospital marketing, PR, etc. 
Miscellaneous 
1. Given the expected lack of success in acquiring third party 
payors' subscribers lists, Hillcrest will, as an alternative 
strategy convene a meeting between Administration, 
Marketing, CompMed, and PMCI to establish cross sales 
strategies. PMCI's role will be to elevate the discussions 
r-,. - Professiona Marketing Consultant! 
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from the present level of interpersonal to that of inter-
institutional dialogue for the purpose of establishing a de-
facto marketing consortium. 
2. Information Systems and Marketing should supply to the PRS 
Coordinator: 
a) better office lighting 
b) multi-line phone with headset 
c) auto-feed copy stand (with lighted magnification) to 
facilitate reading/inputting from printouts. 
Jim, we are looking forward to returning on the week of April 25 
(Cindy Martinez - Monday, and Todd Hamilton - Wednesday and ,;lk> 
Thursday). Thank you for your hospitality and decisiveness 
during my time' on-site. 
Sincerely, 
JmyJ~ 
Todd c. Hamilton 
Director of Client Services 
Attachments 
1. Letter to target physicians re: BMC interviews 
2. BMC Interview Instrument 
3. Interview Schedule 
4. Physicians to be interviewed 
5. Agenda for Physician Marketing Committee 
cc: Gary Brown 






To: Jim Maccallum, Pete Thibeault, Gary Brown &: Staff. 
From: Todd Hamilton 
Date: June 9, 1988 
Subject: Trip Report June 6 &: 7, 1988 
***************************************************************** 
Once again, I enjoyed my visit to Hillcrest Health Center. This 
visit focused on numerous details identified in Ken's previous 
correspondence. 
Activities Conducted 
o Briefing and Exit Conferences· with Jim Maccallum. 
o Submission of Draft ER Marketing Plan. 
o Preliminary report and clarification of goals with Lou 
Neidens (BMC} . 
o Consultation with Gary Brown re: Budgets, Personnel Issues, 
Sofiware/Hardware Requirements, etc. 
o Meeting with Physician Steering Committee re: Project 
status, mailing lists, and patient enrollment. 
o Observed Marketing Department's presentation to General 
Orientation. 
o Meetings with Pete Thibeault, Eddie Wiseman, Gary McElwez 
re: Hardware/Software requirements. 
o Conference with Nick Hahalis re: Practice Audits, Referring 
Physician Research, and Physician Services Directory. 
o Meeting with Wanda Llewellen re: Connection Card 
Orientation and personnel issues. 
I 
o Meeting with Pete Thibeault, Barbara Reeves, Shane Burge, 





o Meeting with Vicky Mathews re: Good Neighbor Clinic 
Guidelines and operational issues pertaining to occupational 
health sales and staffing, and Advisory Board. 
o Meeting with Betty Overstreet re: Physician Referral 
activity, reports, and policies. 
FOLLOW-UP REQUIRED 
General Administrative 
o Since new off ice space has been dedicated in the Medical 
Building, immediate attention must be given to telephone and 
computer linkages with the hospital. 
o Since PMCI submitted the requir.ed budget report spreadsheet, 
Gary Brown needs to break out the figures and report them to 
PMCI by 6-17. 
o Tracking reports have been developed by PMCI and are 
attached. 
Connection Card ·Program 
o As suggested at the Physician Steering Committee, admit 
packages should be provided to physicians offices due to the 
large numbers of "direct admit" patients. I would 
appreciate it if Pete could address this to Barbara Reeves 
for ·.implementation by June 17. 
o Pete also needs to monitor the Preparations by Admitting, 
ER, and lab for combined training re: Connection Card. 
Barbara, Shane and Bob agreed to set the training, with 
marketing and DP's assistance, within two weeks. 
o Bob Reynolds also volunteered to draft the protocol for 
cholesterol screenings, and to send it to PMCI for review. 
o Marketing is conducting Connection Card Orientation for new 
employees on the first Monday of each month. Since the card 
goes live soon, employees should begin enrolling during the 
next General Orientation. Additionally only 297 of the 600 
HHC employees reportedly attended the initial training 
sessions. The remainder should be trained within a month. 
o Administration, Personnel and Marketing have all endorsed 
filling the Data/Benefits Coordination position. This 
should be a high priority for Gary. The better candidates 




o The enrollment software will reportedly be complete by June 
10, excluding report writing. A copy should be submitted to 
PMCI for testing, since we have only received onsite 
demonstrations. 
o Gary is collecting quotes for three PC's (ER, Admitting, 
Connection Line) upon which the card files will be stored 
and accessed pending installation of the LAN. These quotes 
. should be called into PMCI ASAP for submission to Jim 
Maccallum. 
Physician Referral/Telemarketing 
o PMCI reviewed the correspondence which was sent to 
Physicians re: financial screening. Replies to that should 
be attached to Betty's Monthly report. 
o A consolidated monthly report is attached. Please evaluate 
this in lieu of current multiple forms prior to the end of 
June. 
o Mr. Thibeault decided that an external source for PRS 
software was needed. Current contenders are National Health 
Enhancement Systems or Advanced Revelation. An early 
decision would be welcomed, and will certainly enhance this 
exemplary program. 
Occupational Health 
o The.draft guidelines for Good Neighbor Clinics need to be 
reviewed by that committee. Gary should inform us of the 
schedule and the outcome. 
o A temporary 3-11 shift Clinic Coordinator has been 
identified beginning July 1. Gary and Vicky need to work 
with her while continuing to recruit for full-time day shift 
coverage·~ 
o The Drop Package components have been submitted for PMCI's 
review. Please proceed with sche~uling printing. 
o Vicky needs to write up by June 17 the competitive 
information obtained, and submit it to PMCI. Additionally, 
revisions to previously critiqued.protocols need to pe sent 
to PMCI. 
o Before our next onsite visit, Vicky needs to have organiz~d 




Physician Support Services 
o The Directory is progressing nicely. Nick or Teresa need 
to notify us weekly re: status. Nick should also send us a 
proposed Table of Contents, and the corrected drafts (thus 
far), by June 17. 
o The Admitting Department has been asked by Nick to continue 
collecting referring physician's data~ Nick's analysis will 
chart the "from-to" of referrals as well as identifying the 
"from". 
o The Physicians Support Business Plan and the automatic 
Connection Card enrollment need to be drafted prior to our 
next visit. 
Emergency Services 
o The draft ER Plan needs to be reviewed in detail by Gary and 
discussed with Dr. Askins and the ER manager. At our next 
onsite visit we need to have a meeting with those people to 
discuss the timing of implementation given the construction. 
o On June 13 Lou Neidens and Betty Chase will draft the 
previously requested memo outlining Dr. Kolb's specific 
consultation function. This will be rushed to me, and I 
will·. immediately follow-up with Mel. The consultation will 
be conducted between June 15 and 30. 
Summary 
This was very productive trip, and also instructive, I think, for 
Denis D'Amico. I was pleased to see how receptive the HHC staff 
were regarding his association with PMCI. 
Since our next strategy session will be offsite, we cannot 
specify the next onsite visit date, but will work that out by 
telephone. 
Attachments 
1. Sample form for collecting referring physician data in 
Admissions. 
2. Tracking Reports 
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